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ABSTRACT 
  
Individuals account for more than a quarter of chapter 11 bankruptcy filings, 
and this share has grown over time.  For individuals, chapter 11 is more expensive 
and complicated than the much more common chapter 13 because the applicable 
rules are a hybrid of those that apply in chapter 13 and those that apply to entities in 
chapter 11.  Some debtors may be forced into chapter 11 by chapter 13's debt limits, 
but many debtors who are eligible for chapter 13 choose chapter 11.  Perhaps the 
hybrid nature of individual chapter 11 cases is justified because the individuals who 
use chapter 11 look like a blend of the typical chapter 13 debtor and a small 
business: they have much greater assets, debts, income and expenses, and the 
overwhelming majority are operating some type of business.  Real estate also plays 
a significant role in chapter 11.  We find that more than a third of individual chapter 
11 debtors confirm a plan and avoid dismissal or conversion for at least 881 days, 
and that this rate is higher for jointly filed cases, cases filed by experienced 
attorneys and cases with substantial real estate.  The rate is lower in cases filed pro 
se and cases in which the debtor does not expect to distribute assets to general 
creditors.  We further find that involuntary chapter 11 cases are almost non-existent; 
the fear of involuntary servitude through bankruptcy is more of a theoretical than an 
empirical problem. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior empirical research has taught us a great deal about individuals1 who file 
under chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code2 and corporations that file under 
chapter 11,3 but we know relatively little about individuals who file under chapter 
11.4 Individuals file around 30% of all chapter 11 filings,5 and so this study is 
designed to fill this gap in our knowledge. 
The rules governing an individual chapter 11 case are a blend of those 
applicable to more standard consumer and business bankruptcy cases.  Individual 
chapter 11s look much like cases under chapter 13—the more common individual 
reorganization chapter—in several respects.  In particular, chapter 11, like chapter 
13, insists that individuals comply with a projected disposable income test,6 and 
both chapters withhold a discharge until individuals complete their plan 
                                                                                                                         
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2012) ("[A] person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 . . . may be a debtor 
under chapter 11."). Other entities are specifically excluded from eligibility to file chapter 7 or chapter 11, 
but those details are irrelevant to our study. Since a "person" is broadly defined to include "individual, 
partnership, and corporation," id. at § 101(41), it would seem self-evident that individuals are eligible for 
chapter 11. Nevertheless, it required a decision from the United States Supreme Court—Toibb v. Radloff, 
501 U.S. 157 (1991)—to make that proposition clear. 
2 See Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren, The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 743 (2005) [hereinafter Lawless & Warren, Disappearing Business Bankruptcy]; see, 
e.g., DAVID T. STANLEY ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 94 (Brookings Institution 
1971); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR 
DEBTORS (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) [hereinafter SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE]; TERESA A. 
SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: 
AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000) [hereinafter SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS]; Robert Lawless et 
al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 
(2008) [hereinafter Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail]; Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. 
Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473 (2006); 
Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt 
Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415 (1999).  
3 See Arturo Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11 
Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253 (2006); LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG 
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (University of Michigan Press 2005). See, e.g., Edward 
R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small-Business 
Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. & ECON. 381 (2007) [hereinafter Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making]; Edward R. 
Morrison, Bargaining around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 255 
(2009) [hereinafter Morrison, Small Business Workouts]; Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The 
Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603 (2009) [hereinafter Warren & 
Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11]. 
4 See Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, supra note 3. After we began our project, Professor 
Lawton completed two studies based on random samples that she drew from all chapter 11 cases filed in 
2004 and 2007. See Anne Lawton, Musings on BAPCPA and the Individual Chapter 11 Debtor, 90 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 307 (2016) [hereinafter Lawton, Musings]; Anne Lawton, The Individual Chapter 11 Debtor 
Pre- and Post-BAPCPA, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 455 (2015) [hereinafter Lawton, Individual Chapter 11 
Debtors]. Professors Warren and Westbrook reported some facts about individuals in chapter 11 in their 
prior studies, but their focus in those studies was on business bankruptcy more generally. See, e.g., Elizabeth 
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 499 (1999) [hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, Financial Characteristics].   
5 See infra Table 1 and accompanying text. 
6 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(15)(B), 1325(b) (2012). 
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payments.7 A corporation, by contrast, obtains a discharge upon confirmation of its 
chapter 11 plan.8 In other respects, however, application of chapter 11's usual rules 
makes cases involving individual debtors quite unlike cases under chapter 13.  First, 
debtors in chapter 13 face more rigid requirements (for example, the debtor must 
propose a plan within fourteen days of filing,9 and plan payments—which cannot 
extend past five years10—must begin quickly11) and active oversight by a 
bankruptcy trustee.12 Chapter 11 provides flexibility rather than rigidity, and relies 
on the initiative of the debtor-in-possession and the participation of 
creditors.  Second, the absolute priority rule, as most courts interpret it, applies to 
both individual and corporate chapter 11 debtors (albeit with differences).13 Chapter 
13, by contrast, has no absolute priority rule.14 
Our empirical analysis of individuals in chapter 11 informs the normative 
debate over the proper structure of bankruptcy law.  One might believe that chapter 
13, or a version thereof, may be more appropriate for nearly all individuals who 
want to reorganize, or that a separate fast-track adaptation of chapter 11 is 
preferable.  Under another view, an entirely different resolution mechanism might 
be preferable.15 Regardless of the merits of the various arguments, it makes little 
sense to apply very different rules if individuals in chapter 11 have the same 
characteristics, but slightly larger debts, as those in chapter 13.  
In some ways, individuals in chapter 11 are very different from those in chapter 
13.  Chapter 11 debtors are much more likely to operate a business,16 and they have 
dramatically higher debt-to-income ratios than other consumer debtors; in our 
sample, the median ratio was 16 in 2010 and 8 in 2013.17 As expected, chapter 11 
debtors have much higher household incomes than individuals in chapters 7 or 13, 
but their expenses also are quite large.18 Real estate debt plays a particularly 
prominent role, which, unsurprisingly is especially true of the filings made in 2010.  
The typical individual filing for relief under chapter 11 is male; women account for 
a much smaller proportion of chapter 11 than chapter 13 filings.19 Many individuals 
                                                                                                                         
7 See id. at §§ 1141(d)(5)(A), 1328(a). 
8 See id. at § 1141(d)(1)(A). 
9 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b). 
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2012). 
11 See id. at § 1326. 
12 See id. at § 1302. 
13 See infra Part IV.B.3 for a discussion of the absolute priority rule. 
14 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 1129.04, at 1129–138.1 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2016).  
15 See, e.g., Jean Braucher & Charles W. Mooney Jr., Means Measurement Rather than Means Testing: 
Using the Tax System to Collect from Can-pay Consumer Debtors after Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., Feb. 2003 at 6.  
16 See infra Table 11 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra Table 31 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra Tables 25 and 26 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra Table 10 and accompanying text. 
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in chapter 11, like other bankrupt debtors, are frequent users of the bankruptcy 
courts.20  
One should not overstate the differences, however, as individual chapter 11 
cases generally are not that complex.  The vast majority of debtors have a small 
number of creditors.21 Half have liabilities that fall below the liability threshold for 
small business debtors, and assets and liabilities that fall far below the $10 million 
cutoff that the American Bankruptcy Commission recently recommended for small 
and medium sized enterprises.22 Moreover, few individuals enter chapter 11 with 
affiliated debtors, and procedural consolidation is rare.23 
One striking finding is that a large number of individual debtors chose to file 
for relief under chapter 11 even though they qualified for chapter 1324 and even 
though a chapter 11 case costs substantially more.  The median amount that chapter 
11 debtors paid to their attorneys at the outset of the case was at least $7,50025—
several times higher than the roughly $2,500 national average for total fees in 
chapter 13.26 While we cannot determine the reason why debtors eligible for chapter 
13 might nonetheless choose chapter 11, the greater relative flexibility of the latter 
over the former may play a role. 
 Much of the prior empirical literature asks whether bankruptcy's reorganization 
chapters successfully serve the interests of debtors and creditors.  The most 
common definition of success focuses on the goals of the debtor and asks whether 
individuals receive a discharge.27 That definition was not appropriate for our 
undertaking given that individuals, unlike corporations, do not receive their 
discharge until their plan is completed,28 and few individual debtors will complete 
their plans during the three- to six-year window in which we observed the cases.29 
Instead, we started the analysis with a broad definition of success that included any 
case in which the debtor received a discharge or avoided conversion or dismissal as 
of the date we gathered our data.  Based on this definition, we found a success rate 
of roughly one-third,30 or about the same success rate found in the chapter 13 
                                                                                                                         
20 See infra Section III.A.3. 
21 See infra Table 20 and accompanying text.  
22 See infra Tables 29 and 34 and accompanying text. For the Commission's recommendations for small 
and medium sized enterprises, see AM. BANKR. INST., COMM'N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, 
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 288 (2014) [hereinafter ABI Commission Report].  
23 See infra Table 12 and accompanying text.  
24 See infra Table 30 and accompanying text.  
25 See infra Table 28 and accompanying text. 
26 See Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
17, 57 (2012). 
27 See, e.g., Norberg & Velkey, supra note 2, at 504; Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, supra 
note 3, at 611. 
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A) (2012). 
29 Many of the plans that our random sample debtors proposed are scheduled to last thirty years. See infra 
note 238 and accompanying text.  
30 See infra Table 39 and accompanying text. 
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literature.31 If we define success more narrowly as plan confirmation, however, 
individual debtors perform less well in chapter 11 than in chapter 13.   
Approximately 39% of our debtors confirmed plans,32 while recent national data 
puts chapter 13 confirmation rates at about 70%.33 We found that joint filing and 
ownership of significant real property predict success and that no-asset cases, pro se 
cases, and cases handled by attorneys with little chapter 11 experience are more 
likely to fail.34 We also found evidence suggesting that the absolute priority rule, 
which does not exist in chapter 13, may affect success rates.  Chapter 11 cases filed 
in jurisdictions with debtor-friendly interpretations of the exception to the absolute 
priority rule were more likely to succeed than cases in jurisdictions with less debtor-
friendly absolute priority rule decisions.35  
 Using discharge or confirmation as measures of success, however, fails to take 
account of system goals.  Many debtors do not belong in a reorganization chapter; 
in an efficient system, bankruptcy courts should quickly dismiss or convert these 
cases.36 If we measure success, as scholars have done in prior studies, by how long 
it takes bankruptcy courts to dispose of the "failed" reorganizations,37 then 
individual chapter 11 cases fare worse than chapter 13 cases.  More specifically, we 
found that courts take longer to dispose of the "obvious" individual chapter 11 
failures compared with the obvious chapter 13 failures.38 
Our findings provide answers to many questions about the characteristics and 
performance of individuals in chapter 11.  Like any good empirical study, however, 
questions for further study remain.  Nonetheless, our findings lay the groundwork 
for exploring changes to chapter 11 or 13 that may increase the odds of individual 
success in bankruptcy.   
We begin our analysis in Section II with data derived from PACER case reports 
for all bankruptcy cases filed in 2010 and 2013 in the districts studied.  The PACER 
data provides information about debtor and system characteristics, such as debtor 
                                                                                                                         
31 See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 2, at 339; Michael Bork & Susan D. Tuck, 
Bankruptcy Statistical Trends: Chapter 13 Dispositions, 4 graph 1 (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Working 
Paper No. 2, 1994); Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Measuring Projected Performance in Chapter 13: 
Comparisons Across the States, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 2000 at 22; Henry E. Hildebrand III, 
Administering Chapter13—At What Price?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 1994 at 16; Norberg & 
Velkey, supra note 2, at 505; Hulya Eraslan et al., The Anatomy of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Under Chapter 
13, Working Paper 07-31 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter Eraslan, Anatomy] (studying chapter 13 cases).  
32 See infra Table 46 and accompanying text. 
33 See Ed Flynn, Chapter 13 Case Outcomes by State, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2014 at 40, 41 (stating 
70% of chapter 13 plans are confirmed nationally). 
34 See infra Tables 42, 43, 45, 47, 48 and 50 and accompanying text.  
35 See infra Tables 44 and 49 and accompanying text.  
36 See, e.g., Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 3, at 412; (discussing why only some 
businesses should be reorganized and noting the costs incurred when the judge waits to liquidate a business); 
see also Morrison, Small Business Workouts, supra note 3, at 298; Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 
11, supra note 3, at 616–17, 627.   
37 See, e.g., Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 3, at 390 (discussing the costliness of 
delays in shutting down economically distressed businesses); see also Warren & Westbrook, Success of 
Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 627 (using promptness as a basis for measuring success in chapter 11 cases). 
38 See infra Table 52, and note 294 and accompanying text. 
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type, the rate of conversions between bankruptcy chapters, and the availability of 
assets for distribution to general unsecured creditors.  We also provide data about 
the experience level of attorneys representing individual chapter 11 debtors and find 
that few attorneys specialize in individual chapter 11 cases.  We wrap up Section II 
with an examination of involuntary filings and conclude that involuntary individual 
chapter 11 cases are exceedingly rare.  
Section III examines and analyzes the results of our coding of a random sample 
of the larger PACER case sample ("random sample data").  These hand-coded cases 
provide much richer, more detailed data about the individuals who file for relief 
under chapter 11, including information about business operations, prior and 
subsequent bankruptcy filings, income, expenses, assets and liabilities.  
In Section IV, we address the central question of success, and whether chapter 
11 serves the needs of individual debtors.  We use regression analysis to determine 
which case characteristics predict success, and also discuss the impact of the 
absolute priority rule on debtor success.  The analysis moves through various 
definitions of success—from a debtor-centric definition focused on survival and 
discharge to a system-wide definition focused on the expeditious handling of 
chapter 11 cases.   
Finally, in Section V, we provide a summary of the study's key findings.  We 
conclude that the normative case for an individual reorganization chapter, separate 
from chapter 13, remains unclear.  
 
II.   PACER CASE REPORT DATA 
 
We began our empirical analysis with data derived from PACER case reports 
("PACER data") for all bankruptcy cases filed in 2010 and 201339 in 78 of the 94 
judicial districts in the United States.40 According to the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts (the "AO"), these jurisdictions accounted for 91% of all bankruptcy 
filings, and approximately 93% of all chapter 11 filings in the United States in those 
years.41 We are confident that our failure to obtain waivers from the remaining 
jurisdictions did not materially affect our results.42  
                                                                                                                         
39 PACER provides a link to present reports in spreadsheet form. We began by downloading all 
bankruptcy cases filed in each jurisdiction of our study during 2010 and 2013. Because this data set was so 
massive, we dropped cases in which neither the current nor previous chapter was chapter 11 or 13. 
40 We did not receive waivers from the following jurisdictions: (1) Southern District of Alabama; (2) 
Connecticut (waiver for only 2010); (3) District of Columbia; (4) Guam; (5) Hawaii; (6) Southern District of 
Illinois; (7) Northern District of Indiana; (8) Maine; (9) Eastern District or Missouri; (10) Western District of 
New York; (11) Northern Mariana Islands; (12) Western District of Oklahoma; (13) Southern District of 
Texas; (14) the Virgin Islands; (15) Southern District of West Virginia; and (16) Eastern District of 
Wisconsin. 
41 See Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary: Business and Nonbusiness Cases Filed—Table F-2, 
ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2010), www.uscourts.gov/file/10993/download; Statistical Tables 
for the Federal Judiciary: Business and Nonbusiness Cases Filed—Table F-2, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. 
CTS. (Dec. 31, 2013), www.uscourts.gov/file/10999/download. 
42 Harvard's Bankruptcy Data Project provided an independent estimate of the number of individual 
chapter 11s, and these jurisdictions collectively accounted for less than 5% of the total in 2010. The Harvard 
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Deciding on the period to study involved a difficult trade-off.  We wanted to 
choose a set of cases filed sufficiently long ago that the debtors had time to receive 
plan approval and then make payments for a number of years.  Unlike chapter 13 
plans,43 however, chapter 11 plans can, and do, extend well beyond five years.44 
Thus, we expected that few of our debtors would have completed a plan of 
reorganization unless we examined cases filed far in the past.  If we drew a sample 
of cases filed too long ago, on the other hand, our results would be skewed by the 
financial crisis and the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code enacted in 2005.45 
We settled, first, on 2010, aware that the financial crisis and the real estate 
collapse played a significant role in individual chapter 11 cases filed in that year.  
To ensure that our results were not simply an artifact of the period studied, we 
expanded our study to include cases filed in 2013, as well. 
This Section of the report is largely descriptive.  We begin in Section A with 
some basic information, gleaned from the PACER case reports, about the individual 
chapter 11 cases filed in 2010 and 2013.  We provide data on debtor type, 
conversions between chapters, filings by district, the nature of debtors' liabilities, 
and the infrequency of involuntary chapter 11 filings.  When applicable, we 
compare the individual chapter 11 findings with PACER case report data on chapter 
13 and corporate chapter 11 cases.  In Section B, we look at the experience levels of 
the attorneys representing the individual debtors who filed for relief in 2010 and 
2013 and find that few specialize in individual chapter 11 cases.  Finally, in Section 
C, we discuss the handful of involuntary individual chapter 11 cases filed in 2010 
and 2013.  We conclude, as a practical matter, that there is no thirteenth amendment 
involuntary servitude problem for individual debtors in chapter 11.    
 
A.  Some Basic Facts about Individuals in Chapter 11 
 
1.  Chapter 11 Debtor Type 
 
PACER case reports include a field that lists the bankruptcy chapter the case is 
in at the time that the case is pulled, regardless of whether the case is open or 
closed.  For converted cases, the case reports also include a field that lists the most 
recent pre-conversion bankruptcy chapter.  Using these two fields, we identified any 
case that had been in chapter 11.46 We then narrowed the cases to those filed by an 
individual. 
                                                                                                                         
Bankruptcy Data Project never had data available for 2013; the 2010 data source is now archived: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150905052318/http://bdp.law.harvard.edu/.   
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2012).   
44 See infra note 238 and accompanying text.  
45 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 
23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).  
46 This approach may miss some cases that were once in chapter 11 if they were later converted to two 
other chapters. For example, we would miss a case that was filed in chapter 11, converted to chapter 13 and 
then converted to chapter 7. We suspect that such cases are extremely rare.  
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Table 1 lists the type of debtor for these PACER case reports for 2010 and 
2013.  In both years, corporate chapter 11 cases predominated in the PACER data 
sample, with the debtor checking the "corporation" box on the voluntary petition in 
64-65% of the cases.  See Columns (A) & (B), Row (2) of Table 1.  Surprisingly, 
individual debtors comprised a sizable portion of the PACER data sample: in both 
2010 and 2013, at least 30% of chapter 11 debtors indicated on the petition that they 
were individuals.  See Columns (A) & (B), Row (1) of Table 1.  Another 3% to 5% 
of debtors checked the "partnership" or "other" boxes on the petition.  See Columns 
(A) & (B), Rows (3) & (4) of Table 1. 
Chapter 11 cases, however, do not account for a significant share of all 
individual filings, regardless of chapter.  In both 2010 and 2013, individual chapter 
11 filings accounted for less than 0.3% of all individual bankruptcy cases in our 
sample.47  
 
Table 1: Debtor Type for Chapter 11 Cases 
 
  (A) 
2010 
(B) 
2013 
Debtor Type Number Percentage Number Percentage 
(1) Individual 4,049 30.3% 2,617 31.2% 
(2) Corporation 8,617 64.5% 5,487 65.4% 
(3) Partnership 466 3.5% 179 2.13% 
(4) Other 227 1.7% 105 1.25% 
Total 13,359  8,388  
 
Our estimate of individual chapter 11 cases is a little higher than that found by 
Harvard's Bankruptcy Data Project for 2010.48 (The Project did not gather data for 
2013.) The solid bold line in Figure 1 shows the Project's estimate of the number of 
individual chapter 11 cases across time, while the dashed bold line shows the 
percentage of chapter 11 cases filed by individuals.  The difference between our 
estimate of chapter 11 filings and that of the Project likely results from the fact that 
we included a case as an individual chapter 11 if either its current or previous 
chapter was chapter 11.  Harvard's Bankruptcy Data Project looked only at the 
initial chapter, thereby missing individual cases that converted to chapter 11 from 
either chapter 7 or 13.  
                                                                                                                         
47 Chapter 11 accounted for 4,049 of 1,419,645 (0.29%) individual filings in 2010 and 2,617 of 934,907 
(0.28%) individual filings in 2013. 
48 See supra note 42 (discussing the Harvard Bankruptcy Data Project). Coincidentally, Warren and 
Westbook also found that 33% of the chapter 11 cases in their 1994 sample were filed by individuals (citing 
Ed Flynn, Who Is Filing in Chapter 11?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1999 at 30. See Warren & Westbrook, 
Financial Characteristics, supra note 4, at 534. Lawton found a smaller percentage in her study of 
individual chapter 11s in 2004 (23%) and 2007 (27%). See Lawton, Individual Chapter 11 Debtors, supra 
note 4, at 466, Table 1.   
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Figure 1: Individual Chapter 11 Cases in Harvard's Bankruptcy Data Project 
 
 
 
2.  Conversions 
  
Cases are often converted from one chapter to another,49 but the rules differ 
depending upon whether conversion is sought by the debtor or by another party, and 
upon the chapters involved.  A debtor may convert into chapter 11 from either 
chapter 750 or chapter 13.51 Interestingly, no statutory provision permits conversion 
                                                                                                                         
49 The Code requires that the debtor be eligible under the destination chapter. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(d), 
1112(f), 1307(g) (2012).  
50 See id. at § 706(a). Although this right appears to be absolute, it is subject to two exceptions, one 
statutory and the other judicial. The statutory exception prohibits conversion if the case was previously 
converted into chapter 7. The judicially-created exception, applicable when bad faith is involved, derives 
from the Supreme Court's decision in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007). In 
Marrama, the chapter 7 debtor attempted to hide assets from the trustee. Id. When the trustee discovered 
those assets, the debtor sought to prevent their loss by converting from chapter 7 to chapter 13. Id. at 368. 
The Court denied conversion on the basis of the debtor's bad faith. Id. at 370. 
51 Section 1307(d) provides that, before confirmation of a plan, a party in interest or the U.S. Trustee may 
request and the court may convert the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(d) (2012). Thus, involuntary conversions 
are possible, but subsection (d) is subject to subsection (f). It, in turn, mandates that a chapter 13 case not be 
converted to any other chapter, in the absence of a request by the debtor, if the debtor is a farmer. Id. at 
§ 1307(f).  
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from chapter 12 to chapter 11,52 but most courts permit such a conversion under 
appropriate circumstances.53  
A debtor may also convert out of chapter 11 into either chapter 7, 12 or 13.54 
The right to convert to chapter 7 is absolute if the case was filed voluntarily and no 
trustee has been appointed.55 Upon the request of a party in interest, the court may 
convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for cause, unless appointment of a trustee or 
examiner would better serve the best interests of creditors.56 Conversion is not 
permitted if it does not serve the best interests of creditors and the debtor or another 
party in interest establishes, first, that a plan is likely to be confirmed within 
designated time frames and, second, that the reason for conversion includes an act 
or omission by the debtor that was reasonably justified and can be cured.57   
Conversion from chapter 11 to chapter 13 is governed by different rules.  The 
debtor must request conversion before discharge58—a provision with less bite since 
2005 because individual chapter 11 debtors do not receive a discharge upon 
confirmation of the plan.59 
The data in Tables 2 and 3 include converted cases—cases begun in chapter 11 
and then converted to chapter 7 or 13, and cases begun in chapter 7 or 13 and 
converted to chapter 11.60 To identify these cases we used PACER case report fields 
that reveal the current chapter (or the chapter in which the case closed) as well as 
the immediately preceding chapter, if any.  Notably, these fields contain one 
important limitation.  If, for example, a case was filed under chapter 11, converted 
to chapter 13 and then later converted to chapter 7, we would only see that the case 
ended in chapter 7 and was previously in chapter 13.  Subject to this limitation, 
                                                                                                                         
52 Section 1208(a) permits conversion from chapter 12 to chapter 7 upon the debtor's request, and 
subsection (d) permits conversion to chapter 7, at the request of a party in interest, upon a showing that the 
debtor "committed fraud in connection with the case." Id. at § 1208(d). 
53 See In re Miller, 177 B.R. 551, 553–55 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) (permitting conversion because debtor 
filed chapter 12 in good faith, creditors were not prejudiced, and conversion was equitable; to dismiss 
instead and force debtor to refile would change the petition date to prejudice of pre- and post-petition 
creditors); In re Bird, 80 B.R. 861, 863, 865 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding conversion from chapter 12 
to chapter 11 permissible, within sound discretion of court; permitting conversion despite debtors' failure to 
follow court orders, given reasons to support good faith); In re Lawless, 79 B.R. 850, 854 (W.D. Mo. 1987) 
(holding that whether to permit conversion of chapter 12 case to chapter 11 is within sound discretion of 
bankruptcy court; affirming bankruptcy judge's denial of motion to convert when debtors failed to meet 
deadline for filing chapter 12 plan and did not meet statutory qualifications for chapter 12); In re Orr, 71 
B.R. 639, 643 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987) (permitting conversion because debtors filed chapter 12 in good faith, 
unaware that they exceeded its debt limits, creditors would not be prejudiced, and conversion would not be 
inequitable). 
54 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(a), 1112(d) (2012).  
55 See id. at § 1112(a).  
56 See id. at § 1112(b)(1). 
57 See id. at § 1112(b)(2). 
58 See id. at § 1112(d).  
59 For a more complete discussion of the timing of discharge, see Norberg & Velkey, supra note 2, at 476–
77 (discussing proposed time tables for debtor discharge); Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, 
supra note 3, at 626–29 (examining average lengths of chapter 11 filings).  
60 We frequently compare chapter 11 to chapter 13, and so we constructed a similar set of all cases that are 
currently or have been in chapter 13. See infra Table 2. 
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Tables 2 and 3 provide information about between-chapter conversions for 
individuals in the PACER data sample who filed for relief under the Bankruptcy 
Code in 2010 and 2013.  Note that we dropped all cases that had never been in 
chapter 11 or 13 and indicated the omission in both Tables 2 and 3 with the 
designation "n/a."    
 
Table 2: Conversion Between Chapters for Individual Bankruptcy—2010 
 
 Initial Chapter 
 
 
Converted 
Chapter 
 7 11 12 13 
7 n/a 937 n/a 42,293 
11 90 n/a 7 310 
12 n/a 1 n/a 17 
13 5,486 48 8 n/a 
No Conversion n/a 2,656 n/a 358,333 
 
Table 3: Conversion Between Chapters for Individual Bankruptcy—2013 
 
 Initial Chapter 
 
 
Converted 
Chapter 
 7 11 12 13 
7 n/a 379 n/a 20,124 
11 55 n/a 7 255 
12 n/a 1 n/a 5 
13 3,339 30 8 n/a 
No Conversion n/a 1,890 n/a 274,490 
 
The data in Tables 2 and 3 reveal that debtors sometimes convert from chapter 
11 to chapter 13 and vice versa, but conversion from either chapter to chapter 7 is 
far more common.  Of the 3,642 cases initially filed in chapter 11 in 2010,61 just 48 
(1.3%) were converted to chapter 13 while 937 (25.7%) were converted to chapter 
7.  Similarly, of the 400,953 cases initially filed in chapter 13, only 310 (0.08%) 
were converted to chapter 11 while 42,293 (10.55%) were converted to chapter 7.  
This means that chapter 11 cases are converted to chapter 7 at more than twice the 
rate that chapter 13 cases are converted to chapter 7.  We return to this fact when we 
discuss the "success" rate in Section IV below. 
                                                                                                                         
61 We counted a case as initially filed in chapter 11 if the previous chapter was listed as chapter 11 or if the 
previous chapter was blank and the chapter was listed as chapter 11. For 2010, we had 3,642 cases 
"initiated" in chapter 11. If we add the 407 cases converted into chapter 11 (90 from chapter 7, 7 from 
chapter 12, and 310 from chapter 13), this gives us the 4,049 cases disclosed in Column (A), Row (1) of 
Table 1. See supra Table 1. 
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3.  Where Are the Debtors Filing? 
 
As the data in Table 4 show, there is wide variation among districts in terms of 
individual chapter 11 filings.  Table 4 provides data from the five districts with the 
highest and lowest number of individual chapter 11 filings in 2010 and 2013.  Table 
58, which is set out in Appendix A, provides data on all 78 judicial districts.  Both 
Tables 4 and 58 provide four pieces of information: (1) the jurisdiction in which the 
case was filed; (2) the number of cases in that jurisdiction; (3) the jurisdiction's 
share of our PACER total sample; and (4) the percentage of individual chapter 11 
cases in that jurisdiction. 
 
Table 4: Top 5 and Bottom 5 Districts for Individual Chapter 11 Filings 
 
Top Five Districts 
 2010 2013 
District 
Individual 
Ch. 11 
% 
Whole 
Sample 
% 
Individual 
of District 
Ch. 11 
Individual 
Ch. 11 
% 
Whole 
Sample 
% 
Individual 
of District 
Ch. 11 
CACD 581 14% 47% 349 13% 47% 
CAND 312 8% 65% 127 5% 61% 
AZ 294 7% 42% 117 4% 41% 
FLMD 232 6% 29% 146 6% 35% 
NV 200 5% 40% 125 5% 47% 
Bottom Five Districts 
 2010 2013 
District 
Individual 
Ch. 11 
% 
Whole 
Sample 
% 
Individual 
of District 
Ch. 11 
Individual 
Ch. 11 
% 
Whole 
Sample 
% 
Individual 
of District 
Ch. 11 
LAMD 1 0% 6% 1 0% 10% 
IAND 3 0% 43% 0 0% 0% 
ND 3 0% 38% 0 0% 0% 
OKND 2 0% 8% 1 0% 17% 
VT 3 0% 33% 0 0% 0% 
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The data in Tables 4 and 58 demonstrate that the number of individual chapter 
11 filings varies greatly by district: from a low of one case each in 2010 and 2013, 
respectively, for the Middle District of Louisiana, to a high of 581 and 349 for 2010 
and 2013, respectively, for the Central District of California.  While four western 
districts (the Central District of California, the Northern District of California, the 
District of Nevada, and the District of Arizona) account for 34% and 27% of our 
sample in 2010 and 2013, respectively, significant numbers of individual chapter 11 
filings occur in other areas of the country, such as the Middle District of Florida.  
There also is dramatic variation in the percentage of chapter 11 cases in each district 
that are filed by individuals, from a low of less than 1% in Delaware (see Table 58) 
to more than 60% in the Northern District of California.62 
 
4.  Primary Nature of Debt and Small Business Status 
 
The voluntary petition asks debtors to disclose whether their debts are 
"primarily business debts" or "primarily consumer debts," and the AO reports 
bankruptcy statistics by the debtor's choice.  According to the AO, about 86% of all 
chapter 11 cases filed in 2010 (11,774 of 13,713) were business filings, while less 
than 1% of chapter 13 filings (4,174 of 438,913) were business filings.63 These 
commonly-reported statistics lead most people to think of chapter 11 as business 
bankruptcy and chapter 13 as consumer or non-business bankruptcy.  The AO's 
statistics are for all chapter 11 filings, however, not just those made by individuals.    
Roughly 45% of the individuals in our PACER data sample reported that their 
debts were primarily business-related.  See Table 5.  While this 45% figure is less 
than the overall proportion of business filings in chapter 11, it is still dramatically 
higher than the percentage of chapter 13 filers who claim that their debts are 
primarily business-related; the AO reports this figure as less than 1% and our 
findings are similar, as the data in Table 5 show.  Notably, the proportion of debtors 
claiming that their debts are primarily business-related is remarkably stable between 
2010 and 2013, despite the fairly dramatic drop in the total number of individual 
chapter 11 cases filed during that period.64 
                                                                                                                         
62 The existence of substantial variation is consistent with the findings of Warren & Westbrook, Financial 
Characteristics, supra note 4, at 572–73 (illustrating differences in debtor type by district in 1994). 
63 See Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary: Business and Nonbusiness Cases Filed—Table F-2, 
ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2010), www.uscourts.gov/file/10993/download. 
64 The difference is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.40). The business/non-business divide may 
not have always been so stable. In her prior study, Lawton found 41.8% business individual chapter 11s in 
2004 and 55.9% in 2007. See Lawton, Individual Chapter 11 Debtors, supra note 4, at 467. Her data, 
however, are drawn from a period of massive disruption in bankruptcy law caused by BAPCPA. 
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Table 5: Primary Nature of Debt 
 
 Individual Chapter 11 Chapter 13 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
Business 45% 46% 1% 1% 
Consumer/Non-business 55% 54% 99% 99% 
Total Number  4,409 2,617 406,407 298,191 
 
Prior research has shown that consumers check the box claiming primarily non-
business debts with little or no thought, and that almost 20% of chapter 13 filings 
may be business-related, using a broad definition.65 Even if we adopt this higher 
estimate for chapter 13 and make no adjustments to the self-reporting of chapter 11 
debt,66 however, an individual chapter 11 case is still more than twice as likely to be 
business-related than is a chapter 13 case.  And, because there are so many more 
chapter 13 filings than chapter 11 filings, business chapter 13 filings significantly 
exceed business individual chapter 11 filings in absolute numbers.   
Chapter 11 provides special procedural rules applicable to a small business 
debtor,67 which the Code defines as someone engaged in business who owes less 
than roughly $2.5 million in non-contingent liquidated debts.68 The supervisory role 
of the U.S. Trustee is enhanced in a small business case, both at the beginning of 
the case and during its pendency.69 The small business debtor may use a simplified 
standard form for its disclosure statement, and the bankruptcy court may combine 
the hearing on plan confirmation with the hearing on approval of the disclosure 
statement.70 The Code also provides plan-proposal and plan-confirmation deadlines 
for small business debtors.71    
                                                                                                                         
65 See Lawless & Warren, Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 778 (noting 19.5% of 
debtors had some indicator of self-employment).  
66 Although most individual chapter 11 debtors checked the petition box indicating that their debts were 
primarily consumer in nature, the overwhelming majority operated a business. See infra Section III.A.2. 
(discussing different measures of business filings).  
67 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(n) (2012) (curtailing serial filings by small business debtors by preventing 
automatic stay from taking effect when, for example, debtor is involved in a pending small business 
bankruptcy case, unless second filing was involuntary or debtor shows it resulted from unforeseeable 
circumstances and it is more likely than not that the court will confirm a plan of reorganization within a 
reasonable time period); id. at § 1121(e) (providing exclusivity period and filing deadlines for small business 
cases). 
68 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (2012) (setting the original maximum amount at approximately $2 million). 
The current dollar limit, which re-set on April 1, 2016, is $2,566,050. See id. at § 104(a) (providing the 
schedule for increases to small business debtor threshold dollar amount). 
69 See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(H) (2012) (indicating U.S. Trustees have additional duties in small business 
cases); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012) (laying out additional duties of trustee or debtor in possession in 
small business cases). 
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(f) (2012). 
71 See id. at § 1121(e)(2); see also id. at § 1129(e) (2012). 
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The voluntary petition contains a box indicating whether the debtor is a small 
business debtor,72 and the PACER case reports record the debtor's answer.  Table 6 
presents the small business findings broken down by debtor type.  A small 
percentage of the debtors in our data sample—about 7% to 9%—stated that they 
were small businesses.  The more striking fact, however, is that PACER did not 
report responses for more than 60% of the individuals who filed for relief under 
chapter 11.73 See Column (A), Row (3) of Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Small Business Debtors 
 
 (A) 
Individual 
(B) 
Corporation 
(C) 
All 
 2010 2013 2010 2013 2010 2013 
(1)  Small Business 7% 9% 21% 23% 17% 19% 
(2) Not Small Business 28% 30% 53% 64% 54% 54% 
(3) Blank 65% 61% 14% 13% 30% 27% 
Total Number 4,049 2,617 8,617 5,487 13,359 18,388 
 
5.  Are Assets Available for Distribution? 
 
The PACER case reports contain an "assets" field, marked "yes" or "no," that 
seems to correspond with whether the debtor checked a box on the bankruptcy 
petition indicating an expectation that "after any exempt property is excluded and 
administrative expenses paid," funds will be available for distribution to unsecured 
creditors.74 If the debtor checked "no," the AO records the filing as a "No Asset" 
case, and prior studies have found that more than 90% of chapter 7 filings fall into 
this category.75 By comparison, both individual chapter 11 debtors and chapter 13 
debtors are very optimistic about their ability to pay at least something to unsecured 
creditors, and their optimism seems to be growing.  In 2010, about 86% of 
individual chapter 11 debtors and 90% of chapter 13 debtors indicated that there 
would be assets available for general unsecured creditors.76 In 2013, these numbers 
rose to 92% and 94%, respectively.77 Whether this optimism was warranted is 
                                                                                                                         
72 The voluntary petition requires chapter 11 debtors to check that they either are or are not a small 
business debtor as defined at section 101(51D) of the Code. Id. at § 101(51D) (2012) (defining "small 
business debtor" for purpose of bankruptcy filing). 
73 Given the number of blank entries in the PACER sample, we will spend more time discussing small 
business filings in Section III.A.2 of this Report, which addresses the very different results in the small 
random sample. See infra Table 14 and accompanying text.  
74 Voluntary Petition for Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, Official Form 101, Services & Forms, ADMIN. 
OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., www.uscourts.gov/file/18686/download (last visited Feb. 18, 2017). 
75 See Ed Flynn, Chapter 7 Asset Cases and Trustee Compensation, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2014 at 
48, 49 (indicating only about 8% of chapter 7 cases are closed as asset cases). 
76 See infra Table 7. 
77 We found a lower estimate in our random sample, which is likely due to differences in coding. 
Nonetheless, we still found a fairly high percentage of cases in which debtors expected that assets would be 
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something we cannot tell from these data, but there are good reasons to be skeptical.  
At least two prior studies found that most chapter 13 debtors pay nothing to 
unsecured creditors.78 
 
Table 7: Assets Available for General Creditors—PACER Data 
 
 Chapter 11 Chapter 13 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
No Asset 13% 8% 10% 6% 
Assets  86% 92% 90% 94% 
Unknown or blank .6% .05% .05% .03% 
Total Number 4,049 2,617 406,495 298,521 
 
B.  Attorneys 
 
PACER case reports contain a field that identifies the debtor's attorney.  We 
used this field to try to answer two questions: 1) do attorneys who file individual 
chapter 11 cases specialize in this work? and 2) how often do individuals file 
chapter 11 pro se? Unfortunately, this field often contains multiple pieces of 
information, such as the attorney of the debtor, the attorney for a co-debtor, and 
(occasionally) an attorney for a bankruptcy administrator.79 
To identify the attorneys who file individual chapter 11 cases, we used our 
statistical package to identify the names that followed the phrases "attorney for 
debtor," "attorney for debtor in possession," "attorney for joint debtor," or "attorney 
for alleged debtor."  We then used the statistical package to tabulate the number of 
petitions in our combined sample (both 2010 and 2013) for each attorney name.  
Finally, we asked a research assistant to read through the table to identify names 
that were likely duplicates, such as Kristen A. Smith, Kris A. Smith, and Kristen A. 
Smith, disbarred.80 Table 8 presents the results.  Column (A) indicates the number 
of attorneys who have handled a given number of individual chapter 11 cases, while 
Column (B) shows this number as a percentage of all attorneys in our sample.  
                                                                                                                         
available for general unsecured creditors. See infra Table 22 and accompanying text (indicating 
approximately 77% of debtors in 2010 and 2013 believed assets would be available to pay general unsecured 
creditors). 
78 See Eraslan, Anatomy, supra note 31; see also Norberg & Velkey, supra note 2, at 543. 
79 See Anne Lawton, An Argument for Simplifying the Code's "Small Business Debtor" Definition, 21 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 55, 89 (2013) [hereinafter Lawton, Simple Definition] ("[T]he United States Trustee 
does not operate in the six federal judicial districts in Alabama and North Carolina" and that "the Bankruptcy 
Administrator handles cases in those districts."); see also Trustees and Administrators, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE 
U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/trustees-and-administrators (last visited Feb. 
18, 2017) (detailing the responsibilities of U.S. Trustees in general and bankruptcy administrators specific to 
Alabama and North Carolina). 
80 The name "Kristen Smith" is purely hypothetical; we do not wish to imply that a real Kristen Smith, if 
she exists, has been disbarred. 
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Column (C) shows the number of individual chapter 11 cases handled by attorneys 
with a given level of experience, and Column (D) presents that number as a 
percentage of all individual chapter 11 cases in our sample, other than those filed 
pro se. 
 
Table 8: Attorneys 
 
 Attorney Experience Cases by Attorney Experience 
Petitions Filed (A) 
Number 
(B) 
% of Total 
(C) 
Number 
(D) 
% of Total 
(1) 21+ 17 0.7% 609 10.4% 
(2) 16 to 20 10 0.4% 181 3.1% 
(3) 11 to 15 35 1.4% 453 7.7% 
(4) 6 to 10 135 5.5% 998 17.0% 
(5) 3 to 5 352 14.3%  1304 22.2% 
(6) 2 422 17.1%  844 14.3% 
(7) 1 1493 60.6%  1493 25.4% 
 
The data in Table 8 suggest that few attorneys specialize in individual chapter 
11 cases.  Only sixty-two attorneys handled eleven or more individual chapter 11 
cases over the two years covered by the data.  See Column (A), Rows (1)-(3) of 
Table 8.  Over 60% of the individual chapter 11 cases in our PACER data sample 
were filed by attorneys who had filed five or fewer petitions in 2010 and 2013 
combined.  See Column (D), Rows (5)-(7) of Table 8.  By contrast, only around 
21% of our cases were handled by attorneys who worked on eleven or more cases in 
2010 and 2013 combined.  See Column (D), Rows (1)-(3) of Table 8. 
We used two methods to identify pro se filings.  First, we looked for the text 
"pro se" following "debtor" or "possession."  Using the first method, we estimated 
that in our combined sample of 2010 and 2013 filings about 8.2% (546 petitions of 
6,666) of the filings were made pro se.  Second, we looked for cases in which we 
could not identify an attorney name using the technique we described for obtaining 
the data in Table 8.  This second method suggests that about 8.1% (537 of 6,666) of 
the filings were made pro se.  The two methods give the same answer in almost all 
cases. 
 
C.  Involuntary Chapter 11 Cases 
 
Bankruptcy courts are like hospitals in that nearly everyone who uses their 
services would rather that their health (financial or otherwise) made these services 
unnecessary.  Our focus in this Section is not on those debtors who wish that they 
had a better alternative than chapter 11, but rather on those individuals who were in 
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some sense involuntarily committed to chapter 11's care.  Debtors may arrive in 
chapter 11 against their will if creditors file an involuntary petition; by contrast, 
creditors cannot commence an involuntary chapter 13 case.81 The standard 
justification for this limitation is that creditors should not be able to force an 
individual into a bankruptcy regime that requires payment out of future income.82  
Possible constitutional issues could not be fully tested until the 2005 
Amendments created the very statutory configuration in chapter 11 that was 
thought, decades ago, to raise thirteenth amendment problems—that is, the 
possibility of an involuntary case against an individual debtor who would be 
required to devote future income to repayment of pre-petition debts.  Several 
changes have produced this possibility.  First, the amendments added section 1115, 
which includes as property of the estate "earnings from services performed by the 
debtor after the commencement of the case."83 Second, the amendments added 
section 1123(a)(8), requiring that an individual debtor's chapter 11 plan "provide for 
the payment to creditors . . . of all or such portion of earnings from personal 
services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the case . . . as is 
necessary for the execution of the plan."84 Finally, the amendments added 
section 1129(a)(15)(B), which requires, as a condition for confirmation, that the 
debtor commit an amount equal to his or her "projected disposable income" for the 
longer of the next five years or the period for which the plan provides for 
payments.85 These new provisions operate in conjunction with preexisting chapter 
                                                                                                                         
81 Section 303(a) provides that involuntary cases "may be commenced only under chapter 7 or 11." 11 
U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012). Congress considered the possibility of permitting involuntary chapter 13 cases while 
the current statute was under consideration, but the Report of the House Judiciary Committee foresaw 
constitutional problems under the thirteenth amendment: 
 
As under current law, chapter 13 is completely voluntary. This Committee firmly 
rejected the idea of mandatory or involuntary chapter XIII in the 90th Congress. The 
thirteenth amendment prohibits involuntary servitude. Though it has never been tested 
in the wage earner plan context, it has been suggested that a mandatory chapter 13, by 
forcing an individual to work for creditors, would violate this prohibition. 
 
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 120 (1977) (footnotes omitted), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6080–81. 
Since that time, courts have been divided on the issue. Some have voiced similar constitutional concerns. 
See, e.g., In re Nahat, 315 B.R. 368, 374 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 798 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1982). Other courts have found no constitutional issue. In In re Graham, 21 B.R. 235 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa 1982), for example, the debtor's ex-wife moved to convert his chapter 7 case to a chapter 11, thereby 
enabling unsecured creditors (including herself) to impose a repayment plan that would reach his substantial 
post-petition income. The court noted that converting the case would divert the fruits of the debtor's labors to 
his pre-petition creditors, much like a mandatory chapter 13, but thought the constitutional concerns clearly 
overblown: "Such a mandatory repayment scheme is so radically different in character from the slavery that 
the thirteenth amendment was meant to abolish . . . that the Court questions whether the framers of that 
amendment had the prohibition of mandatory repayment plans in mind when they drafted it." Id. at 238 n.3. 
82 See Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Bondage, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 191 (2009). 
83 11 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012). Post-petition earnings are part of the chapter 13 estate under section 1306(a). 
84 Id. at § 1123(a)(8). 
85 Id. at § 1129(a)(15). See infra notes 237–240 and accompanying text for discussion of how bankruptcy 
courts interpret the language of section 1129(a)(15). 
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11 rules: individual chapter 11 debtors cannot convert an involuntary case to 
another chapter;86 chapter 11 plans have no statutory maximum time limit87 and can 
be extended on a creditor's motion;88 creditors can propose a plan in chapter 11, 
unlike in chapter 13,89 once the debtor's exclusivity period has expired;90 and, 
finally, debtors in involuntary cases do not have an absolute right to dismiss the 
case.91 Taken together, these provisions allow creditors to use an involuntary 
chapter 11 bankruptcy to reach a debtor's future income, rendering the 
constitutional question no longer theoretical.  Scholars, including one of us,92 have 
vigorously criticized these changes.  We do not revisit this debate here.  Rather, we 
demonstrate that the ability of a creditor to file an involuntary chapter 11 petition 
against an individual has had, to date, little or no practical significance. 
According to the PACER case reports, just twenty-eight of the 
6,66693 individual chapter 11 bankruptcies in our sample (0.4%) were started with 
an involuntary petition.  Because there were so few, we examined each one. 
In 2010, seventeen of our cases began with an involuntary petition in one 
chapter or another.  Three of the seventeen began with involuntary petitions in 
chapter 7 that later converted to chapter 11,94 and the remaining fourteen were 
originally filed as involuntary petitions in chapter 11.  Three of those fourteen were 
mistakenly filed as involuntary petitions.95 A fourth case was transferred intra-
district and PACER counted it as two, rather than one, involuntary filing.96    
                                                                                                                         
86 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(2). A chapter 13 debtor, in contrast, may convert to chapter 7 "at any time." Id. 
at § 1307(a). 
87 See id. at § 1129(a)(15)(B). A chapter 13 plan may be no longer than five years. Id. at § 1322(d). 
88 See id. at § 1127(e)(2). 
89 Section 1321 states that "[t]he debtor shall file a plan." Id. at § 1321. 
90 Chapter 11 permits others, besides the debtor, to propose a plan once the exclusivity period expires in 
four to six months after the date of filing. Id. at § 1121(c) (terminating the exclusivity period, for a debtor 
who is not a small business, 120 days after the order for relief, or 180 days after such order if the plan has 
not been accepted by all impaired classes); id. at § 1121(e) (providing a 180-day exclusivity period for small 
business cases, subject to extension for cause). 
91 See id. at § 1112(b) (requiring a showing of cause). Under section 1307(b), the bankruptcy court "shall" 
grant dismissal of a chapter 13 case upon the debtor's request, unless the case has been previously converted 
into chapter 13. 
92 See G. Eric Brunstad Jr., The Inapplicability of "Means Testing" to Cases Converted to Chapter 7, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2006 at 1, 60; Howard, supra note 82; Robert J. Keach, Dead Man Filing Redux: Is 
the New Individual Chapter Eleven Unconstitutional?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 483 (2005). 
93 The total number of filings in our sample varies from question to question due to some cases with 
omitted fields.  
94 See In re Munson, No. 10-39795 (Bankr. D. Or. Oct. 14, 2010); In re Levin, No. 10-33696 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 2, 2010); In re Esmerian, No. 10-12721 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2010). 
95 See Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss for Filing by Mistake at ¶ 1, In re Jimenez, No. 10-18064 (Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. Oct. 14, 2010), ECF No. 3 (stating that involuntary petition was filed by mistake and that debtor 
"intended to file a Voluntary Petition"); Letter Withdrawing/Settling Petition, In re Bouchey, No. 10-12203 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. June 11, 2010), ECF No. 4 (stating that "case was inadvertently filed as an involuntary 
case" and would be refiled as a voluntary case); Sua Sponte Order Dismissing Petition at 2–3, In 
re Pease, No. 10-50799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2010), ECF No. 2 (explaining the case was "not truly an 
involuntary case at all" with debtor as the "'only petitioning creditor'"). 
96 See In re Weinberg, No. 10-12836 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2010) (original case number 10-16229 
filed in the Los Angeles division). 
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Of the seventeen involuntary cases filed in 2010, the bankruptcy court entered 
an order for relief or converted the case to chapter 11 in five cases.  Two of those 
five cases started with the filing of an involuntary chapter 11 petition.97 Neither of 
those two involuntary chapter 11 cases progressed to plan confirmation.  The 
bankruptcy court dismissed one of these cases less than four months after entering 
the order for relief.98 In the other, the bankruptcy court ordered joint administration 
of the debtor-wife's involuntary case with her debtor-husband's voluntary chapter 
11,99 and later granted the married debtors' motion to convert to chapter 7.100 Thus, 
in none of the 2010 cases that began with the filing of an involuntary chapter 11 
petition was a chapter 11 plan confirmed. 
In 2013, only seven cases began with the filing of an involuntary chapter 11 
petition.  Another four cases started with an involuntary chapter 7 petition followed 
by conversion to chapter 11,101 but PACER coded one of these cases as an 
individual filing when the debtor was actually a corporation.102 The bankruptcy 
court entered an order for relief in only three of these ten cases, but these three were 
involuntary chapter 7 cases that were converted to chapter 11.  An order for relief 
was not entered in any of the cases begun with an involuntary chapter 11 petition. 
Debtors may also arrive in chapter 11 against their will if they file a voluntary 
petition in another chapter and an appropriate party moves to convert the case to 
chapter 11.103 We focused our analysis on debtors who initially filed in chapter 7 
because the post-petition earnings of chapter 7 debtors are not available to their 
creditors. 
Of the 6,666 individual cases filed in 2010 and 2013 in the seventy-eight 
judicial districts covered by this study, only 145, or 2.2%, ended up in chapter 11 
after conversion from an initial filing under chapter 7 of the Code.  In almost all of 
these 145 cases, however, the debtor alone filed the motion to convert to chapter 11 
from chapter 7;104 only two of these 145 cases (one filed in each of 2010 and 2013) 
                                                                                                                         
97 See Order Entering Relief under Chapter 11 on Involuntary Petition and Directing Filing of Required 
Documents, In re Ramos, No. 10-29568 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 20, 2010), ECF No. 8; Order for Relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Pettit, No. 10-20901 (Bankr. D. Utah Apr. 9, 2010), ECF No. 9. 
98 See Order Dismissing Case, In re Pettit, No. 10-20901 (Bankr. D. Utah July 26, 2010), ECF No. 31. 
99 See Order Providing for Joint Administration of Cases, In re Ramos, No. 10-29070 (Bankr. D. Md. Oct. 
14, 2010), ECF No. 42 (order docketed in lead case). 
100 See Order Converting Case to Chapter 7, In re Ramos, No. 10-29070 (Bankr. D. Md. Feb. 1, 2012), 
ECF No. 117 (order docketed in husband's lead case). 
101 Five of the six involuntary individual chapter 7 cases filed in 2010 and 2013 were converted to chapter 
11 on the debtor's motion. (There were a total of seven involuntary chapter 7 cases, but PACER incorrectly 
coded an involuntary corporate case as an involuntary individual case, thereby leaving six involuntary 
individual chapter 7 cases in 2010 and 2013.) In the sixth case, the bankruptcy court ordered substantive 
consolidation with the individual debtor's voluntary chapter 11 case and, on its own motion, converted the 
case to chapter 11. See discussion of In re Munson infra note 105. 
102 See In re Dynatemp, Inc., No. 13-21960 (Bankr. D. Md. July 12, 2013) (involuntary petition filed under 
chapter 7, case converted to chapter 11, and then re-converted to chapter 7). 
103 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(b), 1307(d) (2012). 
104 In several cases in 2010 and 2013, the debtor and the U.S. Trustee stipulated to conversion, typically 
after the U.S. Trustee had moved to dismiss for abuse under section 707(b)(2) and (3). See, e.g., Stipulated 
Order Converting Case, In re Sharpe, No. 13-11896 (Bankr. D.N.M. Sept. 24, 2013), ECF No. 22 (stating 
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were converted to chapter 11 without the debtor's consent.105 In one of these two 
cases, the bankruptcy court granted the married debtors' motion to dismiss the case 
shortly after conversion to chapter 11.106 In the other case, which was still pending 
as of this writing, the debtor filed a chapter 11 plan, but a confirmation hearing had 
not yet been scheduled.107  
Involuntary cases are exceedingly rare, regardless of how we count them.  The 
broadest plausible definition would begin with involuntary chapter 11 petitions not 
filed by mistake, and add cases converted from chapter 7 without the debtor's 
consent.  By this measure, nineteen of our 6,666 individual chapter 11 cases (0.3%) 
were involuntary.  The next broadest measure would focus only on cases with an 
involuntary chapter 11 petition in which the court entered an order for relief.  By 
this measure, just two of our 6,666 cases (0.03%) were involuntary.  Finally, 
because of concern that individuals may be forced to pay out of their future income, 
one could restrict the definition to involuntary chapter 11 cases in which a plan of 
reorganization had been confirmed.  This had not occurred in any of the cases in our 
sample, although, as noted, one case was still pending.  Thus, while BAPCPA's 
amendments to chapter 11 created the possibility of thirteenth amendment 
                                                                                                                         
the matter was before the court on the U.S. Trustee's dismissal motion, and the debtor and U.S. Trustee had 
stipulated to conversion to chapter 11); Order Approving Stipulation for Voluntary Conversion of 
Underlying Case to Chapter 11 under 11 U.S.C. §§ 348 and 706(a) and (c) and § 707(b)(1) In Lieu of Case 
Dismissal, In re Peled, No. 10-37905 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010), ECF No. 28 (stating married debtors 
and U.S. Trustee had stipulated to a voluntary conversion to chapter 11 "in Lieu of Case Dismissal under 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)"). 
105 See Order on Florida Bank's Motion to Convert to Chapter 11 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 706(b) at 1–2, 
11, 13, In re Baker, No. 13-00296 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2013), ECF No. 83 (stating conversion to 
chapter 11 would benefit both the debtor and her creditors, even though debtor opposed conversion and was 
eligible for relief under chapter 7); Civil Minute Order, In re Moya, No. 10-53532 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 4, 
2011), ECF No. 42 (converting case upon motion of U.S. Trustee to dismiss or, in the alternative, convert 
debtors' chapter 7 case over debtors' objection to dismissal). Two cases in 2010 that appeared, at first, to be 
involuntary conversions turned out, upon closer examination, not to be involuntary conversions at all. One 
case was a mistaken chapter 7 filing; the debtor had intended to file for relief under chapter 11. Stipulation 
and Order Consenting to Conversion of this Chapter 7 Case to One under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, In re Cresci, No. 10-15107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010), ECF No. 6 (stating that debtor had 
"intended to file a voluntary individual Chapter 11 petition"). In the other case, the debtor's creditors filed an 
involuntary chapter 7 petition against him in October of 2010. See Involuntary Petition at 1–2, In re Munson, 
No. 10-39795 (Bankr. D. Or. Oct. 14, 2010), ECF No. 1. In early January of 2011, the debtor filed his own 
voluntary chapter 11 petition. See Voluntary Petition at 1, 3, In re Munson, No. 11-30188 (Bankr. D. Or. 
Jan. 10, 2011), ECF No. 1. On January 26, 2011, the bankruptcy court (1) granted an order for relief in the 
involuntary chapter 7 case; (2) substantively consolidated the two cases, deeming the involuntary chapter 7 
petition date as the start of the bankruptcy case; and (3) appointed an examiner. See Order for Relief; Order 
Consolidating Cases; Order Directing Appointment of Examiner at 1–3, In re Munson, No. 10-39795 
(Bankr. D. Or. Jan. 26, 2011), ECF No. 85; see also Order Amending 1/26/11 "Order for Relief; Order 
Consolidating Cases; Order Directing Appointment of Examiner" at 1–2, In re Munson, No. 10-39795 
(Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 1, 2011), ECF No. 109. 
106 See Civil Minute Order, In re Moya, No. 10-53532 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 6, 2011), ECF No. 57 
(entered two months after order converting case from chapter 7 to 11).  
107 See Debtor's Plan of Reorganization at 1, In re Baker, No. 13-00296 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. June 24, 2016), 
ECF No. 251.  
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involuntary servitude problems for individual chapter 11 debtors, in practice there 
are virtually no such cases. 
 
III.   CODING INDIVIDUAL CASES 
 
The PACER data, discussed in Section II, allowed us to analyze information on 
a massive number of cases.  The disadvantage is that we were limited to variables 
the courts chose to code.  To provide a richer and more nuanced analysis of 
individual chapter 11 cases, we used a random number generator to draw a smaller 
sample from the individual chapter 11 cases identified in the courts' PACER 
spreadsheets for 2010 and 2013.  Because we received our PACER waivers over 
time, we estimated probabilities of inclusion that would yield approximately 100 
cases in each year and we applied these same probabilities as we received additional 
waivers.  The final sample contains 109 cases from 2010 and 114 from 2013 (the 
"random sample data").108 
Initially, we selected only those cases for which PACER listed the debtor type 
as an individual.  To verify the accuracy of PACER's coding, we conducted 
searches of chapter 11 cases in which the debtor was listed as a partnership or 
corporation; unsurprisingly, few, if any, of these cases involved individual debtors.  
But, PACER also has a category of debtor type listed as "other"; searches of this 
category produced a few individual chapter 11 filings.  We included these miscoded 
cases with the same probability that we used for the cases coded as individual.    
Using this data set, we then coded for a host of variables, including many that 
the PACER spreadsheets do not provide.  We coded for the debtor's financial 
information using the last-filed schedules in the chapter 11 case.109 We were unable 
to code some information because of missing, incomplete or incomprehensible 
schedules.   We denoted these records as "unknown" and present the percentage of 
such cases in each table because it varies from question to question (e.g. some 
debtors complete some schedules but not others).  Some debtors listed assets or 
liabilities without declaring an itemized value and with an implicit valuation of zero 
in the totals.  These entries, therefore, almost certainly understate the true values. 
                                                                                                                         
108 One individual debtor shows up twice in our 2013 sample, because two of his 2013 chapter 11 filings 
were pulled as part of the random sample. See Voluntary Petition at 1, 3, In re Burr, No. 13-21050 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2013), ECF No. 1; Voluntary Petition at 1, 3, In re Burr, No. 13-20330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 27, 2013), ECF No. 1. The debtor had filed a chapter 13 case earlier in 2013, but the bankruptcy court 
dismissed that case in late October, because debtor's unsecured liabilities exceeded the chapter 13 debt 
limits. See Order Dismissing Case, In re Burr, No. 13-10992 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2013), ECF No. 66 
(granting creditor motion to dismiss). The debtor filed the first of his two chapter 11 cases approximately 
one month later.  
109 A few debtors converted into or out of chapter 11 without ever filing schedules during the course of the 
chapter 11 case. In these instances, we used the schedules filed closest in time to the beginning or end of the 
chapter 11 case. For example, if the debtor initially filed for relief under chapter 7 and filed schedules during 
the pendency of the chapter 7, but did not re-file schedules when the case converted to chapter 11, we coded 
the case using the last schedules filed in the chapter 7 case prior to conversion. If the debtor initially filed for 
relief under chapter 11 and the case converted to chapter 7 without the debtor filing schedules during the 
chapter 11 case, we used the first schedules filed after conversion. 
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The analysis in this Section, like the analysis of the PACER data in Section II, 
is largely descriptive.  Hand coding the cases in the 2010 and 2013 random sample, 
however, allowed us to provide a more detailed picture of individuals who file for 
relief under chapter 11.  Our main goals were to determine whether chapter 11 
debtors look more like chapter 13 debtors or small and medium-sized enterprises,110 
and whether debtors appear to make good use of the flexibility afforded by chapter 
11.   
In Section III.A.1 and 2, we provide basic demographic information about the 
random sample debtors and their business operations.  We found that apart from 
joint filings, men account for three to four times as many individual chapter 11 
filings as women.  In addition, unlike chapter 13, most of the individual debtors in 
our random sample were engaged in business.  In Section III.A.3, we look at the 
rate of repeat bankruptcy filing and find a fairly high rate of repeat, although not 
necessarily abusive, filings.  For example, about one-third of the debtors in the 2010 
random sample had filed for bankruptcy more than once.  We wrap up Section III.A 
with an examination of data about debtor size, using size as a proxy for complexity; 
these measures show that most debtors in the random sample are small.   
In Section III.B, we present a more in-depth analysis of the financial condition 
of the random sample debtors.  The income, expense, home ownership, and asset 
and liability data show that the debtors in the 2010 and 2013 random sample have 
higher incomes, higher rates of home ownership, and more significant assets than 
both the typical American and the average chapter 13 debtor.   
 
A.  Do Individuals in Chapter 11 Look Like Those in Chapter 13? 
 
One of the major reasons for undertaking this project was to examine whether 
chapter 13 or some hybrid subchapter tailored to the specific needs of bankrupt 
individuals would serve them better than filing for relief under chapter 11.  
Admittedly, it is not at all clear that chapter 13 effectively provides a fresh start to 
consumers or that chapter 11 effectively reorganizes the small and medium sized 
enterprises dominating its docket.  Still, it is worth asking whether individual 
chapter 11 debtors look more like chapter 13 consumers, albeit with just a little 
more debt, or like small and medium-sized enterprises. 
 
1.  Demographic Information 
 
Tables 9 and 10 present basic demographic information as we begin to sketch a 
portrait of the individual debtors who file under chapter 11.  As the data in Table 9 
demonstrate, a little over half of the debtors reported a household size of one or two 
                                                                                                                         
110 The American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 recommended a 
number of amendments to chapter 11 for cases involving debtors that qualify as small and medium-sized 
enterprises ("SME"). See ABI Commission Report, supra note 22, at 279, 288–89, 291, 294, 296–98. 
2017] NATIONAL STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL CH. 11 BANKRUPTCIES 87 
 
 
individuals.  Another 37% and 39% in 2010 and 2013, respectively, reported a 
household size of three or more persons.   
Table 9 shows that a large majority of the debtors (at least 66% in 2010 and 
72% in 2013) are married.  Almost half of the married debtors (47.4%) chose not to 
file jointly with their spouses,111 perhaps suggesting that they had somewhat 
separate financial affairs.  As the data in Table 10 show, only 41.3% of filings were 
joint filings in 2010; in 2013 this number fell to 34.2%, although the difference is 
not statistically significant.112    
Table 10 also reports the gender of the chapter 11 filers and the results of a 
prior study of the gender of chapter 13 filers.113 We determined the gender of our 
filers by inserting their first name into a web page that states whether the name is 
primarily used by men or women.114 If the debtor's first name was commonly used 
by both men and women or was not in the database, we checked the middle name.  
If that name was also ambiguous or was unavailable, we coded the debtor's gender 
                                                                                                                         
111 See infra Table 47, Row (8) (showing 73 of 154 married debtors filing singly, not jointly). Spouses may 
file joint bankruptcy cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (providing that "[a] joint case under a chapter of 
this title is commenced by the filing . . . of a single petition . . . by an individual that may be a debtor under 
such chapter and such individual's spouse."). Official Form B1, used for the filing of a voluntary petition 
during the years of our study, provided two boxes—one for the name of the debtor and the other for the 
debtor's spouse. Official Form B1 has been superseded. See infra note 119 for a link to the new form for the 
voluntary petition. Other cases, if sufficiently related, may be administratively consolidated. See FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 1015(b). 
In the recent past, courts often held same-sex couples ineligible to file jointly, even when the parties were 
legally married in another jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) 
(holding debtors, legally married in Canada, ineligible for joint bankruptcy petition); see also In re Allen, 
186 B.R. 769, 772 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that term "spouse" as used in Bankruptcy Code does not 
apply to homosexual couple, but only to those legally married—a status determined under state law; 
allowing 20 days to dismiss one joint debtor or suffer dismissal of entire case). But see In re Rabin, 359 B.R. 
242, 249 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (holding debtors who were registered domestic partners under California 
law entitled to exemption rights identical to people who are married); In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 2011) (permitting same-sex couple to file joint bankruptcy petition). 
Recent Supreme Court authority has clarified the law on this issue. First, the Court in United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), invalidated section 1 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which 
defined marriage as a union of a man and a woman for purposes of federal law. The Court held that 
application of this provision to deny the benefit of a spousal estate tax exemption under federal law 
unconstitutionally deprived a surviving spouse of equal protection under the fifth amendment. The 
Department of Justice announced that, in light of Windsor, same-sex couples were to be treated like 
heterosexual couples for purposes of bankruptcy, even when the couple was domiciled in a state that did not 
recognize their marriage. Consumer and Creditor Information,  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/consumer_info/index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). More 
recently, the Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) that same-sex couples have a 
constitutionally-protected right to marry.   
Although this issue is now resolved, it was uncertain as of 2010—one of the years on which this Study 
focused.  
112 The p-value is .28.  
113 See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 2, at 483. Norberg & Velkey also cite a series of other articles that 
find that women filing single account for between 35% and 40% of bankruptcy petitions. Id. at 483 n.21.  
114 GENDERCHECKER, http://genderchecker.com/search.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). Our data suggest 
that the husband's name is usually listed first as "debtor" in jointly-filed cases. 
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as unknown.  While other studies have found that more than a third of chapter 13 
filers are women filing alone, such debtors make up less than 15% of our sample.    
 
Table 9: Household Size and Marital Status 
 
Household Size 2010 2013 
1 27.5% 21.9% 
2 25.7% 31.6% 
3 to 4 22.0% 26.3% 
5+ 14.7% 13.2% 
Unknown 10.1% 7.0% 
Marital Status 2010 2013 
Married 66.1% 71.9% 
Not Married 24.8% 22.8% 
Unknown 10.1% 5.3% 
 
Table 10: Joint Filers and Gender of Debtor 
 
 Chapter 11 Random Samples Chapter 13 
2010 2013 Norberg & Velkey (2006) 
Joint Filing 41.3% 34.2% 25.5% 
Male 41.3% 50.9% 34.8% 
Female 14.7% 12.3% 34.3% 
Unknown 2.8% 2.6% 5.3% 
 
 Prior research has found that about as many women as men file for bankruptcy, 
and some studies found that more women than men file under chapter 13.115 Our 
results stand in sharp contrast to the existing literature on chapter 13 filers.  The 
data in Table 10 show that in 2010, 41.3% of the individual chapter 11 filers were 
men filing alone while only 14.7% were women filing alone; in 2013, the figures 
were 50.9% for men and 12.3% for women.  Putting aside joint filings, there are 
approximately three to four times as many male as female debtors in our 2010 and 
2013 samples.  We have no explanation for why so few women file for relief under 
chapter 11. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
115 See, e.g., Norberg & Velkey, supra note 2 (finding women constituted 36.3% of petitioners that the 
authors could classify and men constituted 36.9%).  
2017] NATIONAL STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL CH. 11 BANKRUPTCIES 89 
 
 
2.  Business Operations 
 
In Section II.A.4, we noted that individual chapter 11 debtors are far more 
likely to check the "primarily business debts" box on the petition than are chapter 
13 debtors.  We also noted that debtors may not give much thought to whether their 
debts are primarily consumer or business in nature, and so the PACER data results 
may underestimate the rate at which debtors are actually engaging in "business."  
These issues also arise with the random sample data. 
 
Table 11: Engaged in Business 
 
 (A) 
Primarily Business 
Debts 
(B) 
Business1 
(C) 
Business2 
 2010 2013 2010 2013 2010 2013 
Yes 45.9% 43.0% 80.7% 86.8% 86.5% 92.1% 
No 53.2% 56.1% 12.8% 8.8% 5.4% 3.5% 
Unknown 0.9% 0.9% 6.4% 4.4% 6.3% 4.4% 
 
Table 11 demonstrates that the rate at which our random sample debtors 
checked the "primarily business debts" box on the petition is similar to the rate 
found in the PACER case report data.  See Column (A) of Table 11.  This finding is 
not surprising, given that we randomly drew the small samples from the PACER 
case reports.    
In Table 11, we report debtors' business activity using two alternative measures.  
We coded a case as "Business1" if the debtor: 1) checked the "primarily business 
debts" box on the petition, 2) disclosed any business assets on Schedule B,116 3) 
disclosed a currently operating business on the Statement of Financial Affairs, or 4) 
disclosed business income or business expenses of at least $1,000 per month on 
Schedule I.  Using this measure, at least 81% of the 2010 debtors and 87% of the 
2013 debtors operated a business.  See Column (B) of Table 11. 
Owning and leasing real estate is a form of business activity.  We, therefore, 
created another measure, "Business2," to add those debtors with substantial real 
estate income.  We coded a case as Business2 if the debtor: (1) satisfied any of the 
requirements for Business1, or (2) had at least $1,000 per month in real estate 
                                                                                                                         
116 We used the following instruction to guide the research assistants in their coding efforts: "Are there 
items listed in items 13, 14, 16, 22–24, 29–30, and/or 32–34 of Schedule B indicating that debtor is 
operating a business? Answer Y or N, the item numbers from Sch. B, and a short description. Example: 
debtor lists three firms in item 13, accounts receivable in Item 16, and a patent in Item 22, enter 'Y, 13(3B), 
16, & 22(P).' No need to identify in parentheses for items with a single category, like accounts receivable. 
Please use abbreviations that sufficiently identify the item in parentheses." The item numbers are those on 
old Schedule B, in effect during the years of our study, and do not necessarily correspond to the line item 
numbers on current Official Form 106A/B.  
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income.  Using this measure, the business rate rose to 86% in 2010 and 92% in 
2013.  See Column (C) of Table 11.  Only 4% to 5% of debtors in each year were 
not engaged in business under this measure. 
As another measure of business engagement, we also checked the extent to 
which our debtors' financial affairs were entangled with those of legal entities or 
individuals other than their spouses.  As Table 12 shows, the rate at which our 
debtors disclosed affiliate bankruptcies on their petitions rose sharply from about 
5% in 2010 to about 12% in 2013.  See Column (A) of Table 12.  By contrast, the 
rate of administrative consolidation fell from about 7% in 2010 to about 4% in 
2013.  See Column (B) of Table 12.  We found no substantive consolidations in our 
sample.  See Column (C) of Table 12.   
The main conclusion we draw from these findings is that affiliate filings and 
consolidation, whether procedural or substantive, seem to be somewhat rare among 
individual chapter 11 debtors.  We do not want to overemphasize the differences 
between the two years.  Our sample sizes are relatively small and, thus, there is a 
significant amount of uncertainty as to the true means for the full population for 
2010 and 2013.  The difference in the rate of affiliate bankruptcies between 2010 
and 2013 may actually be smaller (or larger), and the difference in the rate of 
administrative consolidation is not statistically significant.   
 
Table 12: Related Bankruptcy Cases 
 
 (A) 
Affiliate 
Bankruptcy 
(B) 
Administrative 
Consolidation 
(C) 
Substantive 
Consolidation 
 2010 2013 2010 2013 2010 2013 
Yes 4.6% 12.3% 7.3% 3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
No 89.9% 85.1% 92.7% 96.5% 100.0% 100.0% 
Unknown 5.5% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
 To test for further entanglements between a debtor's financial affairs and those 
of another individual or legal entity, we also looked at whether the debtor had 
guaranteed the debt of another or served as a co-debtor for someone other than a 
spouse.  We coded not only for the existence of a guaranty or co-debtor, but also for 
whether the co-debtor or the obligor on the guaranteed debt was an individual or 
non-human legal entity.  The most striking finding, shown in Table 13, is that more 
than 30% of the debtors in each year were liable, in some fashion, for debt owed by 
another legal entity.  This finding suggests substantial entanglement in some 
business enterprise among the individual chapter 11 debtors in our random samples. 
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Table 13: Guaranties or Co-Debtors 
 
 Guaranty or Co-Debtor 
 2010 2013 
Co-debtor or guarantor of both legal entity 
and individual 
17.4% 20.2% 
Legal Entity only 15.6% 17.5% 
Individual only 12.8% 14.0% 
Unknown Entity 0.0% 0.9% 
None 39.4% 29.8% 
Unknown 14.7% 17.5% 
 
Given the evidence that a large number of the individual debtors in the 2010 
and 2013 random sample were engaged in some form of business activity, we 
expected a substantial cohort to check the small business debtor box on the 
voluntary petition.  The small business debtor definition in the Code applies to 
individual debtors and contains no requirement that the debtor be primarily engaged 
in business or commercial activity.117 Yet, as the data in Table 14 demonstrate, the 
vast majority of individual chapter 11 debtors in 2010 and 2013 did not identify as 
small business debtors on the voluntary petition.  In 2010, only 15.6% of individual 
chapter 11 debtors checked the small business debtor box on their voluntary 
petitions; that figure dropped to 11.4% in 2013.118  
In approximately 11% of the cases in the 2010 and 2013 samples, the debtor did 
not identify his or her status as a small or non-small business debtor on the petition.  
These cases are shown in Table 14 as "N/A" or "N/A-converted."  Of that 11%, a 
small number of debtors (less than 3% each year) either failed to check one of the 
small business status boxes on their chapter 11 petition or checked both boxes; we 
coded these cases as "N/A."  Another 8% to 9% of the individual debtors in the 
2010 and 2013 random sample who failed to identify as a small business debtor 
began bankruptcy in a chapter other than chapter 11.  Only chapter 11 debtors must 
complete the small business portion of the voluntary petition.119 Upon conversion to 
chapter 11, many debtors in the 2010 and 2013 random sample did not re-file the 
voluntary petition and, hence, these debtors did not designate their status as a small 
or non-small business debtor. 
                                                                                                                         
117 The small business debtor definition applies to persons, defined to include individuals, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(41), who are "engaged in commercial or business activities." Id. at § 101(51D)(A). 
118 This difference is not statistically significant.  
119 See Voluntary Petition, ADMIN OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., www.uscourts.gov/file/582/download (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2017). Form B1 has been superseded by Form B101 for individual debtors, but Question 13 
still limits the small business questions to those debtors filing for relief under chapter 11. See Voluntary 
Petition for Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 
www.uscourts.gov/file/18686/download (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).  
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Table 14: Small Business Debtors—2010 and 2013 
 
 2010 2013 
Small Business 15.6% 11.4% 
Not Small Business 73.4% 77.2% 
N/A - converted 8.3% 8.8% 
N/A 2.8% 2.6% 
 
It is unclear whether the figures in Table 14 accurately reflect the percentage of 
small business debtors among the individual chapter 11 debtors in the random 
sample.  With BAPCPA, Congress eliminated the small business election, adopted 
in 1994, and required debtors to identify as small business debtors if they satisfy the 
Code's new definition.120 Yet, some commentators, including one of us, have 
questioned whether chapter 11 "small business debtors are not self-reporting and 
may not be proceeding as small business cases."121 
Individual debtors qualify as small business debtors if: (1) they are engaged in 
business or commercial activities; (2) their liabilities fall below the applicable 
statutory debt limit for small businesses;122 (3) no official unsecured creditors' 
committees forms; and (4) the debtor's primary activity is not the business of 
owning or operating real property.123 As Table 11 shows, the vast majority of 
debtors in the 2010 and 2013 samples were engaged in some form of business or 
commercial enterprise.  Half the debtors in 2010 had total liabilities reported on 
their summary of schedules, without deducting for contingent and unliquidated 
debt, of $1,837,241 or less; in 2013, that median figure fell to $1,544,138.124 Thus, 
at least half the debtors in the 2010 and 2013 sample had liabilities substantially 
below the then-current small business liability cutoff.  An official committee of 
                                                                                                                         
120 The Code does not say this directly, but commentators understand this to be the effect of the provisions. 
See ABI Commission Report, supra note 22, at 288, 289 ("[T]he current small business provisions are 
mandatory and self-executing."); see also Lawton, Individual Chapter 11 Debtors, supra note 4, at 462–63.  
121 See ABI Commision Report, supra note 22, at 289–90 (citing study by Professor Robert Lawless, which 
found close to two-thirds of debtors that should have designated as a small business failed to do so on the 
petition). See also Lawton, Musings, supra note 4 (finding, even though Congress made small business 
designation mandatory with BAPCPA, that the percentage of debtors checking the small business box on the 
petition increased only slightly among a 2007 sample from a 2004 sample of individual chapter 11 debtors).  
122 The debt ceiling in section 101(51D) for a small business debtor changes every three years on April 1. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2012). From January 1, 2010 through March 31, 2010, the small business debt limit 
was $2,190,000. See Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed Under Section 
104(b) of the Code, 72 Fed. Reg. 7082 (Feb. 14, 2007). For cases filed between April 1, 2010 and March 31, 
2013, the debt limit was $2,343,000. See Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code 
Prescribed Under Section 104(A) of the Code, 75 Fed. Reg. 8747, 8748 (Feb. 25, 2010). The limit increased 
to $2,490,925 on April 1, 2013, see Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed 
Under Section 104(a) of the Code, 78 Fed. Reg. 12089, 12090 (Feb. 21, 2013), and recently re-set, on April 
1, 2016, to $2,566,050. See Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code, 81 Fed. Reg. 8748 
(Feb. 22, 2016).  
123 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (2012).  
124 See infra Table 29. 
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unsecured creditors did not form in any of the cases in our 2010 or 2013 sample.  
Therefore, unless the primary activity of a substantial number of the debtors in our 
2010 and 2013 sample was the business of owning or operating real property, the 
data in Table 14 suggest that many individual debtors fail to identify as small 
business debtors despite qualifying under those provisions. 
As our discussion later makes clear,125 the real estate crisis did play an 
important role in a number of cases in the random sample, especially those from 
2010.  Filing for relief under chapter 11 because of a foreclosure, however, does not 
mean that the debtor's primary activity was the business of owning or operating real 
property.  Determining which chapter 11 debtors qualify for the "real property" 
exclusion and, thus, are not small business debtors is difficult, because Congress 
failed to define what constitutes a debtor's primary activity.126 Nonetheless, our data 
suggest that a not-insignificant number of debtors in both 2010 and 2013 qualified 
as small business debtors but failed to so indicate on the voluntary petition.127  
Congress created the small business reforms in order to provide better 
monitoring of small business entities, which perform poorly in chapter 11.128 For 
the non-small business individual filers, however, chapter 11 provides little 
oversight for a number of reasons.  First, the U.S. Trustee's heightened oversight 
obligations do not apply.129 Second, official creditors' committees are nonexistent.  
We found no case in the random sample in which a committee formed.130 The 
absence of a committee raises concern about creditor disengagement; an unsecured 
creditor with a small claim may decide that the cost of an attorney outweighs the 
benefit of participation in the chapter 11 case.  In fact, we found evidence of 
disengagement by unsecured creditors.  In approximately 60% of the random 
sample cases, as Table 15 indicates, no objections, of any type, were raised by any 
unsecured creditor. 
                                                                                                                         
125 See infra Section III.B.3. 
126 See Anne Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage: Diagnosing A Debtor's Prospects for Success, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 
985, 993–94 (2012) [hereinafter Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage] ("Congress did not define what constitutes the 
'primary activity' of 'owning or operating real property,' and BAPCA's legislative history provides no insight 
on how a debtor whose 'primary activity is the business of owning or operating real property' differs from a 
single asset real estate debtor."). 
127 These figures include debtors who (1) checked neither small business box on their petition originating 
under chapter 11, (2) checked neither box on the petition because they initially filed under chapter 7 or 13, 
and (3) checked that they were not a small business on their chapter 11 voluntary petitions. 
128 See Lawton, Simple Definition, supra note 79, at 90 ("Although the Bankruptcy Code envisions that 
creditors should play a major role in the oversight of chapter 11 cases, this often does not occur with respect 
to small business debtors" and that "Congress' concern with small business debtors was the absence of 
oversight . . . .").  
129 See 11 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(7) (2012). 
130 This finding is not unusual. An official creditors' committee rarely forms in chapter 11 cases. See 
Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage, supra note 126, at 1005–09 (finding official creditors' committees formed in 
only 18% of 798 cases in a national random sample of chapter 11 debtors—both individuals and artificial 
entities—that filed for relief in 2004).  
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Table 15: Objections by Unsecured Creditors 
 
 2010 2013 
Objection 38.5% 39.5% 
No Objections 61.5% 60.5% 
 
Third, as the data in Table 16 reveal, trustees and examiners are rarely 
appointed in individual chapter 11 cases.131 The bankruptcy court appointed just 
four chapter 11 trustees in the 2010 cases and two in the 2013 cases.  An examiner 
was appointed in only one case, in 2010.  In fact, as Table 16 shows, in the 
overwhelming majority of individual chapter 11 cases in our random samples no 
party even moved for appointment of a chapter 11 trustee or examiner.   
 
Table 16: Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee or Examiner 
 
 Trustee Examiner 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
Motion Withdrawn 1% 1% 1% 0% 
Motion Denied 5% 3% 0% 1% 
Motion Granted 4% 2% 1% 0% 
No Motion 91% 95% 98% 99% 
 
As discussed more fully below,132 confirmation rates for individual chapter 11 
debtors' plans are low relative to confirmation rates in chapter 13.133 If the low 
confirmation rates are attributable to a lack of effective oversight, then the question 
is whether to raise the debt limits in chapter 13134 in order to permit these debtors to 
use a more structured process carrying trustee supervision.135 The difficulty lies in 
the differences between the stereotypical chapter 13 debtor and the typical 
individual debtor in our random sample.  Individual chapter 11 debtors have 
significantly higher incomes, own more real property, and have more complex cases 
than typical chapter 13 debtors.  Moreover, as the data in Table 11 indicate, the 
sharply higher rate at which chapter 11 debtors are conducting business is some 
                                                                                                                         
131 A debtor-in-possession may be replaced by an appointed trustee, but only under somewhat exceptional 
circumstances, typically involving fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement by the debtor-
in-possession. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012). As Table 16 demonstrates, such appointments are unusual. 
132 See infra Section IV. 
133 See infra Table 46 for data on chapter 11 confirmation rates. For chapter 13, the confirmation rate is 
substantially higher—about 70%. See Flynn, supra note 33, at 41. 
134 For a discussion of the chapter 13 debt limits, see infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. 
135 Chapter 13 cases are administered by a "standing" trustee, who is responsible for duties such as 
examining proofs of claim, investigating the debtor's financial affairs, and making payments to creditors in 
accordance with the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). This contrasts with the usual practice in chapter 11 
cases, in which the debtor becomes a debtor-in-possession, with the rights and powers of a trustee. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1107 (2012). 
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indication that a different set of procedures may be appropriate.  Therefore, if 
individual filers neither fit in chapter 13 nor perform well in chapter 11, the solution 
may lie with a special subchapter tailored to the needs of individual and small 
business debtors.    
 
3.  Prior and Subsequent Bankruptcy Filings  
 
Prior research has found that many debtors are repeat filers, especially those 
who file under chapter 13.136 In 2005, Congress amended section 362(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code to discourage bad faith repeat filings by individual debtors filing 
under chapter 7, 11 or 13.137 Congress also added a serial filer provision—found at 
section 362(n)—applicable to small business debtors.138 The basic argument for 
these provisions was that debtors were filing and dismissing bankruptcy cases 
solely to disrupt the foreclosure process, and the current literature offers some 
evidence of serial filing, especially in chapter 13.139 Repeat filing does not 
necessarily mean bad faith filing, however.  For example, the debtor may have 
experienced an entirely new financial shock that prevented completion of the 
reorganization plan.140 
We measured serial filing in chapter 11 by looking at both prior and subsequent 
bankruptcy cases.  For prior filings, we used the debtor's disclosure on the voluntary 
petition for both 2010 and 2013.  For the 2010 cases, we also searched nationally on 
Bloomberg Law141 for both prior and subsequent bankruptcy cases using each 
debtor's name and the last four digits of the debtor's social security number.  Our 
searches included any dba used by the debtor and identified on the voluntary 
petition.  We did not conduct Bloomberg Law searches for the cases in the 2013 
random sample, because too little time had elapsed since the 2013 case filings to 
provide us with a meaningful comparison to the 2010 data.   
Table 17 provides data on prior bankruptcy filings for 2010 and 2013, based on 
the debtor's disclosures on the petition.  As the data show, the percentage of cases 
with prior bankruptcy filings increased substantially from 2010 to 2013.  In 2010, 
                                                                                                                         
136 See, e.g., Norberg & Velkey supra note 2, at 497 ("Among the most remarkable findings of the Project 
is that at least half of all of the Chapter 13 debtors in the sample had filed one or more bankruptcy cases in 
addition to the sample case."). 
137 See Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 302(3) (2005). For more on the legislative history, see Hon. William Houston 
Brown & Lawrence R. Ahern III, 2005 BANKRUPTCY REFORM LEGISLATION WITH ANALYSIS 2D 297 (2006) 
[hereinafter Brown & Ahern]. 
138 See Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 441(2) (2005). See also Brown & Ahern, supra note 137, at 298. 
139 See Norberg & Velkey supra note 2, at 497. 
140 Although chapter 13 allows debtors to modify their plans, the Administrative Office reports that these 
modifications are somewhat rare. Of the chapter 13 plans actually completed in 2014, just 22% had any 
modifications, and only 2% had more than two. See BAPCPA Report—2014: Chapter 13 Cases Terminated 
by Dismissal or Plan Completion—Table 6, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 
www.uscourts.gov/file/18145/download (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). For a discussion of post-confirmation 
modification in chapter 11, see infra note 196. 
141 See BLOOMBERG LAW, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/start (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
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approximately 10% of the debtors had previously filed for bankruptcy;142 that 
number more than doubled to 27% in 2013.  
 
Table 17: Prior Bankruptcies Based on Debtor Disclosure 
 
 2010 2013 
Prior Bankruptcy 10.1% 27.2% 
No Prior Bankruptcies 89.9% 78.9% 
 
Table 18 shows the results of the national Bloomberg Law searches for 2010.  
The data provide a more nuanced picture of the 2010 individual debtors, showing 
all bankruptcy filings by the same debtor over the span of approximately twenty 
years. 
 
Table 18: Prior and Later Bankruptcies—2010 
 
 Percentage 
Prior Bankruptcy Only 7.3% 
Later Bankruptcy Only 16.5% 
Both Prior and Later Bankruptcies 8.3% 
No Other Bankruptcies 67.9% 
 
As Table 18 shows, approximately one-third of the debtors in the 2010 sample 
filed at least one other bankruptcy case.  Later filings were more than twice as 
common as prior filings for the 2010 sample.  This finding is somewhat consistent 
with Table 17's data showing that the 2013 debtors were twice as likely to report a 
prior bankruptcy filing as the 2010 debtors.  These findings may be the result of 
economic conditions or of the changes brought by BAPCPA. 
The number of repeat filings is clearly relevant for determining a debtor's bad 
faith.  A second or even a third bankruptcy filing may simply be a debtor's attempt 
to successfully rehabilitate his or her financial affairs.143 Reorganization takes time, 
and successful reorganization may require more than a single filing, but it is harder 
to tell a positive story when a debtor files six or more times in rapid succession.144 
                                                                                                                         
142 In 2010, twelve debtors disclosed a prior filing on their petitions, but in one case the filing was by a 
related entity rather than either of the married debtors. See In re Lewis, No. 10-14965 (Bankr. D. Ariz. May 
14, 2010) (disclosing prior filing by Lewis Investment Properties, LLC).  
143 See, e.g., In re Langdon, No. 10-07211 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 3, 2010) (married debtors' chapter 11 
plan apparently failed, as they re-filed for relief under chapter 13 a little over three years after confirmation).  
144 See, e.g., In re Anderson, No. 10-39309 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (chapter 11 case dismissed, 
after debtor had filed and had dismissed four chapter 13 cases in prior two years in Northern District of 
California; debtor then re-filed for relief under chapter 7 in Eastern District of California, only to have the 
court dismiss that case within a month of filing); In re Wiryadimejo, No. 10-17032 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 
25, 2010) (chapter 11 case dismissed, after which debtor filed five more bankruptcy cases—four under 
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As Figure 2 shows, most debtors filed only one or two other bankruptcy cases.  A 
handful of the 2010 debtors, however, fall into the rapid-succession, repeat-filer 
category.   
 
Figure 2: Number of Other Bankruptcy Filings by 2010 Debtors 
 
 
 
BAPCPA's amendments to section 362 complicate matters for debtors whose 
first bankruptcy case fails.  Section 362(c)(3) limits operation of the automatic stay 
to thirty days from filing in any individual chapter 7, 11 or 13 case in which the 
debtor had a case "pending within the preceding one-year period [that was] 
dismissed."145  
Section 362(c)(3) only applies if certain conditions are met.  First, it applies 
only if the earlier bankruptcy case was dismissed, unless the dismissal resulted from 
application of the means test in chapter 7.146 Thus, the thirty-day stay-termination 
rule of section 362(c)(3) does not apply to a second bankruptcy case filed under 
chapter 11 if the debtor obtained a discharge in an earlier-filed case, even if the 
earlier case was pending during the year preceding the debtor's second bankruptcy 
case.147 Nor does it apply to a bankruptcy case filed within one year of an earlier 
                                                                                                                         
chapter 7 and one under chapter 11—over the next nineteen months); cf. In re VonFeldt, No. 10-10796 
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Feb. 9, 2010) (debtor filed four bankruptcy cases between May of 1997 and July of 2000 
(three under chapter 13 and one under chapter 7), waited almost a decade until filing his chapter 11 case in 
2010, and then filed two more cases under chapter 13 in 2013 and 2014).  
145 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2012).  
146 See id. 
147 See, e.g., In re Dietz, No. 10-10547 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2010) (debtor received chapter 7 
discharge in case filed in same district 11 months earlier). Unlike chapters 7 and 13, chapter 11 does not 
68%
17%
9%
3% 3%
None
One
Two
Three
Four or More
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case in which the debtor confirmed a chapter 11 plan that later failed, as long as the 
chapter 11 case did not result in dismissal.148 
Second, the period between filings does not run from petition date to petition 
date.  The Code uses the word "pending."149 Therefore, if a debtor files a chapter 13 
case in January of 2008, but the case is not dismissed until January of 2010, that 
chapter 13 case is pending within one year of any other bankruptcy case filed by the 
debtor in 2010.150 
The Code does not define the term "pending," but the case law on the issue, 
albeit limited, holds that the time period in section 362(c)(3) runs from the date of 
the order of dismissal, not from the date the bankruptcy case closes.151 Therefore, 
we used the date of the dismissal order for the results presented in Table 19.   
                                                                                                                         
limit an individual debtor's right to a discharge based on the debtor having received a discharge, within 
certain time frames, in an earlier-filed bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (2012) (no language denying 
discharge based on discharge received in prior bankruptcy case); cf. id. at § 727(a)(8), (9) (denying discharge 
to a chapter 7 debtor if the debtor received a discharge in a case filed, depending on chapter, within 6 to 8 
years of the current chapter 7 case); id. at § 1328(f) (denying discharge to chapter 13 debtor if debtor 
received a discharge in a case filed, depending on chapter, within two to four years of the current chapter 13 
case).  
148 See, e.g., In re Inglis, No. 10-35781 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2010) (debtor obtained confirmation of 
a chapter 11 plan but six months after case was closed debtor re-filed for relief under chapter 13). But see In 
re Manteghi, No. 10-43851 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2010) (bankruptcy court dismissed case with 
prejudice, noting debtor had materially breached plan, and even though bankruptcy court enjoined debtor 
from re-filing within one year debtor re-filed under chapter 13 within 2 months of dismissal order). 
149 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2012). 
150 See In re Drabin, No. 10-16315 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. July 7, 2010) (married debtors filed in December 
2010, about 11 months after bankruptcy court dismissed their 2008 chapter 13 case).  
151 See In re Linares, No. 10-26453, 2010 WL 2788248, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 12, 2010) (holding 
dismissal date not administrative closing date is relevant to begin the time period in section 362(c)(3)); In re 
Easthope, 2006 WL 851829, at *3 (Bankr. D. Utah Mar. 28, 2006) (noting it would be unfair to debtors to 
run the time period in section 362(c)(3) from the date of case closing because debtors cannot control when 
the clerk's office closes a case and, thus, holding that "[t]he plain meaning of the word 'pending' as well as 
policy considerations demonstrate that a case is no longer pending once it has been dismissed."); In re 
Moore, 337 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2005) (stating debtor's prior bankruptcy case was "no longer 
'pending' for purposes of § 362(c)(3) as of the date of dismissal, regardless of when the case was closed"). 
Courts disagree about whether a motion to vacate or reconsider a dismissal order extends the time that a case 
is pending. Compare In re Lundquist, 371 B.R. 183, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (footnote omitted) 
(holding that "[a] case is 'pending' for purposes of section 362(c) until it is dismissed, and a motion to vacate 
the dismissal does not extend the time that the case is 'pending.'") with In re Myers, No. 07-14565, 2007 WL 
2428694, at *8–9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding "the Lundquist analysis unpersuasive" and concluding that 
debtor's earlier bankruptcy case was still pending, notwithstanding the court's order of dismissal, because 
"the dismissal order lacked finality due to [debtor's] pending motion for reconsideration.").  
2017] NATIONAL STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL CH. 11 BANKRUPTCIES 99 
 
 
Table 19: Other Filings 2010 and § 362(c)(3) 
 
 Percentage 
No other filings 67.9% 
Other Filings/No § 362 Problem 6.4% 
Other Filings/ § 362 Problem 25.7% 
 
The 2010 case may not be the one posing a section 362 problem for the debtor.  
The data in Table 19 track the 2010 debtors over the span of approximately twenty 
years.  Thus, if a debtor filed for relief in November of 2010, the bankruptcy court 
dismissed the case in June of 2011, and the debtor then filed for relief under chapter 
13 in November of 2011, section 362(c)(3) would apply to the 2011 chapter 13 
filing, not the 2010 chapter 11 filing.  Nevertheless, as the data in Table 19 show, 
section 362(c)(3) posed a problem, at some point in time, for more than one in four 
of the debtors in the 2010 random sample. 
 
4.  Size and Complexity 
 
We close out this part of the report with some statistics bearing on the 
complexity of the bankruptcy cases.  Complexity is important because, first, it 
makes coding the cases much more difficult, increasing the chance of error.  For 
example, many debtors amend their schedules several times over the course of their 
bankruptcy case, and we tried to use the most recent schedules available.152 We may 
have missed some revisions, however, or interpreted some amended schedules as 
replacements when they were really meant to supplement prior disclosures, or vice 
versa.  In addition, the quality of disclosure varied significantly from debtor to 
debtor, making it difficult, at times, to determine which scheduled amount to use.153 
Second, complexity makes it harder to argue that these cases belong in chapter 13.  
Just as many Americans with straightforward financial affairs use simple forms—
1040A or 1040EZ—to file their taxes, the same is arguably true of chapter 13.  To 
the extent that individuals do not have simple affairs and have more active creditors, 
chapter 13 may serve less well.   
                                                                                                                         
152 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
153 See, e.g., In re Tuls, No. 13-11930 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 11, 2013) (debtor filed schedules with initial 
chapter 7 filing showing total liabilities of approximately $2.1 million, converted to chapter 11 four months 
later and filed an amended Schedule F, and three months after converting to chapter 11 converted back to 
chapter 7 and filed amended schedules with total liabilities of $3.36 million); In re McBryde, No. 10-13394 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2010) (debtors filed initial Summary of Schedules with "Total" of almost $2.1 
million for liabilities, and 14 months later filed an amended Summary of Schedules with $0 entered for 
"Total" liabilities, apparently because debtor's amendment did not include any amendments to Schedules D, 
E or F); In re Anderson, No. 10-39309 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (summary of Schedules with 
negative entry for Real Property Assets, and no values for two parcels of real property listed on Schedule A). 
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Size can serve as a proxy for complexity, and the data in Tables 20 through 22 
demonstrate that most of the cases in the random sample were small.  As shown in 
Table 20, the overwhelming majority (around 86%) of debtors estimated at filing 
that they had fewer than fifty creditors, and only around 3% estimated that they had 
at least 100.   
 
Table 20: Estimated Number of Creditors 
 
 2010 2013 
1 to 49 86.2% 86.0% 
50 to 99 10.1% 10.5% 
100 to 199 1.8% 1.8% 
200 to 299 0.9% 0.9% 
Unknown 0.9% 0.9% 
 
The data in Table 21 indicate that the majority of debtors at filing estimated that 
they had between $1 and $5 million of liabilities; the next largest category was 
between $500,000 and $1 million.  Fewer than 10% of debtors (6% in 2010 and 8% 
in 2013) estimated their liabilities as in excess of $5 million.  Even fewer debtors—
less than 4% in both 2010 and 2013—estimated their assets as exceeding $5 
million.    
 
Table 21: Estimated Assets and Liabilities 
 
 Assets Liabilities 
 2010 2013 2010 2013 
0 to 50K 17.4% 14.9% 2.8% 1.8% 
50K to 100K 0.9% 0.0% 1.8% 1.8% 
100K to 500K 14.7% 18.4% 4.6% 10.5% 
500K to 1M 11.9% 31.6% 14.7% 21.9% 
1M to 5M 48.6% 30.7% 67.0% 55.3% 
5M to 10M 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10M to 50M 3.7% 2.6% 5.5% 7.9% 
50M and above 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 
n/a 2.8% 1.8% 2.8% 0.9% 
 
Finally, Table 22 provides the debtors' responses to the question on the petition 
as to whether assets will be available to pay a dividend to general unsecured 
creditors.  As the data in Table 22 reveal, debtors were quite optimistic about their 
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ability to pay such a dividend; approximately 77% of debtors in both 2010 and 2013 
checked the box on the petition indicating that funds would be available to pay 
unsecured creditors.154 We cannot determine whether this optimism at filing bears 
out in the ultimate payout made to unsecured creditors. 
 
Table 22: Assets Available for General Creditors—Random Sample 
 
 2010 2013 
Asset 77.1% 77.2% 
No Asset 17.4% 21.1% 
Unknown 5.5% 1.8% 
 
B.  The Debtor's Financial Condition 
 
Financial information obtained from the debtors' schedules reveals that 
individual debtors in the random sample are wealthier than the average American.  
They are more likely to own real property, and their incomes are much higher than 
that of the typical American household.   
 
1.  Occupation, Income and Expenses 
 
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook famously argued that most consumers in 
bankruptcy are "middle class," but with lower incomes.155 Much of their supporting 
data were drawn from surveys that we did not try to replicate.  We can, however, 
get some sense as to the characteristics of individual chapter 11 filers by examining 
their occupation, income, and expenses. 
                                                                                                                         
154 While this 77% figure is optimistic, it is not as optimistic as the roughly 90% rate that we found in our 
PACER data sample. See supra Table 7 and accompanying text. At first, we were concerned that the rate 
difference between the small sample and the PACER data resulted from a mistake in the randomization 
process. A check of several cases, however, revealed that the rate difference resulted from coding 
differences. More specifically, we checked three entries from the Central District of California that our 
research assistants had marked "No Asset" and one that our research assistant had marked "unknown," and 
found that the research assistants' answers differed from those of PACER on three of the four cases. We then 
checked the petition on Bloomberg Law and verified that our research assistants had correctly coded the box 
that the debtor checked (or, in the case of the "unknown" response, that the debtor failed to check either 
box). We do not know why PACER coded these cases as it did. 
155 See SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 2, at 5–7. 
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Table 23: Occupation 
 
 2010 2013 
Real Estate 8% 10% 
Professional  9% 13% 
Owner, Manager, Executive 24% 24% 
Self-Employed 17% 13% 
Other  18% 24% 
Retired 4% 1% 
Unemployed 1% 3% 
Unknown 19% 13% 
 
We coded how the debtor (or the first debtor in a jointly filed case) 
characterized his or her occupation on Schedule I.  This coding is admittedly 
imprecise.  For example, some debtors listed their occupation as "Owner" while 
others stated that they were "Self-Employed."  While the two categories may 
overlap, the debtor who is an owner may have employees, and the self-employed 
debtor may operate a business for which he or she alone works.  Some debtors listed 
the company where they worked (or perhaps that they owned) but failed to list a 
position.  We saw little benefit in distinguishing between positions such as 
"elementary school teacher," "farmer," "bartender," "pilot," and "IT specialist," so 
we created an "Other" category for these kinds of positions.  Categorizing the wide 
variety of occupational responses provided on Schedule I was difficult and required 
judgment calls.  Different researchers may draw the lines in different places.  
Nonetheless, our results are instructive.  Approximately half of the debtors in our 
random sample (1) were professionals in fields that are often highly compensated 
(attorney, chiropractor, dentist, engineer, pharmacist, physician, and psychiatrist), 
(2) ran a business (president, CEO or owner), or (3) were self-employed.  We 
suspect that other debtors, such as realtors and mortgage brokers, as well as some of 
the debtors in the "other" category—farmer, investment advisor, photo journalist, 
and professional truck driver—also were self-employed.    
We make two observations from this data on debtor occupation.  First, a very 
large proportion of individual chapter 11 debtors operated businesses as their 
primary occupation.  Second, the data may say something about whether individual 
chapter 11 debtors are "middle-class," although this term can have an extremely 
expansive meaning.  Neither self-employment nor even the ownership of a small 
business necessarily indicates what one might call high living.  In a moment, 
therefore, we turn to the debtors' income and expenses. 
Before doing so, however, we note the very long job tenure claimed by the 
individual chapter 11 debtors in our sample.  The data in Table 24 are based on the 
responses of one debtor for each case; thus, for joint cases, we used the period 
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provided for the first debtor listed on Schedule I.  Several of our debtors did not 
respond to Schedule I's inquiry "How long employed."  Those who did respond 
reported median employment tenure of seven-and-a-half years and nine years in 
2010 and 2013, respectively.  By contrast, in their study of debtors who filed for 
relief under chapters 7 or 13 in the early 1980s, Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook 
found that the median job tenure was just eighteen months.156 We suspect that the 
difference in findings may be due to the fact that many of our debtors were self-
employed and were simply reporting how long they had been in a particular line of 
work, rather than how long they had worked at their most recent position. 
 
Table 24: Employment Duration in Years 
 
 2010 2013 
Over 25 Years 7.3% 12.3% 
10 to 25 Years 17.4% 18.4% 
5 to 10 Years 18.3% 15.8% 
2 to 5 Years 9.2% 10.5% 
1 to 2 Years 2.8% 11.4% 
0.5 to 1 Year 2.8% 3.5% 
3 to 6 Months 3.7% 0.0% 
Fewer than 3 Months 4.6% 2.6% 
N/A 33.9% 25.4% 
Longest Time Employed 40.00 55.00 
Average Duration 10.75 12.85 
Median Duration 7.50 9.00 
 
In their study of consumers who filed for bankruptcy in 2007, Lawless and his 
co-authors found a median income for chapter 13 filers of $35,688 per year, or 
about $37,532 in 2010 dollars.157 The income levels of the individual chapter 11 
debtors in our small sample were dramatically higher.  Table 25 presents data on the 
debtors' current monthly income, as disclosed on the Statement of Current Monthly 
Income, and their combined average monthly income from Line 16 of former 
Schedule I.  Half the debtors in our 2013 random sample reported combined 
monthly income of $8,624 or more, which annualizes to a figure in excess of 
$100,000.  Our findings are roughly consistent with those in the BAPCPA reports 
prepared by the AO, which show median current and average monthly income of 
$7,935 and $9,212, respectively, in 2010 and $7,518 and $9,481, respectively, in 
                                                                                                                         
156 See SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 2, at 96. 
157 See Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail, supra note 2, at 361. 
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2013.158 These numbers are not directly comparable to our figures because we 
coded for all individual chapter 11 bankruptcies while the AO focused only on 
chapter 11 debtors with primarily non-business debts.   
 The data in Table 25 also show that the debtors in our sample were over-
represented among the top income categories.  Approximately 36% of our debtors 
had monthly incomes that placed them in the top 20% of household incomes 
nationally.159 Approximately 14% had annual incomes in excess of $200,200 in 
2010 and $225,333 in 2013, which placed them among the top 5% of American 
households nationally.  Not all the debtors in our sample were high earners, 
however.  Between 12% and 18% of the debtors had incomes that placed them in 
the bottom 40% of household incomes nationally.  But as the data demonstrate, 
lower-income debtors comprised a smaller percentage of our sample compared with 
their representation in the American population at large. 
 
Table 25: Debtors' Monthly Income 
 
 Combined Monthly 
Income—Schedule I 
Current Monthly 
Income 
 2010 2013 2010 2013 
Top 5% 13.8% 14.0% 13.8% 14.0% 
5th Quintile (includes top 5%) 36.7% 36.0% 35.8% 36.0% 
4th Quintile 29.4% 26.3% 11.0% 22.8% 
3rd Quintile 7.3% 19.3% 14.7% 21.9% 
2nd Quintile 11.0% 6.1% 11.9% 5.3% 
1st Quintile (includes 0) 7.3% 6.1% 15.6% 6.1% 
0 1.8% 3.5% 9.2% 3.5% 
Unknown 8.3% 6.1% 11.0% 7.9% 
Maximum  53,383 68,200 55,916 61,000 
Average 11,858 11,669 9,993 10,416 
Median 9,004 8,624 6,828 7,514 
 
Although it may seem surprising that someone with a six-figure income would 
need bankruptcy, these debtors had expenses comparable in size to their incomes.  
While median combined monthly incomes ranged from $8,600 to $9,000, the data 
in Table 26 demonstrate that median monthly expenses ranged from about $8,200 to 
                                                                                                                         
158 See ADMIN OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 2010 REPORT OF STATISTICS REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY 
ABUSE PROTECTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005 at 39. 
159 See Median Household Income, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (2010), 
https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/income.html.  
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$9,200.  In fact, in both 2010 and 2013, more than three in ten debtors in the 
random sample reported monthly expenses of $10,000 or more.   
  
Table 26: Debtors' Monthly Expenses 
 
 Schedule J 
 2010 2013 
Over 25K 11.0% 8.8% 
10K to 25K 27.5% 23.7% 
5K to 10K 36.7% 36.8% 
2.5K to 5K 10.1% 16.7% 
1 to 2.5K 5.5% 4.4% 
0 1.8% 1.8% 
N/A 7.3% 7.9% 
Maximum 114,940 64,780 
Average 12,618 10,739 
Median 9,243 8,176 
 
Numerous scholars have claimed that medical expenses and medical debts are a 
major cause of consumer bankruptcy.160 By contrast, our debtors did not generally 
claim major medical expenses, at least relative to their incomes.   
                                                                                                                         
160 See, e.g., David U. Himmselstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Steffie Woolhandler, Medical 
Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 742 (2009) 
(survey results showing 62.1% of all bankruptcies in 2007 were medical); Melissa Jacoby, Teresa A. 
Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the 
Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 375 (2001) (suggesting bankruptcy policy should be included in 
any review of health care financing policy); see also RONALD MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH 
AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 61, 63 (2007) (noting many consumers use credit cards to 
meet medical expenses). 
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Table 27: Medical Expenses 
 
 2010 2013 
More than 500 7.3% 3.5% 
400 to 500 5.5% 5.3% 
300 to 400 3.7% 7.0% 
200 to 300 4.6% 8.8% 
100 to 200 22.0% 18.4% 
1 to 100 31.2% 38.6% 
0 15.6% 14.0% 
N/A 10.1% 4.4% 
Maximum 1,800 10,514 
Average 193 268 
Median 100 100 
 
Attorney compensation is another expense chapter 11 debtors incur, albeit not a 
recurring monthly one.  Attorney fees may play a role in whether individual debtors 
choose to file for relief under chapter 13 rather than chapter 11.  In order to 
compare chapter 13 and chapter 11 attorney fees, we coded information provided on 
the attorney's disclosure-of-compensation form filed at the outset of the case for our 
debtors in the random sample.161 These disclosures list the amount that the attorney 
has agreed to accept for legal services, as well as the amount already received.  
Some attorneys agreed to receive an amount contingent on some other factor, such 
as the number of hours they worked; we coded these disclosures as "N/A."  We 
present our findings in Table 28. 
                                                                                                                         
161 We did not try to gather the total amount of attorney's fees expended by the individual debtors in the 
random sample.  
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Table 28: Attorney Compensation 
 
 (A) 
Amount Received 
(B) 
Agreed Amount 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
$100K to $200K 1.8% 0.0% 1.8% 0.9% 
$25K to $100K 8.3% 2.6% 4.6% 5.3% 
$10K to $25K 20.2% 26.3% 21.1% 21.1% 
$5K to $10K 20.2% 23.7% 18.3% 15.8% 
$2K to $5K 19.3% 15.8% 16.5% 7.9% 
$1 to $2K 6.4% 6.1% 2.8% 0.9% 
0 4.6% 5.3% 0.9% 1.8% 
n/a or Pro Se 19.3% 20.2% 33.9% 46.5% 
Maximum $180,000 $50,000 $180,000 $101,424 
Average $15,801 $9,855 $16,588 $14,653 
Median $8,363 $7,500 $10,000 $10,287 
 
Of those records we were able to use, the median agreed amount in our random 
sample cases was around $10,000 in each year.  See Table 28, Column (B).  The 
median amount already received was $7,500 in 2013 and $8,363 in 2010.  See Table 
28, Column (A).  By comparison, the median value for total fees in chapter 13 cases 
is around $2,500, though in some jurisdictions total chapter 13 fees approach 
$5,000.162 
Finally, we were curious whether debtors filed for chapter 11 in an attempt to 
avoid a trustee's scrutiny of their expenses.  Most of these debtors had some 
expenses that the average American would label as a luxury.  Our median debtor 
claimed monthly expenses of approximately $8,200 to $9,200, or about $98,000 to 
$111,000 per year, while median household income in the United States was 
$49,276 in 2010 and $53,595 in 2013.163  
But that comparison may be inapt.  First, some of these expenses were business-
related.  Second, it may be appropriate, as one of us has argued, to allow higher-
income debtors to claim greater expenses in bankruptcy.164 We could not develop 
                                                                                                                         
162 See Lupica, supra note 26. Attorneys' fees are only part of the story. The filing fees for the two chapters 
are quite different: currently, the filing fee for chapter 13 is $235, compared with $1,167 for chapter 11 
cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) (2012) (prescribing a cap; the actual percentage varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction). Fees are also paid to the chapter 13 standing trustee, generally calculated as a percentage of the 
amount of payments under the plan. See id. at § 1930(e). Quarterly fees, payable to the U.S. Trustee in a 
chapter 11 case, are based on the amount disbursed during the relevant quarter. The fees range from $325 for 
disbursements up to $14,999.99, to $30,000 for disbursements exceeding $30,000,000. See id. at 
§ 1930(a)(6). Individual chapter 11 debtors are highly unlikely to deal with such staggering sums, of course.  
163 See Median Household Income in the United States, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, retrieved from 
FRED, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Feb. 19, 2017), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA646N.  
164 See Richard M. Hynes, Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 301 (2004) (arguing if 
bankruptcy is designed to provide social insurance, debtors who enjoyed greater living expenses pre-
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workable criteria as to what constituted a luxury expense.  Instead, we instructed 
our research assistants to look for "unusual and large expenses that some might 
think are indicative of a luxurious lifestyle" and told them to be sure to include 
tuition for private school or for any college, whether public or private.  Because 
there were several research assistants, the standard likely varied from case to case 
just as the identity of the trustee or bankruptcy judge will cause the standard to vary.  
Some of the research assistants' entries showed large expenses for real property 
(utilities, mortgage, etc.) or business and medical expenses that perhaps should have 
been included elsewhere on the form.  We did find, however, that at least twelve 
(11%) of the 2010 and sixteen (14%) of the 2013 cases had expenses that might 
draw the scrutiny of a trustee.  These expenses included (1) tuition of at least $1,000 
a month (nine cases, with a high of $4,525 per month), (2) food of at least $1,000 
per month (five cases, with a high of $3,000 per month for a household of three), 
and (3) a large number of miscellaneous entries for such things as entertainment or 
recreation (several cases ranging from $1,720 to $3,487 per month), gardeners, pool 
service, golf club fees, boats and recreational vehicles, and $4,237 for a life 
insurance policy on a business associate. 
 
2.  Debt 
 
Table 29 provides data on debtors' total liabilities reported on the summary of 
schedules, as well as a breakdown by secured and non-priority unsecured debt.  
Information in the summary of schedules often differed from information in the full 
schedules because debtors amended some or all of the latter without amending the 
former.  It is not clear which numbers are more accurate.  Totals on the individual 
schedules often reflect the debtor's last estimates and, therefore, may be more 
accurate.  On the other hand, debtors at times were unclear as to whether their 
amended schedules supplemented or replaced prior schedules, making it difficult 
for our research assistants to determine schedule totals in some cases.  The results 
are not usually materially different, so we present the information from the 
summary of schedules unless there is a good reason not to do so.   
                                                                                                                         
bankruptcy should be allowed greater expenses in bankruptcy). 
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Table 29: Distribution of Indebtedness—Liabilities from Summary of 
Schedules 
 
 Secured Claims Unsecured Non-
Priority Claims 
Total Liabilities 
2010 2013 2010 2013 2010 2013 
Over 
$10M 
2.8% 2.6% 4.6% 5.3% 7.3% 9.6% 
$5M to 
$10M 
7.3% 4.4% 2.8% 3.5% 8.3% 5.3% 
$2.5M to 
$5M 
11.9% 9.6% 3.7% 4.4% 19.3% 15.8% 
$1M to 
$2.5M 
33.9% 23.7% 10.1% 13.2% 41.3% 30.7% 
$500K to 
$1M 
16.5% 30.7% 16.5% 8.8% 11.0% 21.9% 
$1 to 
$500K 
16.5% 20.2% 52.3% 56.1% 5.5% 10.5% 
0 4.6% 2.6% 2.8% 2.6% 0.9% 0.0% 
n/a 6.4% 6.1% 7.3% 6.1% 6.4% 6.1% 
Maximum 56,634,114 23,440,918 153,710,706 43,399,184 161,757,352 43,439,884 
Average 2,454,233 1,925,596 3,409,150 2,085,418 5,859,607 3,685,636 
Median 1,248,607 906,396 229,367 208,207 1,837,241 1,544,138 
 
As the data in Table 29 show, the median debtor in 2010 had over $1.8 million 
in total debt, of which $1.25 million was secured debt and approximately $229,000 
was non-priority unsecured debt.  In 2013, these figures were a little lower: $1.5 
million in total debt, of which approximately $906,000 was secured debt and 
$208,000 was non-priority unsecured debt.  As shown in Table 29, most of the 
debtors in 2010 and 2013 had total debt between $500,000 and $2,500,000.   
Presumably, many debtors choose chapter 11 because they wish to reorganize 
but their debts make them ineligible for chapter 13.165 Because individuals meeting 
chapter 13's debt limits166 would be expected to choose that chapter (if, for no other 
                                                                                                                         
165 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012). Chapter 13 carries more restrictive eligibility requirements than either 
chapter 7 or chapter 11. Only individuals with regular income who meet fairly modest debt limitations are 
eligible for chapter 13. The only other choices for a debtor unable to meet those requirements would be to 
liquidate under chapter 7 or to forego bankruptcy altogether. A limited number of debtors—those qualifying 
as a "family farmer or family fisherman"—may be eligible for chapter 12. See id. at § 109(f). We did not 
track chapter 12 cases. 
166 These debt limits are adjusted every three years, under the mandate of 11 U.S.C. § 104(a). As of April 
1, 2016 the debt limits are $1,184,200 for secured debts and $394,725 for unsecured debts. See Revision of 
Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code, 81 Fed. Reg. 8748 (Feb. 22, 2016). Between April 1, 2013 
and March 31, 2016 these limits were $1,149,525 for secured debt and $383,175 for unsecured debt. See 
Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed Under Section 104(a) of the Code, 
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reason, because it is substantially less costly), we were particularly interested in 
those debtors who nonetheless elected chapter 11. 
To examine more carefully the impact of chapter 13's current debt limits, we 
compared each debtor's liabilities against (1) the debt limits in effect at the time of 
bankruptcy filing (Column (A) of Table 30), and (2) the debt limits if Congress 
were to increase those limits by 50% (Column (B) of Table 30).  We also used two 
different measures of debt: (1) the amount of debt listed on the summary of 
schedules; and (2) the amount of debt listed on the individual schedules.  Each 
measure has its disadvantages.  The summary of schedules does not distinguish 
debts that are both non-contingent and liquidated from those that are not, and only 
the former count toward the debt limits.  The full schedules do denote these debts, 
but it is not always clear whether amended schedules replace or supplement an 
original schedule, and so the total amount of debt is sometimes uncertain.  
Moreover, in chapter 11, the debtor may check the boxes for contingent or 
unliquidated debt for strategic reasons.167 
 As the data in Table 30 demonstrate, a significant number of the debtors in our 
samples had liabilities below the secured and unsecured debt ceilings for chapter 
13.  Our lowest estimate of chapter 13-eligible debtors is 19.3%, which is the figure 
for 2010 debtors using the summary of schedules data.  This figure rises from 19% 
to 46.5% for 2013, using the full schedules rather than the debtors' summary of 
schedules.    
Raising the debt limit by 50% does not significantly increase the percentage of 
chapter 13-eligible debtors in our random sample.  The most dramatic impact is for 
the full-schedule analysis of debtors who filed in 2010.  Raising the debt limits by 
50% would increase by 16%—from 27% to 42%—the number of chapter 13-
eligible debtors.  By contrast, for 2013, the debt-limit change would increase by 
only 9%—from 47% to 55%—the number of chapter 13-eligible debtors.  Of 
course, a more dramatic change in the debt limit would have a greater impact. 
                                                                                                                         
78 Fed. Reg. 12089, 12090 (Feb. 21, 2013). Between April 1, 2010 and March 31, 2013, the limits were 
$1,081,400 for secured debt and $360,475 for unsecured debt. See Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in 
the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed Under Section 104(A) of the Code, 75 Fed. Reg. 8747, 8748 (Feb. 24, 
2010). Between April 1, 2007 and March 31, 2010, these limits were $1,010,650 for secured debt and 
$336,900 for unsecured debt. See Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code Prescribed 
Under Section 104(b) of the Code, 72 Fed. Reg. 7082 (Feb. 14, 2007). Thus, the debt limits changed during 
the years on which this Study focused. In addition, the categories of unsecured and secured debts may 
include only obligations that are non-contingent and liquidated. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012). The debt 
limits remain the same if an individual files jointly with his or her spouse. See id.  
167 In chapter 11, a creditor must file a proof of claim if the debtor designates the creditor's debt as 
contingent, unliquidated, or disputed on the schedules. If the creditor fails to do so, the creditor will "not be 
treated as a creditor with respect to such claim for the purposes of voting and distribution." FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 3003(c)(2).  
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Table 30: Impact of Chapter 13 Actual and Hypothetical Debt Limits 
 
 (A) 
Full Schedules 
(B) 
Full Schedules x 1.5 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
Over 67.0% 50.0% 51.4% 41.2% 
Under 26.6% 46.5% 42.2% 55.3% 
N/A 6.4% 3.5% 6.4% 3.5% 
 Summary of Schedules Summary of Schedules x 1.5 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
Over 73.4% 57.9% 58.7% 43.9% 
Under 19.3% 36.0% 33.9% 50.0% 
N/A 7.3% 6.1% 7.3% 6.1% 
 
As we discussed in Section III.B, our debtors had very high incomes and 
expenses.  They also had enormous debt-to-income ratios relative to the ratios 
reported by prior scholars studying bankrupt individuals in other chapters.  While 
Lawless and his co-authors found a median debt-to-income ratio of 3.3 in their 
sample of bankrupt debtors filing in 2007,168 the median debt-to-income ratio in our 
sample was eight in 2013 and sixteen in 2010.  Table 31 presents these ratios, using 
figures from the summary of schedules.169  
                                                                                                                         
168 See Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail, supra note 2, at 372. Other scholars found similar 
ratios. See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE, supra note 2, at 313 ("The mean consumer debt/income 
ratio for wage-earning debtors was 2.5."); SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 2, at 70 
(noting the mean debt-to-income ratios for all types of debt ranged from 2.51 in 1991 to 3.20 in 1981). The 
self-employed had debts more than five times their yearly income. See Robert M. Lawless, Striking Out on 
Their Own: The Self-Employed in Bankruptcy, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 101, 
111 (Katherine M. Porter ed., 2012) ("For the median self-employed debtor, it would take almost 5 years' 
worth of income to retire the outstanding debts.").  
169 See Official Form 6I [hereinafter "B6I"], Line 16 (Dec. 2007), www.uscourts.gov/file/467/download 
(outlines current income of individual debtors). The results are substantially similar if we use the income 
figure from Line 16 of Schedule I, which referred to the combined average monthly income of spouses. 
Official Form 6I was in use during the period of our study but has been superseded by Official Form 106I.   
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Table 31: Debt-to-Income Ratios Using Summary of Schedules 
 
   
2010 2013 
Over 75 11% 2% 
51 to 75 6% 3% 
25 to 50 10% 5% 
10 to 25 37% 17% 
6 to 10 18% 37% 
5 or less 6% 25% 
Undefined: Zero or Negative Income 6% 4% 
N/A 6% 8% 
Median 16 8 
    
The Code's rules for payment of priority debt also favor the selection of chapter 
13 for eligible debtors.  A chapter 13 debtor's plan must provide for payment in full, 
in deferred cash payments, of all priority claims.170 
The rules for chapter 11, which are more complicated generally, may make plan 
confirmation more difficult for an individual debtor because deferred cash payments 
are not an option for all types of priority debt.  The chapter 11 plan must provide for 
payment in cash, on the plan's effective date, of all administrative claims,171 and if 
any class of priority claimants other than tax claimants votes not to accept the plan, 
then the holders of claims in that class, too, must be paid in full, in cash, on the 
plan's effective date.172 Finally, unless a tax creditor agrees to the contrary, the 
chapter 11 plan must provide for payment of the value, as of the plan's effective 
date, of all priority tax claims over a period of time not to exceed five years from 
the filing of the petition, not from plan confirmation, in a voluntary case.173 In other 
words, the longer it takes debtors to confirm their plans, the less time they have 
under the terms of their plans to pay off the debts owed to priority tax claimants.  
Only if individual chapter 11 debtors hold little priority debt are the differences in 
priority debt treatment for chapter 13 versus chapter 11 plans inconsequential. 
In order to determine the extent of priority debt among our chapter 11 debtors, 
we first coded for the various types of priority debt listed on Schedule E.  Table 32, 
which presents those results, reveals that about six in ten of the individual debtors in 
the random sample disclosed priority tax liabilities on their schedules.  
Approximately a third of our debtors, however, reported no priority debt at all.   
 
                                                                                                                         
170 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (2012).  
171 See id. at § 1129(a)(9)(A).  
172 See id. at § 1129(a)(9)(B)(ii).  
173 See id. at § 1129(a)(9)(C)(ii). 
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Table 32: Types of Priority Debt 
 
 2010 2013 
Domestic 3.7% 5.3% 
Deposits by Individuals 0.9% 1.8% 
Taxes 57.8% 60.5% 
Wages 0.0% 1.8% 
None 34.9% 32.5% 
Unknown 7.3% 3.5% 
 
We also coded for the amount of priority debt by type of debt, and present those 
results in Table 33.  Because some debtors listed multiple types of priority debt, the 
rows within a column do not add to 100%. 
 
Table 33: Amount of Priority Debt by Category 
 
 Taxes Domestic 
Support 
All Priority 
2010 2013 2010 2013 2010 2013 
Over 500K 0.9% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 5.3% 
250K to 
500K 
2.8% 3.5% 0.0% 0.9% 1.8% 4.4% 
100K to 
250K 
3.7% 7.9% 0.9% 0.0% 3.7% 7.9% 
50K to 
100K 
9.2% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 10.1% 6.1% 
25K to 
50K 
11.0% 7.9% 0.9% 0.9% 10.1% 8.8% 
1 to 25K 16.5% 18.4% 0.9% 2.6% 16.5% 20.2% 
0 48.6% 48.2% 89.9% 91.2% 46.8% 43.0% 
N/A 7.3% 4.4% 7.3% 4.4% 9.2% 4.4% 
Maximum 1,063,692 5,654,393 139,500 498,260 1,063,692 5,654,393 
Average 41,872 143,432 1,796 5,230 42,317 150,079 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 2,500 
 
The results are striking.  Most of the debtors in the random samples reported 
little priority debt, apart from tax liabilities.  While over half of the debtors listed 
tax obligations, some debtors reported those obligations as "notice only" or with a 
value of "unknown" or "0."  About 28% of the debtors in each year disclosed total 
priority tax debts of $25,000 or more, however, and in 2013 more than 20% 
disclosed tax debts of $50,000 or more. 
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3.  Assets 
 
The data in Table 34, taken from the last-filed summary of schedules in a 
debtor's chapter 11 case, show that our debtors held substantial assets.  The median 
value of assets in 2010 was $1,145,820; in 2013, that figure fell by 28% to 
$820,777.  These medians, however, hide a great deal of variance.  One debtor in 
our sample disclosed more than $66 million in assets, but 21% and 25% of our 
debtors in 2010 and 2013, respectively, disclosed less than $500,000 in total assets. 
 
Table 34: Assets from Summary of Schedules 
 
 Real Property Personal Property Total Assets 
2010 2013 2010 2013 2010 2013 
Over 
$10M 
1.8% 0.9% 3.7% 0.9% 5.5% 1.8% 
$5M to 
$10M 
6.4% 2.6% 0.9% 0.0% 7.3% 3.5% 
$2.5M to 
$5M 
8.3% 3.5% 0.9% 1.8% 11.0% 4.4% 
$1M to 
$2.5M 
26.6% 19.3% 5.5% 5.3% 28.4% 28.1% 
$500K to 
$1M 
20.2% 31.6% 6.4% 4.4% 20.2% 30.7% 
$1 to 
$500K 
21.1% 29.8% 75.2% 81.6% 18.3% 25.4% 
0 9.2% 6.1% 0.9% 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 
N/A 6.4% 6.1% 6.4% 6.1% 6.4% 6.1% 
Maximum 66,647,000 11,250,000 43,246,837 10,555,535 66,671,585 18,740,635 
Average 2,217,490 1,097,198 1,147,352 361,666 3,359,966 1,460,836 
Median 927,500 637,609 113,835 55,428 1,145,820 820,777 
 
Most of the debtors' assets were in the form of real property, which played a 
greater role on the balance sheet of individual chapter 11 debtors than did personal 
property.  In 2010, the median value for real property was $927,500; for personal 
property, the median was $113,835.  In 2013, the median real property value was 
$637,609; for personal property, it was $55,428.  If we look at totals (or averages), 
real property comprised 66% of our debtors' assets in 2010, while in 2013 that 
figure rose to 75%.  These shares are a little lower than the findings of the AO, 
which reported that real property comprised approximately 78% of the assets of 
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individuals who filed non-business chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions in 2010, and 
70% in 2013.174  
In order to develop a fuller picture of our debtors' holdings, we examined the 
full schedules, starting with home ownership.  The overwhelming majority of our 
debtors owned a home; only 6% in 2010 and 8% in 2013 clearly did not.  We also 
coded the debtor's estimate of the value of the home and the amount of the home 
mortgage, and present that data in Table 35.  We were not able to determine home 
ownership for a number of debtors because either the debtor did not complete the 
relevant schedules or we could not tell if the property listed was the debtor's 
principal residence.   
 
Table 35: Home Ownership 
 
 (A)  
Home Value 
(B) 
Home Mortgage 
Amount 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
Over $5M 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 
$2.5M to $5M 4.6% 2.6% 5.5% 2.6% 
$1M to $2.5M 11.9% 7.0% 10.1% 13.2% 
$500K to $1M 20.2% 14.9% 21.1% 13.2% 
$250K to $500K 25.7% 29.8% 22.9% 21.1% 
$1 to $250K 16.5% 28.1% 15.6% 27.2% 
Unknown Value 4.6% 1.8% 4.5% 5.3% 
Home But No Mortgage   2.8% 1.8% 
No Home 6.4% 7.9% 6.4% 7.9% 
N/A 10.1% 3.5% 11.0% 7.0% 
Maximum 4,500,000 9,200,000 3,557,890 10,200,000 
Average 739,191 624,764 742,362 692,424 
Median 450,000 320,000 473,562 341,260 
 
                                                                                                                         
174 See Assets and Liabilities Reported in Chapter 11 Cases Filed—BAPCPA Table 1B, ADMIN. OFF. OF 
THE U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2013), www.uscourts.gov/file/9950/download (showing real property under assets 
column ($1,247,987,000) divided by the total under assets column ($1,790,046,000) results in real property 
comprising approximately 70% of the assets of individuals who filed non-business chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petitions). For 2010, total real property under the assets column was $2,390,175,000 with total assets of 
$3,077,976,000; thus, real property comprised about 78% of total assets. The 2010 data is available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/Table1B_2.pdf. 
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 Home value is another indicator of a debtor's socio-economic status.  Given the 
reports of celebrities in chapter 11,175 one might expect to find a large number of 
very expensive homes.  We did find a few such homes; the most valuable home in 
our sample exceeded $9,000,000.  The median home value, however, was just 
$450,000 in 2010 and $320,000 in 2013.  Of the 2010 debtors, only 16.5% claimed 
homes worth more than $1,000,000—the same percentage as those who claimed 
homes worth less than $250,000.  In 2013, substantially more debtors claimed 
homes worth less than $250,000 (28.1%) than claimed homes worth more than 
$1,000,000 (10.5%).  These figures represent a fairly wide distribution of home 
values.  Still, these values are substantially greater than median home values in the 
United States.  The median sales price for a new home ranged, by month, between 
$204,000 and $241,000 in 2010 and between $251,000 and $279,000 in 2013.176 
According to the National Association of Realtors, the median sales price of an 
existing family home was $197,400 in 2013.177 Thus, most of our debtors were not 
"ultra-wealthy," but most owned a home worth substantially more than the median 
American home.   
To determine whether debtor estimates of home value were erroneous, we 
compared home values with home mortgage debt.  The data in Column (B) of Table 
35 support the conclusion that debtor estimates of home value were not wildly 
inaccurate.  For example, in 2010, 16.5% of debtors listed their home value in the 
$1-to-$250,000 range; 15.6% listed the amount of their home mortgage as falling 
within that same dollar range.  The pattern is similar for 2013 and across most 
dollar ranges in Table 35.  If debtors had listed inflated or depressed values for their 
homes, we would expect to find a larger difference between the percentage of 
debtors in each home value dollar category compared to the percentage in the same 
dollar category for home mortgage amounts. 
We also looked for other real estate holdings.  Table 36 provides the value of 
other real property owned by the debtor as well as the mortgages owed against these 
properties.  Perhaps the most striking finding is that over 70% of those debtors for 
whom we have data owned other real property.  These data provide more evidence 
that the individual chapter 11 debtors in our sample own substantially greater assets 
than the average American.   
                                                                                                                         
175 See, e.g., In re Jackson, III, No. 15-21233 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 13, 2015) (filing by rapper better 
known as "50 Cent"). 
176 See Median and Average Sales Prices of New Homes Sold in United States, THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(2016), https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/uspricemon.pdf (rounding down to the nearest 
hundredth from exact numbers found in the table). 
177 See National Association of Realtors, Existing Single Family Home Sales, REALTOR.ORG (2016), 
http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/reports/2016/embargoes/ehs-9-22/ehs-08-2016-single-family-only-
2016-09-22.pdf (providing statistical information on the sale price of existing single-family home sales over 
the last three years). 
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Table 36: Other Real Property 
 
 Other Real Property Other Mortgage Total 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
More than $10M 0.9% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 
$5M  to $10M 2.8% 1.8% 2.8% 0.0% 
$2.5M to $5M 10.1% 3.5% 7.3% 7.0% 
$1M to $2.5M 12.8% 9.6% 19.3% 16.7% 
$500K to $1M 13.8% 18.4% 14.7% 17.5% 
$250K to $500K 11.9% 18.4% 11.9% 9.6% 
$1 to $250K 11.0% 14.0% 3.7% 11.4% 
0   0.9% 3.5% 
No Other Real Property 20.2% 28.1% 20.2% 28.1% 
N/A 16.5% 6.1% 17.4% 6.1% 
Maximum 65,382,500 6,013,150 40,727,735 4,947,902 
Average 2,316,483 617,228 2,170,030 1,033,302 
Median 826,850 322,000 1,006,633 720,912 
 
We also coded for the number of parcels, and these data in Table 37 are even 
more striking.  Over 40% of the debtors (47% in 2010; 42% in 2013) listed more 
than two pieces of real property.  In 2010, about twice as many debtors disclosed 
interests in at least ten parcels of land as those who disclosed owning no real 
property at all.  It is hard to reconcile the number of parcels of land held with the 
dollar values listed in Tables 35 and 36.  We would expect values far in excess of 
those shown in the Tables, given the number of parcels of real property disclosed on 
the schedules.  We have two theories to explain the discrepancy.  First, some 
debtors could have disclosed parcels with little value, such as time-shares or 
interests in LLCs that owned real property without equity.  Second, the dollar 
values in Tables 35 and 36 may be understated because the debtors failed to list the 
value of some properties on their schedules or counted as personal property interests 
in LLCs or other entities that themselves owned real property.178 
                                                                                                                         
178 See, e.g., Amended Schedule B, In re Behrend, No. 10-21201 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 2, 2010), ECF 
No. 139 (valuing at $42 million notes receivable and corresponding deeds of trust from sale of properties by 
various LLCs and trusts, and valuing at zero numerous interests in various corporations and LLCs, some of 
which were real estate firms).  
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Table 37: Number of Parcels 
 
 2010 2013 
10+ 11.0% 4.4% 
9 1.8% 0.0% 
8 0.9% 4.4% 
7 3.7% 2.6% 
6 1.8% 7.0% 
5 1.8% 6.1% 
4 10.1% 10.5% 
3 15.6% 7.0% 
2 16.5% 21.9% 
1 24.8% 26.3% 
0 6.4% 5.3% 
N/A 5.5% 4.4% 
 
 Finally, in Table 38, we provide an estimate of the debtors' equity in their 
homes and other real property.  Note that the other real property measure simply 
subtracts the total value of the debtor's mortgages from the total value of other real 
property; it does not calculate equity parcel by parcel.  In light of the real estate 
collapse, we expected to find that a large number of debtors were using bankruptcy 
to try to renegotiate mortgages worth more than their homes.  After all, one 
advantage of chapter 11 over chapter 13 is that the former is not subject to the 
latter's requirement that a plan be completed in five years.179 That requirement 
makes it very difficult for a debtor to repay a mortgage in full under chapter 13.180 
The data in Table 38 show that many of our debtors were under water on their 
mortgages.  Nonetheless, 35% of the debtors in 2010 and 33% in 2013 reported 
equity in their home, while 23% to 25% reported equity in other real property.  At a 
time when real estate prices were seriously depressed—particularly in 2010—this 
                                                                                                                         
179 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2012).  
180 Individual debtors in chapter 11 cases also have more flexibility to modify obligations to secured 
creditors other than holders of residential mortgages. Both chapters 11 and 13 prohibit the modification of 
obligations secured only by the debtor's principal residence. See id. at §§ 1123(b)(5) & 1322(b)(2). Because 
the language of these sections is identical, the Supreme Court's holding in Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 
U.S. 324 (1993), interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), is equally applicable to the interpretation of 
section 1123(b)(5). This flexibility derives, in part, from the fact that chapter 11 plans may extend beyond 
the five-year limit applicable in chapter 13. Thus, a debtor may restructure a long-term mortgage on rental 
property only in chapter 11. Individual chapter 11 debtors also have more flexibility in modifying secured 
claims on personal property. The infamous "hanging paragraph," codified at the end of section 1325(a)(9), 
applies only in chapter 13. Thus, individual debtors in chapter 11 may modify secured claims even though 
the collateral is an automobile purchased within 910 days before filing, or is another type of collateral 
securing a debt incurred within a year before the petition. 
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finding suggests that individual debtors in chapter 11 hold more wealth than the 
typical American and are unlike the stereotypical chapter 13 debtor. 
 
Table 38: Debtor Equity in Real Property 
 
 Home Equity Other Real Property 
Equity (Net) 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
Over $1,000,000 0.9% 1.8% 6.4% 2.6% 
$500,001 to $1,000,000 8.3% 2.6% 3.7% 2.6% 
$250,001 to $500,000 4.6% 5.3% 0.9% 1.8% 
$50,001 to $250,000 13.8% 15.8% 10.1% 11.4% 
$1 to $50,000 7.3% 7.9% 1.8% 7.0% 
0 to -$50,000 15.6% 14.0% 9.2% 8.8% 
-$50,001 to -$250,000 18.3% 20.2% 12.8% 10.5% 
-$250,001 to -$500,000 3.7% 5.3% 1.8% 9.6% 
-$500,001 to -$1,000,000 1.8% 7.0% 9.2% 7.9% 
Less than - $1,000,000 2.8% 3.5% 6.4% 4.4% 
Unknown 6.4% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
N/A 10.1% 7.0% 17.4% 5.3% 
No home or other real 
property 
6.4% 7.9% 20.2% 28.1% 
Average 3,383 -67,660 234,972 -136,715 
Median 0 -7,069 -44,116 -40,004 
Maximum 1,743,520 1,784,149 24,654,765 3,263,515 
Minimum -2,196,000 -2,393,432 -6,828,510 -2,202,000 
 
IV.   IS CHAPTER 11 SUCCEEDING? 
 
A central question motivating much of the empirical bankruptcy literature is 
whether bankruptcy successfully serves the interests of individual debtors and their 
creditors.  The most common definition of success focuses on the goals of the 
debtor and asks whether individuals receive a discharge in chapter 13 or whether 
corporations confirm a plan of reorganization in chapter 11.181 While discharge or 
confirmation may be the best definition of success for individuals in chapter 11, the 
literature recites a host of problems.  One is the fact that individuals, unlike 
                                                                                                                         
181 See generally Norberg & Velkey, supra note 2 (detailing the chapter 13 system and analyzing the 
extent to which chapter 13 has fulfilled its principal purpose of giving debtors a fresh start and providing 
repayment to creditors); Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, supra note 3 (analyzing the 
conventional methods used to determine success under chapter 11 and offering some new perspectives for 
analyzing this question).  
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corporations, do not receive their discharge until they complete their plan,182 and 
few individual debtors will do so within the three-to-six-year window in which we 
observed the cases.183 Thus, we adopted a broader definition of success to include 
any case in which the debtor received a discharge or avoided conversion and 
dismissal as of the time we gathered the PACER data.184 We also examined case 
characteristics associated with this measure of success, such as joint filing, pro se 
filing, or filing in a district that had previously interpreted the absolute priority rule 
in a manner favorable to debtors.  We discuss our findings on success for the large 
PACER data set in Section IV.A, and for the much smaller but more richly-coded 
random sample of cases in Section IV.B.  Section B also provides the results of our 
efforts to find absolute priority objections and to determine the impact of such 
objections on plan confirmation.    
In Section IV.C, we take up the question of success as it relates to the 
functioning of the chapter 11 system.  An optimal bankruptcy process should 
quickly and accurately identify debtors who are unable to reorganize successfully, 
and either dismiss or convert those cases to chapter 7.185 As a result, some scholars 
have measured success by the length of time it takes courts to dismiss or convert 
failed reorganizations.186 In Sections C.1 and C.2, we apply a version of this length-
of-time definition to the individual chapter 11 cases in both our PACER data set and 
the random sample.  If we apply this measure to our larger PACER data set, the 
individual chapter 11 cases fare worse than chapter 13s.  More specifically, we 
found that courts take longer to dismiss the "obvious" individual chapter 11 failures 
than to dismiss failed chapter 13 cases.187 For the cases in the random sample, we 
also provide data in Section IV.C.2 on the time it takes to reach various case 
milestones, such as filing schedules and proposing a plan.        
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
182 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A) (2012).  
183 See, e.g., In re Robles, No. 13-13476 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2013) (confirming chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization paying secured creditor over thirty years). See also notes 277–281 and accompanying text 
(providing further discussion of Robles). 
184 By doing so, we follow the example of many other scholars. See, e.g., Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision 
Making, supra note 3; Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, supra note 3; Norberg & Velkey, supra 
note 2 (rejecting traditional views of the low success rates of the current bankruptcy system and contending 
that taking a broader view illustrates more success than conventional wisdom dictates).  
185 See Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 3; Morrison, Small Business Workouts, supra 
note 3; Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 627–32; see also NAT’L BANKR. REV. 
COMMISSION, BANKR.: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 609 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 COMMISSION REPORT] 
(footnote omitted). 
186 See Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 3, at 390; Warren & Westbrook, Success of 
Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 606, 617, 634. 
187 See infra Table 52, and notes 297–298 and accompanying text. The longer time frame results, 
apparently, from a combination of factors: lack of rigid timing rules; absence of a bankruptcy trustee; and 
fairly low stakes that limit creditor participation. 
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A.  Debtor Success—The PACER Data 
 
The PACER data include the full universe of bankruptcy filings in the relevant 
districts, but they provide limited information about each case.  The PACER data do 
not include information on plan proposal, confirmation, or success.  Thus, in Part 1, 
we define success as avoiding dismissal or conversion for a significant period of 
time.  We found that about a third of our 2010 cases qualified as successful under 
this broad definition.    
In Part 2, we discuss the variables that predict success.  We found that success 
is more likely if (1) a case is filed jointly, (2) a case is filed by an attorney 
experienced with individual chapter 11s, (3) the debtor owes primarily business 
debt, or (4) the debtor expects assets to be available for general unsecured creditors.  
We also found some evidence that the success rate is higher in jurisdictions that 
adopt a debtor-friendly interpretation of the exception to the absolute priority rule. 
 
1.  Defining Success 
 
PACER case reports provide only a case's disposition, not whether the 
bankruptcy court confirmed a chapter 11 plan.  Thus, we counted a case as a 
success if it survived dismissal and conversion.  More specifically, we counted a 
case as a success if the debtor received a discharge, or if the result field was left 
blank or coded as "Discharge Not Applicable."  We counted as a failure any case 
that was dismissed or for which discharge was withheld, denied or waived.188 We 
also counted as a failure any case that was converted to chapter 7 or 13 under the 
theory that the debtor should have begun in one of those chapters.  Finally, a small 
number of cases had more ambiguous procedural terminations, such as a case 
transfer or a notation that the case was filed in error.  We also counted these cases 
as failures, but we list them separately in our tables. 
Table 39 provides data on case disposition for the individual chapter 11 cases in 
the PACER sample.  Individual debtors may file jointly, so the PACER case reports 
contain a field for the first debtor and another field for the second debtor, if any.  
Table 39 summarizes the disposition for the first debtor only.   
                                                                                                                         
188 It is not worth debating whether a waived discharge is really a failure because these waivers account for 
a negligible percentage of the cases. 
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Table 39: Outcomes of Individual Chapter 11 Cases 
 
  
All Individual 
Chapter 11s 
2010 2013 
Standard Discharge 9.90% 4.90% 
Hardship Discharge 0% 0% 
Blank 9% 28.20% 
Discharge Not Applicable 13.60% 9.90% 
Total "Survive" 32.50% 42.90% 
Converted to Chapter 7 23.10% 14.50% 
Converted to Chapter 13 1.20% 1.10% 
Dismissed 35,7% 34.90% 
Discharge Denied, Revoked, Waived or Withheld 6.10% 5.20% 
Case Transferred 1.20% 1.20% 
Other Procedural Disposition (Filed in Error, Split or 
Closed in Error) 0.10% 0.20% 
Total "Failure" 67.50% 571% 
Total Number 4,049 2,617 
 
We recognize the limitations of our definition of success as survival, but it is 
the best definition we could implement, given the limitations of the data.  For 
several reasons, we do not want to focus exclusively on discharge.  Some debtors do 
not need a discharge for financial recovery.  For example, chapter 13 is often 
criticized for seldom leading to a discharge,189 but relatively few chapter 13 debtors 
list the receipt of a discharge as their primary goal; most commonly, their primary 
goal is to save their home.190 Whether bankruptcy can successfully serve debtors' 
interests without leading to a discharge is a matter of scholarly debate.191 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                         
189 See, e.g., Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 103, 108, 162 (2011) (deeming chapter 13 ineffective because less than half of the filings lead 
to a discharge). 
190 See id. at 134 (finding more than half of debtors stated saving their home was their primary purpose). 
191 See id. at 113, 144–45, 150 (reviewing the debate and finding although many consumers feel they 
benefitted from bankruptcy, few received a discharge and more than half of homeowners fell behind on 
payments and faced foreclosure within weeks thereafter). 
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our findings rely on the PACER case reports' "standard discharge" designation, 
which may not always be accurate.192 
Timing, however, is the biggest problem with using discharge as the exclusive 
measure of success.  Corporations receive a discharge upon confirmation of a 
chapter 11 plan of reorganization, unless they are using chapter 11 to liquidate.193 
By contrast, individuals do not receive a discharge in chapter 11 until they complete 
their plan,194 and many chapter 11 plans call for payments over thirty years.195 
While the Code allows a court to grant a discharge early if modification of the plan 
is not feasible196 or if the court finds cause,197 these provisions are exceptions to the 
general rule.   
Because we examined the cases during the summers of 2014 and 2015, many 
cases were not yet completed, particularly those filed in 2013.  We counted open 
cases as successes because the debtor had avoided conversion or dismissal.  Some 
debtors could still have been trying for plan confirmation, but our search of the 
                                                                                                                         
192 We checked fifteen cases in which PACER recorded the debtor as having received a standard 
discharge. In five of those fifteen cases, the top of the docket contained the notation "standard discharge;" 
the debtor had confirmed a plan in all five cases, but he or she had not yet received a discharge. See In re 
Rinkenberger, No. 13-36386 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2013); In re Mitcham, No. 13-11973 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. Aug. 5, 2013); In re Vargas, No. 13-29364 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 31, 2013); In re Ragira, No. 13-41986 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. May 2, 2013); In re Ramirez, No. 10-56945 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 5, 2010). While these 
errors raise questions about the accuracy of the "standard discharge" designation in the PACER case reports, 
they do not affect our findings because we used a measure of success that included obtaining a discharge or 
avoiding dismissal for a significant period of time. The incorrectly-coded "standard discharge" cases involve 
confirmed plans; thus, the debtor succeeded by avoiding dismissal for a significant period of time. While the 
incorrect PACER coding affects the categories into which these successful cases fall (e.g., standard 
discharge versus discharge not applicable), it does not affect the percentage of successful cases we found. 
193 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1), (3) (2012). 
194 See id. at § 1141(d)(5). This subsection provides that an individual debtor is not discharged until 
"completion of all payments under the plan," unless modification is impractical and the debtor has paid 
unsecured creditors at least as much as they would have received in a chapter 7. This change to the date of 
discharge for individuals in chapter 11 was one of the most important changes wrought by the 2005 
Amendments. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 321(d)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 95–96 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2)). There is an exception available for 
"cause," which is discussed infra at note 244. 
195 See infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
196 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(B) (2012). Before 2005, only the debtor and a plan proponent had standing 
to seek modification of a confirmed plan. That rule remained unchanged post-2005 for chapter 11 debtors 
that were not individuals. The 2005 amendments, however, expanded the list of parties who may seek post-
confirmation modifications in individual chapter 11 cases. The list now includes the debtor, U.S. Trustee, 
any appointed trustee, and unsecured creditors. See id. at § 1127(e). A modification may seek to increase or 
decrease payments, and must be sought before the completion of payments; the fact that the plan has been 
substantially consummated is irrelevant. See id. 
Courts have not developed standards for post-confirmation modification of an individual debtor's chapter 
11 plan, although at least one court has imported chapter 13's standard—specifically, a substantial change in 
the debtor's income or expenses that was not anticipated at the time of confirmation. In re Mercer, No. 09-
04088, 2013 WL 6507585, at *3–4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2013) (applying standard in section 1329(a) to 
decide whether to grant modification to individual chapter 11 debtor and rejecting arguments for "more 
liberal standard").  
197 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A) (2012). The PACER case reports listed no hardship discharges in 
chapter 11 during the periods we studied. As noted below, however, some courts did grant debtors an early 
discharge. See infra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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individual records suggested that in most of the open cases, at least for 2010, the 
debtor had obtained confirmation of a plan.198 We suspect that cases in which the 
disposition code was blank were likely still open.  During our pilot project, we 
checked fifty randomly selected individual chapter 11 cases with a blank disposition 
field.  Forty-seven of the fifty were indeed live cases as of June 1, 2014.  We could 
not determine the status of one of the remaining three because the docket was not 
available electronically.  The last two cases had been administratively closed.199 
Courts that administratively close a case more typically code the disposition as 
"discharge not applicable,"200 and we counted this disposition as a success, as well. 
                                                                                                                         
198 In our random sample, by comparison, all of the 2010 cases that were still open had a confirmed plan. 
Six of our 2013 cases remained open without a confirmed plan. See infra note 302 and accompanying text. 
199 Chapter 11 debtors are required to pay quarterly fees to the U.S. Trustee for each calendar quarter 
during which the case remains open, and is not converted, dismissed or closed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) 
(2012). To save individuals from having to pay these fees, many courts administratively close a case after 
confirmation of the plan and then reopen the case upon completion of the plan so that the debtor can receive 
a discharge. The Code requires the bankruptcy court to close a case that has been "fully administered," 11 
U.S.C. § 350(a) (2012), but it does not define that phrase. Thus, courts usually look to the 1991 Advisory 
Committee Notes to Rule 3022, which lists six relevant factors that courts should consider in determining 
whether an estate has been fully administered:  
 
(1) whether the order confirming the plan has become final, (2) whether deposits 
required by the plan have been distributed, (3) whether the property proposed by the 
plan to be transferred has been transferred, (4) whether the debtor or the successor of 
the debtor under the plan has assumed the business or the management of the property 
dealt with by the plan, (5) whether payments under the plan have commenced, and (6) 
whether all motions, contested matters, and adversary proceedings have been finally 
resolved. 
 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3022, Advisory Committee Note (1991). Most significantly, the Notes assert that 
"[e]ntry of a final decree closing a chapter 11 case should not be delayed solely because the payments 
required by the plan have not been completed." Id. The U.S. Trustee Program has stated that it "will not 
object to an individual chapter 11 debtor's request to close the case before discharge, subject to reopening for 
the entry of a discharge upon the completion of plan payments, if the estate has been fully administered and 
any trustee has been discharged." Walter W. Theus, Jr., Individual Chapter 11s: Case Closing Reconsidered, 
29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2010 at 1, 62–63. In the absence of a trustee, the question turns on whether the 
case has been fully administered. See id. at 63. 
The authorities appear to be divided on the propriety of this strategy, although several clearly endorse it. 
See In re Necaise, 443 B.R. 483, 493 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2010) (applying factors in Advisory Committee 
Note); In re Johnson, 402 B.R. 851, 855 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2009) (granting motion after all issues pertaining 
to plan had been resolved, and noting otherwise fees could continue for "potentially unlimited duration" if 
debtor's mortgage were paid through the plan); In re Sheridan, 391 B.R. 287, 290 n.2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
2009) (noting most cases in Eastern District of North Carolina are closed upon substantial consummation, to 
be reopened—without payment of fee—for entry of discharge). Even cases denying the debtor's motion to 
close the case, however, are less than categorical. See In re Shotkoski, 420 B.R. 479, 483 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2009) (affirming, under abuse of discretion standard, lower court's refusal to close debtor's case, and 
asserting that other cases might come out differently upon case-by-case inquiry); In re Belcher, 410 B.R. 
206, 218–19 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009) (finding Advisory Committee Notes inapplicable to individual chapter 
11 cases, and refusing to grant motion to close case, but observing debtor could move to modify plan if fee 
obligation became too burdensome). 
200 Judge Collins of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona first explained this coding system to 
us, and Nancy Dickerson, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona, 
confirmed this to be true. See e-mail exchange among the Honorable Daniel Collins, Nancy B. Dickerson, 
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One of the most striking statistics from Table 39 is that almost a third of all 
individual chapter 11 cases from 2010 appear to succeed by avoiding discharge and 
conversion.  The rate is even higher for cases filed in 2013, but this figure is 
misleading, as we explain below.  In addition, our one-third "success" rate is not 
directly comparable to the roughly one-third success rate typically found in studies 
of chapter 13,201 because we used a different definition of success.  We counted 
cases as successes even if the debtor had not yet received a discharge.  To see the 
consequence of this definition, we applied our definition to the chapter 13 cases in 
the PACER dataset.  We provide the results in Table 40.    
The chapter 13 success rate exceeded 40% in 2010.  Note, however, that cases 
in which the debtor actually received a discharge account for only 18% of our cases; 
most of our "successes" are cases for which the PACER case reports left the 
disposition field blank.     
 
Table 40: Chapter 13 Outcomes 
 
  
  2010 2013 
Standard Discharge 17.7% 1.2% 
Hardship Discharge 0.1% 0.0% 
Blank 27.9% 52.5% 
Discharge Not Applicable 0.1% 0.0% 
Total "Survive" 45.8% 53.8% 
Converted to Chapter 7 10.6% 6.7% 
Dismissed 42.8% 39.0% 
Discharge Denied, Revoked or Withheld 
0.5% 0.2% 
Case Transferred 0.1% 0.1% 
Other Procedural Disposition (Filed in Error, Split or 
Closed in Error) 
0.1% 0.1% 
Total "Failure" 54.2% 46.2% 
Total Number of Cases 406,495 298,251 
  
                                                                                                                         
Margaret Howard and Richard Hynes, Aug. 14, 2014 (on file with authors). To check the plausibility of this 
assumption, we searched twenty randomly selected individual chapter 11 cases in which the disposition was 
coded as "discharge not applicable" and found just one with a disposition inconsistent with this explanation. 
That case had been voluntarily dismissed prior to plan approval. 
201 While debtors in approximately 70% of chapter 13 cases confirm a plan, the plan "completion rate has 
been about 36 percent" over the period of time from 2007 to 2013. See Flynn, supra note 33, at 76.  
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We cannot use the data in Tables 39 and 40 to directly compare the outcomes of 
the 2010 and the 2013 cases because we define "success" as the absence of failure, 
and 2010 cases have had much more time to fail.  We, therefore, made use of the 
PACER fields that record the date of conversion or dismissal to estimate the status 
of each case 545 days after filing—roughly the time between a case filed on 
December 31, 2013, and when we first started gathering PACER case reports for 
the 2013 cases.  Table 41 presents the results.  With this adjustment, the outcomes 
of the 2010 and 2013 cases look remarkably similar, with about half of each year's 
cases qualifying as a "success" 545 days after filing.   
  
Table 41: Outcomes Measured at 545 Days 
  
  
  2010 2013 
Standard Discharge 1.1% 2.2% 
Hardship Discharge 0.0% 0.0% 
Blank 43.9% 41.5% 
Discharge Not Applicable 4.2% 6.0% 
Total "Survive" 49.2% 49.7% 
Converted to Ch. 7 18.7% 12.6% 
Converted to Ch. 13 1.1% 1.1% 
Dismissed 28.2% 32.1% 
Discharge Denied, Revoked, Waived or Withheld 1.5% 3.2% 
Case Transferred 1.2% 1.2% 
Other Procedural Disposition (Filed in Error, Split or 
Closed in Error) 0.1% 0.2% 
Total "Failure" 50.8% 50.3% 
Total Number of Cases 4,049 2,617 
 
2.  Predicting Success 
 
In this Section, we consider two measures of success.  The first, Survive2010, 
measures survival, as in Table 39, at the time we downloaded the relevant PACER 
case report.  The Survive2010 measure applies only to cases filed in 2010.  The 
second measure, Survive545, on the other hand, applies to both the 2010 and 2013 
cases, and, as in Table 41, uses the status of the case 545 days after the filing of 
bankruptcy.  The 545-day cutoff gives all cases an equal chance to fail and allows 
us to compare the success rates for the 2010 and 2013 cases  
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Table 42: Predictors of Success 
 
 (A)  
Survive545 
(B) 
Survive2010 
Variables  (1) 
Mean if 
no (# 
cases) 
(2) 
Mean if 
yes (# 
cases) 
(3) p-
value of 
difference 
(1) 
Mean if 
no (# 
cases) 
(2) 
Mean if 
yes (# 
cases) 
(3) p-
value of 
difference 
Filed 2010 49.68% 
(2,617) 
49.22% 
(4,409) 
.72 32.53% 
(4049) 
  
Primarily 
Business 
Debt 
48.39% 
(3,660) 
50.63% 
(3.006) 
.07* 29.29% 
(2,240) 
36.54% 
(1,809) 
.00*** 
No asset 52.81% 
(5,914) 
22.83% 
(736) 
.00*** 37.12% 
(3,499) 
3.35% 
(538) 
.00*** 
Joint 
filing 
44.63% 
(4,013) 
57.89% 
(2,529) 
.00*** 27.62% 
(2,346) 
39.94% 
(1,650) 
.00** 
Pro se 52.27% 
(6,120) 
17.22% 
(546) 
.00*** 34.73% 
(3,697) 
9.38%) 
(352) 
.00*** 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
 
Table 42 provides data on the relationship between our definitions of success 
and a series of five explanatory variables (listed down the far-left column of Table 
42) that we derived from the PACER case reports.  All of the explanatory variables 
in Table 42 are dichotomous—that is, a filer is either pro se or not, a debtor either 
expects assets to be available for creditors or not.  Columns (A)(1) and (B)(1) 
provide the average or mean rates of success when the variable in the far-left 
column of Table 42 is not present.  That is, the case was filed in 2013 instead of 
2010, debts were not primarily business in nature, the debtor expected assets would 
be available for payout to creditors, the case was not a joint filing, or the debtor was 
represented by an attorney.  Columns (A)(2) and (B)(2) provide the average or 
mean rates of success when the variable in the far-left column of Table 42 is 
present.  That is, the case was filed in 2010, debts were primarily business in nature, 
the debtor checked the no-asset box on the petition, the case was a joint filing, or 
the debtor proceeded in chapter 11 on a pro se basis.  Columns (A)(3) and (B)(3) 
provide the p-value for the difference in success rates in Columns (1) and (2).202 
Finally, the numbers in parentheses in Columns (A) and (B) are the number of cases 
or observations.    
                                                                                                                         
202 Differences in success rates may be due to nothing more than chance. A p-value expresses the 
probability that chance explains the observed result using a chi-squared test. Thus, a p-value of .00 means 
that the probability that the difference in success rates is the result of chance is less than 1 in 100 using a chi-
squared test. 
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Table 42 shows that, with the exception of the year of filing, all of the variables 
listed in the far-left column were statistically significant predictors of plan 
success—both with and without a 545-day time constraint.  Macroeconomic 
conditions improved between 2010 and 2013,203 and there were many more 
individual chapter 11 filings in 2010.204 Therefore, we were surprised to find that 
cases filed in 2010 had strikingly similar dispositions at 545 days to those filed in 
2013; the difference of less than a half of a percent (49.68% versus 49.22%) is 
neither statistically nor practically significant (p-value of .72).   
The second variable in the table, however, is a statistically significant predictor 
of success.  We found that cases with primarily business debts succeeded more 
often than cases with primarily non-business debts.  Although the difference is just 
a little over 2% at 545 days (48.39% versus 50.63%), it increases to over 7% 
(29.29% versus 36.54%) for Survive2010.   
Statisticians sometimes measure how well a variable predicts success in terms 
of odds-ratios.  An odds-ratio is a ratio of ratios—the probability of success divided 
by the probability of failure of one group over the probability of success divided by 
the probability of failure of the other group.205 If we use Survive545 as the outcome 
measure, then the odds-ratio for primarily business versus primarily non-business 
debts is 1.09; if Survive2010 is the measure, then the odds-ratio is about 1.39. 
The debtor's belief that assets will be available for general unsecured creditors 
is a very strong predictor of success.  As the data in Table 42 show, approximately 
53% of the cases in which the debtor indicated on the petition that assets would be 
available to creditors (Column (A)(1)) were successful 545 days after the start of 
chapter 11; by comparison, only about 23% of the no-asset cases (Column (A)(2)) 
were successful in that same time frame.  As the p-value in Column (A)(3) 
indicates, the difference in success rates for asset versus no-asset cases is 
statistically significant (p<0.01).     
At 545 days, the odds-ratio for asset versus no-asset cases is 3.78; the odds-ratio 
for Survive2010 is an astounding 17.03.  Just 3.35% of the no-asset cases filed in 
2010 qualified as successful under our measure compared to 37.12% of the cases in 
which the debtor indicated that assets would be available for general creditors.206  
There are at least four possible explanations for why no-asset cases in our 
PACER sample fared so poorly, with a success rate sharply lower than what we 
estimate for our random sample.  First, some chapter 13 trustees and judges will 
                                                                                                                         
203 See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., Household Data Annual Averages–1. Employment 
status of the civilian noninstitutional population, 1946 to date, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat01.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2017) (reporting a decline in the unemployment rate from 9.6% in June of 2010 to 7.5% in 
June of 2013); S&P Corelogic Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price NSA Index (Nov. 2016), 
http://us.spindices.com/indices/real-estate/sp-case-shiller-us-national-home-price-index (rising from 147.68 
in June of 2010 to 156.48 in June of 2013). 
204 See supra Table 1. 
205 See, e.g., Magdalena Szumilas, Explaining Odds Ratios, 19 J. CAN. ACAD. CHILD. ADOLESC. 
PSYCHIATRY 227 (2010). 
206 The PACER case reports left this field blank for eleven individual chapter 11 cases. Three of these 
eleven (27.27%) could be considered successful. 
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only approve plans that offer minimum repayment to general unsecured creditors;207 
perhaps a similar phenomenon is at work in individual chapter 11 bankruptcies.  
Second, classes of claims that receive nothing under a plan are conclusively 
presumed to vote against the plan,208 so debtors proposing such plans must satisfy 
the cumbersome cramdown rules of chapter 11.209 Third, checking the "no asset" 
box on the petition may signal that a debtor cannot even afford to pay expenses and 
secured claims and, thus, will be unable to confirm and complete a plan of 
reorganization.  Finally, the extreme odds-ratio could be due to coding problems in 
the PACER case reports that overstate the number of cases in which the debtor 
marks the petition as a no-asset case.210  
For the remaining two variables in Table 42, we had to manipulate the PACER 
case report data.  To determine whether a case was a joint filing, we looked for the 
word "and" in the case title.  We excluded cases that were marked as an individual 
filing but had terms such as "LLC" or "Inc." in the title, which indicated that these 
cases were misclassified entities.  We found that jointly filed cases fared much 
better than cases with a single debtor; the odds-ratios were 1.71 and 1.74 for 
Survive545 and Survive2010, respectively.  A debtor can only file jointly with his or 
her spouse,211 and we initially thought that a joint filing was merely a proxy for the 
effects of marriage.  Our finding that many married debtors do not file jointly with 
their spouses, however, shows that this is not a complete explanation.212    
We also found that pro se filing, the final variable in Table 42, strongly predicts 
failure; the odds-ratios of represented to pro se filings are 5.26 and 5.14 for 
Survive545 and Survive2010, respectively.  Chapter 11 is extremely complicated, 
and few individuals are able to competently handle their own case.  We were 
surprised, however, that pro se filing is not a stronger predictor of failure; perhaps 
this merely reflects the fact that we used rough proxies for our measure of success.  
We return to this issue in Section IV.B.2. 
Many individual chapter 11 cases are filed by attorneys who do not appear to 
specialize in chapter 11 practice, and we wondered whether success is correlated 
with attorney experience.  Indeed, the number of times a listed attorney appears in 
our sample strongly predicts success.213 Logit regressions, with the number of cases 
as the sole explanatory variable (and pro se cases omitted), yield odds-ratios of 
1.012 for Survive545 and 1.013 for Survive2010.  Both are significant at the 1% 
level.    
                                                                                                                         
207 See 1997 Commission Report, supra note 185, at 235 ("Some courts confirm plans paying zero percent 
to unsecured creditors. Other courts condition confirmation on payment of high percentages of unsecured 
debt."). 
208 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g) (2012). 
209 See id. at § 1129(b). 
210 See supra note 154. 
211 See 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
212 See infra Table 47, Row (8) (showing 73 of 154 married debtors filing singly, not jointly). 
213 The measure we use here was not manually cleaned by our research assistants and so it does not 
precisely match the results in Table 8. 
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The effect of attorney experience is likely to be highly non-linear; the second 
case that an attorney handles is likely to provide a much more valuable lesson than 
the thirtieth case.  We, therefore, reran the regressions with the log of the number of 
cases as the sole explanatory valuable and found odds-ratios of 1.26 and 1.22 for 
Survive545 and Survive2010, respectively.  Both were again significant at the 1% 
level.    
Odds-ratios are difficult to comprehend, so we also divided our attorneys into 
three groups: (1) those who handled only 1 or 2 cases in our sample (Low 
Experience); (2) those who filed three to ten cases (Mid Experience); and (3) those 
who filed more than ten cases (High Experience).  Table 43 summarizes the 
differences in success rates depending on the experience of the debtor's attorney.  
Nearly all differences in the success rates of the various groups are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  The one exception is the difference in success rates 
between the mid- and high-experience attorneys; that difference has a p-value of 
0.20.    
 
Table 43: Success by Attorney Representation 
 
 Survive545 Survive2010 
Mean (# cases) Mean (# cases) 
Pro se 17.22% (546) 9.38% (352) 
Low Experience (1-2) 45.35% (2,538) 29.10% (1,543) 
Mid Experience (3-10) 54.56% (2,399) 37.79% (1,405) 
High Experience (11+) 62.47% (739) 40.59% (749) 
 
Cases are not randomly assigned to attorneys.  As a result, our findings do not 
necessarily mean that attorneys who rarely file individual chapter 11 cases are less 
competent than those who handle them on a regular basis.  Instead, debtors who are 
more likely to succeed may seek out more experienced attorneys, and individuals 
may be more likely to file under chapter 11 (and, hence, attorneys will gain more 
experience) if the district has adopted rules and practices that make success more 
likely.  The paucity of information that we have about the PACER cases prevents us 
from completely separating the treatment and selection effects; we mitigate (but do 
not completely solve) this problem through regression analysis and present the 
results in Table 45 below.   
The final variable we examined using the PACER case report data was the 
jurisdiction's precedent, if any, on application of the absolute priority rule to 
individual chapter 11 cases.  Courts have split as to the proper interpretation of the 
exception that protects individual debtors from the full force of the absolute priority 
rule ("APR").    
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The absolute priority rule requires that a junior class of claims or interests 
receive no part of the estate if a senior objecting class is not paid in full.214 Whether, 
and how, the rule applies to individual debtors in chapter 11 became a significant 
issue following two amendments to the Code in 2005.  First, language was added to 
the subsection setting out the rule: "except that in a case in which the debtor is an 
individual, the debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 1115, 
subject to the requirements of subsection (a)(14) of this section."215 Second, the 
amendments added section 1115, which defines property of the individual debtor's 
bankruptcy estate to include post-petition earnings, "in addition to the property 
specified in section 541."216 The question is whether these amendments implicitly 
repealed the absolute priority rule with respect to individual chapter 11 cases.  More 
specifically, the issue is whether "all property . . . specified in section 541"217 and 
retained by the individual chapter 11 debtor under section 1115(a) refers to all of 
the property in the estate, or only to a portion of that property. 
Most courts (and all circuit courts) that have addressed the issue have adopted a 
"narrow" interpretation that only shields income earned after the filing of the 
petition.  Some courts, however, have adopted a "broad" interpretation, holding that 
the absolute priority rule simply does not apply to individual debtors.  This 
approach allows an individual chapter 11 debtor to retain all property included in 
the bankruptcy estate by section 1115.218   
To assess the importance of this split of authority, we defined a variable called 
broad, which we applied to any jurisdiction in which a court had adopted the broad 
interpretation of the exception to the APR and in which no subsequent court had 
adopted the narrow interpretation.  We defined the variable narrow in the opposite 
manner.  These variables do not measure the effect of a broad or narrow exception 
to the APR, but rather the effect of a broad or narrow precedent.  Many of the 
decisions were rendered by bankruptcy courts and, therefore, have very little 
precedential value.  Thus, we defined alternative measures that considered only 
circuit court and bankruptcy appellate panel decisions; we labeled those variables 
broad circuit and narrow circuit.  Because there were no relevant circuit or BAP 
decisions in 2010, we did not use these measures when examining the 2010 cases.  
Finally, we used the rule in place six months after the debtor's bankruptcy filing, 
because nearly all plans were filed between three months and one year after the 
filing.219 Table 44 presents the results of our analysis for the PACER data.   
                                                                                                                         
214 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). 
215 Id. One of the statutory puzzles is whether the drafters meant to cross-reference section 1129(a)(15) 
rather than subsection (a)(14). The latter mandates payment of post-petition domestic support obligations, as 
a prerequisite for plan confirmation. Subsection (a)(15), on the other hand, is the disposable income test, 
discussed below. See infra notes 237–240 and accompanying text. 
216 11 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012).  
217 Id. 
218 See infra Appendix C for a list of jurisdictions that have adopted either the narrow or broad 
interpretation of the exception to the absolute priority rule.  
219 See infra Table 55 and accompanying text.  
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Table 44: Success and Interpretation of the APR Exception—PACER Data 
 
 
Precedent 
(A) 
Survive545 
(B) 
Survive2010 
Mean (# of cases) Mean (# of cases) 
1) Broad 63.57% (840) 47.28%   (239) 
2) No precedent 48.20% (3,834) 32.64% (3,015) 
3) Narrow 45.73% (1,992) 27.67%   (795) 
4) Broad Circuit 50.74%    (743)  
5) No Circuit 49.56%  (5,502)  
6) Narrow Circuit 44.89%    (189)  
 
The findings in Table 44 are consistent with the theory that a more debtor-
friendly interpretation of the APR allows individuals in chapter 11 to succeed more 
often.  The success rate rises uniformly as the APR interpretation becomes more 
debtor-friendly—from the narrow view to no precedent to the broad view.  
Compare, e.g., Row (3), Column (A) with Row (1), Column (A) of Table 44.  If we 
consider all cases, then we can reject with 99% certainty (p<0.01) the null 
hypothesis that the success rates do not vary with the court's interpretation of the 
exception to the APR.  If we focus only on the circuit court cases, then we cannot 
reject the hypothesis of no difference with 90% certainty; the p-value rises to 0.13.  
See supra Table 44, Column (A), Rows 4-6.  Even if the court's interpretation of the 
exception to the APR is correlated with the rate of success, this may be due to other 
factors that are themselves correlated with each variable (omitted variable bias).  
For example, jurisdictions that adopt the broad interpretation may be more likely to 
have adopted other debtor-friendly rules or procedures.  To address the problem of 
omitted variable bias, we used regression analysis. 
Table 45 presents the results of six regressions that use the variables set forth in 
Tables 42 through 44, as well as the unemployment rate in the relevant judicial 
district.  The first two columns (A) and (B) of Table 45 present the results of 
models that do not include fixed district effects.220 Some variables are not included 
in every regression.  If a variable is omitted, the corresponding cell is left blank.   
Column (A) restricts the sample to cases filed in 2010; outcome information is 
not limited to 545 days.  Because there were no APR precedents on the circuit or 
BAP level in 2010, the measures broad and narrow are used.  The coefficients on 
broad and narrow should be interpreted relative to cases lacking relevant precedent 
(the omitted group).  Column (B) looks at the full sample, 2010 and 2013, and is 
limited to outcomes that occurred within 545 days of the start of each chapter 11 
case.  Column (B) also considers only circuit court and bankruptcy appellate panel 
precedent.  The numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
                                                                                                                         
220 We present linear probability models because they are much easier to interpret. The results of logit 
specifications are not materially different. 
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Table 45: Regressions of Survival Rate—PACER Data 
 
 
 
Variables 
(A) 
Survive 
2010 
(B) 
Survive 
545 
(C) 
Survive 
545 
(D) 
Survive 
545 
(E) 
Survive 
545 
(F) 
Survive 
545 
Chapter 11 11 11 11 13 13 
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1) Broad 0.102*** 
(0.00) 
 0.016 
(0.60) 
 0.026** 
(0.02) 
 
2) Narrow -0.043** 
(0.04) 
 .015 
(0.46) 
 0.012** 
(0.04) 
 
3) Broad 
circuit 
 -0.027 
(0.90) 
 0.060* 
(0.09) 
 0.0323*** 
(0.00) 
4) Narrow 
circuit 
 -0.066** 
(0.02) 
 -0.0536 
(0.12) 
 0.007 
(0.27) 
5) Joint 0.109*** 
(0.00) 
0.105*** 
(0.00) 
0.0892*** 
(0.00) 
0.0888*** 
(0.00) 
0.120*** 
(0.00) 
0.120*** 
(0.00) 
6) Pro se -0.261*** 
(0.00) 
-0.421*** 
(0.00) 
-0.368*** 
(0.00) 
-0.368*** 
(0.00) 
-0.515*** 
(0.00) 
-0.515*** 
(0.00) 
7) AttyLow -0.096*** 
(0.00) 
-0.160*** 
(0.00) 
-0.104** 
(0.02) 
-0.105** 
(0.02) 
  
8) AttyMid -0.012 
(0.59) 
-0.073*** 
(0.00)  
-0.020 
(0.57) 
-0.0213 
(0.55) 
  
9) Atty13Low     -0.173*** 
(0.00) 
-0.174*** 
(0.00) 
10) 
Atty13Mid 
    -0.122*** 
(0.00) 
-0.122*** 
(0.00) 
11) 2010  -0.007 
(0.68) 
0.025 
(0.58) 
-0.0145 
(0.74) 
0.063*** 
(0.00) 
0.0571*** 
(0.00) 
12) NoAsset -0.326*** 
(0.00) 
-0.292*** 
(0.00) 
-0.271*** 
(0.00)  
-0.271*** 
(0.00) 
-0.345*** 
(0.00) 
-0.345*** 
(0.00) 
13) Business 0.0807*** 
(0.00) 
0.045*** 
(0.00) 
0.0498** 
(0.00) 
0.0505*** 
(0.00) 
-0.115*** 
(0.00) 
-0.115*** 
(0.00) 
14) Unemp -0.004 
(0.29) 
-0.002 
(0.66) 
-0.008 
(0.60) 
0.00853 
(0.53) 
-0.003 
(0.47) 
-0.001 
(0.87) 
15) Constant 0.395*** 
(0.00)  
0.618*** 
(0.00)  
0.607*** 
(0.00) 
0.477*** 
(0.00) 
0.643*** 
(0.00) 
0.625*** 
(0.00) 
Observations 3,925 6,353 6,353 6,353 688,892 688,892 
R-squared 0.114 0.101 0.084 0.086 0.158 0.158 
Number of 
courts 
  76 76 76 76 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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The data in Columns (A) and (B) each offer some support for the theory that the 
jurisdiction's interpretation of the APR exception affects the rate of success.  The 
number in Column (A), Row (1) suggests that a case in a jurisdiction with a broad 
interpretation will succeed 10% more often than a case in a jurisdiction with no 
relevant precedent.  The negative sign before the number in Row (2), Column (A) 
means that the narrow view is negatively correlated with success; in other words, 
cases in jurisdictions with narrow interpretations are less likely to succeed than 
cases in jurisdictions with no relevant precedent.221 The figures in rows (3) and (4) 
of Column (B) show the impact of a circuit or BAP decision interpreting the 
exception to the APR; the coefficient on the broad interpretation is no longer 
statistically significant and is, effectively, zero.  The coefficient on the narrow 
interpretation, however, is significantly negative, which means that cases are less 
likely to succeed in jurisdictions with circuit or BAP decisions adopting the narrow 
interpretation of the exception to the APR.    
 The correlations detected in columns (A) and (B) could be due to omitted 
differences between districts.  For example, the Central District of California has a 
model chapter 11 plan,222 and it also had a broad precedent during our sample 
window.223 If the model plan significantly contributed to debtor success in chapter 
11, then the regression may wrongly attribute the model plan's role in success to the 
jurisdiction's broad interpretation of the exception to the APR.      
To address this problem, Columns (C) and (D) present the results of models that 
include fixed district effects to account for differences across districts that do not 
change over time.224 The results in Column (C), which considers all court decisions, 
no longer support the hypothesis that the interpretation of the exception to the APR 
affects the rate of success, but the results in Column (D), which considers only 
circuit level decisions, do.  The coefficient on broad circuit suggests that a broad 
interpretation of the exception increases the rate of success by 6%, a meaningful 
amount given that the average success rate is about 50%.225 The coefficient on 
narrow circuit suggests that a narrow interpretation reduces the success rate by 
about 5%, but the coefficient's p-value of 12% does not meet ordinary standards of 
statistical significance. 
Fixed-effects regressions can yield false positives if there are changes in 
omitted variables affecting the success rate that are correlated with changes in the 
legal variable.  A good number of the legal changes are due to a single 2012 opinion 
by the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, In re Friedman,226 that adopted 
                                                                                                                         
221 The coefficient on "broad" is similar if one uses these same legal measures on the full data set with 
Survive545 as the dependent variable, but the coefficient on "narrow" is no longer statistically significant. 
222 See F 2081-1.PLAN, http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/forms/individual-debtors-chapter-11-plan-
reorganization (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).  
223 See In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012), overruled by Zachary v. Cal. Bank & Tr., 811 
F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding the absolute priority rule continues to apply in individual chapter 
11 reorganizations after the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code). 
224 The standard errors in Columns (C) through (F) are clustered at the district level.  
225 See supra Table 41.  
226 466 B.R. 471 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). 
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the broad interpretation of the APR exception.  If other changes occurred in the 
Ninth Circuit between 2010 and 2013, we could wrongly attribute the effects of 
these changes to the Friedman court's interpretation of the absolute priority rule 
exception.    
To address this concern, we used chapter 13 success rates to run a placebo test.  
The absolute priority rule does not apply in chapter 13, and so interpretations of a 
chapter 11 exception to the APR should have no effect on the success rate.  The 
interpretation of the APR exception could affect the debtor's choice between chapter 
11 and chapter 13,227 but the chapter 13 filing rate is so much higher than the 
individual chapter 11 rate that any such effect should be negligible.228 The 
coefficients on broad and broad circuit in Column (E), Row (1) and Column (F), 
Row (3) of Table 45 are statistically significant, however.  The broad interpretation 
increases the success rate by about 3%; the average success rate for chapter 13, 
depending on year, is 46% to 54%.    
The chapter 13 models have nearly 700,000 observations; thus, even small 
differences in outcomes will be statistically significant.  Moreover, the estimated 
chapter 13 effect is smaller than the chapter 11 effect.  On the other hand, the 
chapter 13 model should not have found any effect for the jurisdiction's 
interpretation of the APR exception.  Therefore, the results suggest that at least 
some of the measured effect could be due to some other, unknown change. 
Most of our other explanatory variables remain robust predictors of success, 
even after controlling for the other factors.  Joint cases appear to succeed an 
additional 9% to 11% of the time, see Table 45, Row (5), Columns (A) through (D), 
while business cases appear to succeed an additional 5% to 8% of the time.  See 
Row (13).  No-asset cases fail dramatically more often.  See Row (12).  Attorney 
representation also seems to matter.  See Rows (6) through (10).  Pro se cases had a 
much lower rate of success, and attorneys who rarely handle individual chapter 11 
cases appear to have lower rates of success, as well.  The coefficients on these 
variables should be interpreted as the success rate relative to those cases brought by 
attorneys with a high level of experience, as this is the omitted dummy variable.  
The coefficient for attorneys with moderate experience is no longer significant, 
however, and is estimated at just 2% using the fixed-district effects model.  
Compare, e.g., Column (B), Row (8) with Column (D), Row (8).  This finding 
suggests that some or all of the difference in outcome between mid- and high-
volume attorneys may be attributable to differences in the districts where they 
practice.229 
                                                                                                                         
227 In Appendix B we test this proposition using quarterly non-business bankruptcy filings between 2006 
and the first quarter of 2016, and find some evidence that the court's interpretation of the APR affects the 
debtors' choice of chapter.  
228 Compare "Total Number of Cases" for Table 39 with "Total Number of Cases" for Table 40 (showing 
that in our sample the ratio of chapter 13 cases to individual chapter 11 cases was more than 100 to 1).  
229 Our variables also seem to predict success in chapter 13. The one exception is that business chapter 13 
cases appear more likely to fail, while business individual chapter 11 cases appear more likely to succeed. 
We defined the attorney experience variables for chapter 13 to match those of chapter 11 (one or two chapter 
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B.  Debtor Success—The Random Sample Data 
 
In this Section, we return to the question of how to measure success for 
individual chapter 11 debtors, but do so using the random sample data.  In Section 
B.1, we develop three definitions of success, and find, depending on the applicable 
definition, that between 36% and 42% of the random sample cases qualified as 
successes.  In Section B.2, we examine the predictors of success.  The limited size 
of our sample limits our ability to establish robust relationships, but we do find 
some evidence that is consistent with the findings from the PACER data.  Finally, 
in Section B.3, we present more direct evidence of the impact of the absolute 
priority rule on case outcome.    
 
1.  Defining Success 
 
In Section IV.A, we defined success to include any case in which the debtor 
received a discharge or avoided dismissal or conversion for 545 days.  We used this 
definition because the PACER case reports do not include information on plan 
proposal or confirmation.  For the random sample cases, however, we had access to 
the dockets and hand-coded each case, which provided rich information about plan 
proposal, time to disposition, plan confirmation, and plan failure.  Thus, in this 
Section, we use three different measures of success—Survive, Confirm, and S&C 
(survive and confirm).    
Survive, the first measure, most closely resembles the measure of success used 
for the PACER data.  We included in the Survive count any case in which there was 
neither an order of conversion nor dismissal for at least 881 days, or the time 
between December 31, 2013 (the last day that one of our cases could have been 
filed) and June 1, 2016 (the date that we chose for closing the study).  This 
definition is imperfect.  For example, a few of the random sample cases languished 
in bankruptcy at least this long with neither a confirmed plan nor an order of 
conversion or dismissal.230 We defined the second measure, Confirm, to include any 
case in which the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan of reorganization.  A 
bankruptcy court, however, can convert or dismiss an individual chapter 11 case 
after confirmation if the debtor stops making plan payments.231 
Our preferred definition combines these two measures.  Thus, our third 
variable, S&C, captures any case in which the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan 
                                                                                                                         
13 cases means low, three to ten means mid-level experience), because we were trying to run a placebo test 
and not trying to understand the determinants of success in chapter 13. 
230 See, e.g., In re Blonder, No. 13-76658 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2013); In re Anderson, No. 13-38712 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2013); In re Jenkinson, No. 13-24701 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 2, 2013) (beginning in 
chapter 13 and on October 28, 2013 converted to chapter 11 by bankruptcy court). See Order Converting 
Case to Chapter 11, In re Jenkinson, No. 13-24701 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2013), ECF No. 36.  
231 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(N) (stating that debtor's "material default" under a confirmed plan provides 
"cause" for conversion or dismissal under subsection (b)(1)). 
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and did not enter an order of conversion or dismissal for the 881-day period starting 
December 31, 2013.   
 
Table 46: Random Sample Data Success Rates 
 
 Percentage of Cases 
Survive 41.26% 
Confirm 38.57% 
S&C 35.87% 
 
As the data in Table 46 show, the success rate drops as our definition becomes 
more stringent.  More than four in ten of the random sample debtors survived 881 
days without having their case converted or dismissed.  Almost 39% of these 
debtors confirmed a plan, but at 881 days some of these plans had failed.  Only 36% 
of the random sample debtors succeeded under the most restrictive of the three 
definitions of success. 
Before moving on to a discussion of the predictors of success for cases in the 
random sample, we note three Code provisions to which some bankruptcy courts 
have given creative interpretations.  By doing so, these courts both increase the odds 
that the debtor will confirm a plan and obtain a discharge, and make individual 
chapter 11 bankruptcies look a little more like chapter 13 cases.   
First, the absolute priority rule applies if a class of unsecured creditors has not 
accepted the plan.232 Section 1126(c) of the Code provides that a class of creditors 
accepts the plan when creditors "hold[ing] at least two-thirds in amount and more 
than one-half in number" of voting claims vote to accept the plan.233 The Code 
apparently does not count silence or lack of objection as acceptance; rather, the 
creditor must actually vote.    
Yet, the bankruptcy court in In re Parker234 confirmed the debtor's plan even 
though several classes of impaired secured classes did not cast votes.  In his ballot 
summary, the debtor asserted that these classes were "deemed to have accepted the 
plan."235 In its confirmation order, the court held that the plan had "been accepted or 
                                                                                                                         
232 See id. at § 1129(b)(1).  
233 See id. at § 1126(c). 
234 No. 13-10897 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2013).  
235 Debtor's Summary of Voting Results ¶¶ 2, 5–6, In re Parker, No. 13-10897 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 11, 
2014), ECF No. 582. The debtor cited In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1988), in 
support of this assertion. In that case the Tenth Circuit found that an impaired creditor who neither objected 
to nor voted to reject the debtor's plan was presumed to have accepted the plan. The court explained that 
because acceptance of the non-voting creditor was presumed, the bankruptcy court did not have to conduct a 
cram down analysis. See id. at 1268. See also In re Campbell, 89 B.R. 187 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988) (holding 
that "impaired classes which failed to vote and did not object to confirmation of the plan are deemed to have 
accepted the plan for purposes of meeting the requirements of § 1129(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code" and, 
therefore, the court did not have to conduct a cram down analysis). But see In re Friese, 103 B.R. 90, 92 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating the rationale of Ruti-Sweetwater decision was "faulty" and disagreeing with 
Campbell).  
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[could] be confirmed as to all classes of creditors and interest holders" in 
accordance with the debtor's ballot summary.236 The confirmation order mentioned 
neither section 1129(b)(2)—the provision defining the requirements for finding a 
plan fair and equitable—nor cram down.  By counting silence as assent, a 
bankruptcy court allows the debtor to avoid the need to cram down the plan.  That, 
in turn, increases a debtor's odds of obtaining plan confirmation. 
Second, section 1129(a)(15) allows an unsecured creditor who is not fully paid 
to demand that the plan propose payments equal to the debtor's projected disposable 
income for five years or "during the period for which the plan provides payments, 
whichever is longer."237 The majority of confirmed plans in our sample called for 
payments extending beyond five years; the most common time frame for payment 
of secured creditors in these plans was thirty years.238 Thus, section 1129(a)(15) 
plainly requires that if an unsecured creditor objects, the debtor must devote an 
amount equal to his or her disposable income to plan payments over that thirty-year 
period.   
Yet we found no plans that offered payments to unsecured creditors after five 
years, suggesting either that courts are restricting the projected disposable income 
test to five years or that unsecured creditors are not demanding more.239 As a matter 
of practice, courts are limiting the devotion of projected disposable income in 
chapter 11 cases to the period applicable in chapter 13—namely, the period for 
which the plan provides payments to unsecured creditors.240 The end result makes 
individual chapter 11 cases look much more like chapter 13 cases. 
Finally, both chapters 11 and 13 delay discharge until the plan is completed.  
Unlike a chapter 11 plan, which may extend for decades, chapter 13 plans cannot 
last more than five years.241 Many debtors will still owe payments on their mortgage 
after this time, but if they default on these payments their discharge is not in 
jeopardy.  Chapter 11's identical language, holding discharge in abeyance until 
                                                                                                                         
236 Order Confirming Third Amended Plan of Reorganization Dated August 22, 2014 ¶ 8, In re Parker, No. 
13-10897 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 18, 2014), ECF No. 584.  
237 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B) (2012). This subsection applies only if an unsecured creditor objects to 
confirmation of the plan; merely voting against the plan is insufficient. See In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. 264, 
271 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007) ("[T]his provision applies only when the holder of an allowed unsecured claim 
objects to confirmation, which [the creditor] did not do in this case."). In the alternative, a debtor may pay all 
allowed unsecured claims in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(A). 
This is quite different than chapter 13's parallel provision—section 1325(b)—which limits the applicable 
commitment period to no more than five years. See id. at § 1325(b). Subsection 1325(b)(1)(B) requires that a 
debtor devote all projected disposable income, during the applicable commitment period, to payment of 
unsecured claims. This provision is triggered when the trustee or an unsecured creditor raises an objection to 
plan confirmation, and the debtor does not repay unsecured claims in full.  
238 See, e.g., Order Confirming Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Shane L. Blackbird and Tracy A. 
Blackbird at 9, In re Blackbird, No. 13-18854 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 25, 2015), ECF No. 120 (paying secured 
creditor over thirty years).  
239 See id. at 10–11 (paying Class 7 unsecured creditors over five years, starting 54 months from the 
effective date).  
240 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012).  
241 See id. at § 1322(d).   
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completion of the plan,242 has a very different effect; it withholds a discharge until 
the debtor completes all payments—secured and unsecured alike—no matter how 
long it takes.243 Some courts, however, are using language in section 1141(d)(5)(A) 
that allows them to grant an early discharge for "cause" upon completion of 
payments to administrative, priority, and general unsecured creditors.244 The end 
result, once again, is to make chapter 11 cases look much more like those in chapter 
13. 
 
2.  Predicting Success 
 
The random sample data allow us to define success much more carefully than 
the PACER data permitted, and to explore new theories.  With so many fewer 
observations, however, we cannot estimate the predictive power of these variables 
with as much precision.  As a result, apparently important relationships may be due 
to chance.  We include p-values so that the reader can more easily judge the level of 
confidence to have in the findings.  On the other hand, the absence of statistical 
significance for a finding does not mean the absence of any relationship.  In many 
cases, the estimated values are practically, but not statistically, significant, because 
the small number of observations limits the power of our tests.  In these cases, a 
lack of statistical significance merely means that further research is needed to settle 
the question. 
                                                                                                                         
242 See id. at § 1141(d)(5).   
243 See id. 
244 In ascertaining "cause," courts generally focus on the likelihood that creditors will be paid in 
accordance with the plan. See, e.g., In re Grogan, BR No. 11-65409-FRA11, 2013 WL 4854313, at *9 
(Bankr. D. Or. Sept. 10, 2013) (requiring debtor to establish, based on totality of the circumstances, "ability 
to make plan payments with a high degree of certainty"). Most courts do not permit early discharge. See, 
e.g., In re Beyer, 433 B.R. 884, 888–89 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (requiring more than "just substantial 
consummation" of the plan, but that debtor show ability to "make all future payments with a high degree of 
certainty," and holding "unknown, potential federal tax liability," which might be incurred upon surrender of 
real estate collateral to secured creditors in full satisfaction of obligations, insufficient to support early 
discharge). Cf. Order Confirming Debtor's Plan of Reorganization ¶ 14, In re Robles, No. 13-13476 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2013), ECF No. 167 (stating debtor would be discharged from all pre-confirmation debts 
"upon completion of all payments required under the Plan to Class 7 general unsecured creditors, as well as 
administrative and priority claimants").   
In one of the few cases finding "cause" sufficient to support early discharge, In re Sheridan, 391 B.R. 287, 
291 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2008), the court stated the usual rule—that creditors will receive amounts promised 
under the plan. The court based its finding of the necessary assurance on the stable income of one debtor (a 
lawyer), and the securing of obligations to otherwise unsecured creditors by a second deed of trust against 
the debtors' home with equity. 
A related provision, section 1141(d)(5)(B), permits a hardship discharge much like that available in 
chapter 13 under section 1328(b). See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(B) (2012); see also id. at § 1328(b). Both 
section 1145(d)(5)(B) and section 1328(b) mandate that the debtor satisfy the best interests of creditors test 
(unlike section 1141(d)(5)(A), which by its terms does not require that the debtor satisfy the best interests 
test in order to utilize the "cause" exception), and that a modification of the plan is not feasible. Section 
1328(b), however, also requires a finding that "the debtor's failure to complete such payments is due to 
circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable." 
Although both chapters 11 and 13 grant the court the power to order a hardship discharge, see id. at 
§§ 1141(d)(5)(B) and 1328(b), this power is almost never exercised.  
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Table 47 summarizes the relationship between a series of dichotomous 
variables and our measures of success, presenting the success rate of each group as 
well as the p-value from a chi-squared test of the null hypothesis that the true 
difference is zero.  Not all explanatory variables can be neatly divided into two 
categories, and so Table 48 presents the estimated marginal effects from logit 
regressions with a single explanatory variable.    
For Table 47, mean 1st is the mean for the first item in the comparison; mean 
2nd is for the second item, and is provided underneath the figure for mean 1st in all 
columns.  P-values are provided in parentheses underneath mean 2nd.  For example, 
for cases filed in 2013, the mean for the Survive measure of success is .456 (mean 
1st), while the mean for 2010 is .367 (mean 2nd).  The p-value is .18, which means 
that there is not a statistically significant difference in survival rates between 2010 
and 2013.  The number of cases or observations is in parentheses following each 
half of the relevant comparison in the far left column of Table 47.  In many rows the 
number of observations do not sum to 223 because we dropped cases that were 
missing the relevant information.  Finally, some debtors reported zero income or 
zero assets.  To prevent the loss of these observations when we look at ratios or 
logs, we added $1 to all income and total asset values.   
 
Table 47: Success Comparisons 
 
 Survive Confirm S&C 
 
Comparisons (# cases) 
Mean1st 
Mean 2nd 
(p-value) 
Mean1st 
Mean 2nd 
p-value) 
Mean1st 
Mean 2nd 
(p-value) 
(1) Cases filed in 2013 (114) v.  2010  
(109) 
.456  
.367  
(.18) 
.412 
.358 
(.40) 
.395 
.321 
(.25) 
(2) Non-business debt (122) v. business 
debt (99) 
.361  
.475  
(.09)* 
.361  
.414 
(.42) 
.328 
.394 
(.31) 
(3) No business operations (24) v. 
business operations (174)  
.292  
.456  
(.12) 
.25  
.437 
(.08)* 
.25  
.402  
(.15) 
(4) Not small business (168) v. small 
business (30) 
.422  
.433  
(.91) 
.399  
.467  
(.49) 
.369  
.433  
(.50) 
(5) Assets expected to be available for 
general unsecured creditors (172) v. no-
asset case (43) 
.448  
.302  
(.08)* 
.419  
.279  
(.09)* 
.389  
.279  
(.18) 
(6) One debtor (139) v. joint filing (84) .360  
.500  
(.04)** 
.295  
.536  
(.00)* 
.281  
.488  
(.00)*** 
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(7) Single (52) v. married (154)  .346  
.474  
(.11) 
.250  
.468  
(.01)*** 
.250  
.430  
(.02)** 
(8) Married debtor filing alone (73) v. 
married filing jointly with spouse (81)  
.425  
.519  
(.24) 
.370  
.556  
(.02)** 
.343  
.506  
(.04)** 
(9) Non-homeowner (18) v. homeowner 
(186) 
.389  
.441  
(.67) 
.333  
.419  
(.48) 
.333  
.387 
(.65) 
(10) Employment duration more than a 
year (142) v. less than a year (15)  
.444  
.400  
(.75) 
.430  
.400  
(.83) 
.390 
.333  
(.65) 
(11) Represented debtor (205) v. pro se 
filing (18)  
.449  
.00  
(.00)*** 
.420  
.00  
(.00)*** 
.390  
.00  
(.00)*** 
(12) Low-experience attorney (81) v. 
mid-experience attorney (80) 
.420  
.450  
(.70) 
.370  
.413  
(.59) 
.321 
.400  
(.30) 
(13) Low-experience attorney (81) v. 
high-experience attorney (44)  
.420  
.500  
(.39) 
.370  
.523  
(.10)* 
.321  
.500  
(.05)* 
(14) Mid-experience attorney (80) v. 
high-experience attorney (44)  
.45  
.500  
(.59) 
.413  
.523 
(.24) 
.400  
.500  
(.28) 
(15)No prior bankruptcy (174) v. prior 
bankruptcy (42) 
.442  
.286  
(.06)* 
.409  
.286  
(.14) 
.381  
.262  
(.15) 
(16) Priority debt less than 12*monthly 
income (177) v. greater than 12* 
monthly income (28)  
.467  
.286  
(.07)* 
.446  
.25  
(.05)* 
.412  
.25 
(.10) 
(17) Less than 3 real estate parcels (113) 
v. more than 2 real estate parcels (110) 
.345  
.535  
(.01)*** 
.354  
.465  
(.10) 
.310  
.455 
(.03)** 
(18) Cases originated in chapter 11 (200) 
v. cases converted from another chapter 
(23)  
.425  
.304  
(.27) 
.405  
.217  
(.08)* 
.375  
.217  
(.14) 
(19) Over chapter 13 debt limit (146) v. 
under debt limit (62)  
.425  
.484  
(.43) 
.370  
.516  
(.05)* 
.343  
.484  
(.06)* 
(20) Over limit but under 1.5 times limit 
(32)  v. under chapter 13 debt limit (62)  
.406  
.484  
(.47) 
.375  
.516  
(.19) 
.375  
.484  
(.31) 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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We find a much bigger difference in outcomes between cases filed in 2010 and 
those filed in 2013 for the random sample data than we do for the PACER data.245 It 
is unclear, however, whether this is due to better definitions of success or to the fact 
that we are looking at a much smaller sample.  None of the differences are 
significant at the 10% level.    
Rows (2) through (4) of Table 47 compare business and non-business cases.  In 
Section IV.A.2, we found that cases with primarily business debts succeeded an 
additional 2% or 7% of the time, depending on the definition of success used.  Row 
(2) shows similar and even larger estimates, but the difference is statistically 
significant at the 10% level only for the Survive measure.  As discussed earlier, 
many debtors who operated a business did not check the box stating that their debts 
were primarily business debts.246   
In Row (3), we compare debtors who operated a business with those few who 
did not.  The non-business cases had sharply lower rates of success; the odds-ratios 
range between 2.02 and 2.34, depending on the measure of success used.  Row (4) 
compares small-business cases with those cases in which the debtor checked that it 
was not a small business case.247 Under all measures, the small business cases have 
a higher rate of success, but none of the differences are close to statistically 
significant. 
The data in Row (5) show that no-asset cases have a much lower rate of success 
than asset cases, and the difference is statistically significant in two of our three 
measures.  The differences, however, are not as pronounced as those in Section 
IV.A.2.  We suspect that the difference is due, at least in part, to differences in our 
coding of no-asset cases.248 
In Section IV.A.2, we found that joint filing is a strong predictor of success; 
here, focusing on our random sample, we also find that jointly filed cases are much 
more likely to succeed, regardless of the measure of success used.  See Table 47, 
Row (6).  In Section IV.A.2, we hypothesized that joint filing serves as a proxy for 
marriage.  Our random sample allowed us to explore this theory, using Schedule I to 
determine the debtor's marital status.  Seventeen of the debtors did not complete this 
Schedule; these cases all ended in failure.  Of the 206 cases in which the debtor 
filed Schedule I, 154 listed a spouse.  Of these 154, a little more than half (81) 
involved a joint petition.249 Of the debtors who completed Schedule I, those who 
reported a spouse were much more likely to succeed than those who did not.  See 
Table 47, Row (7).  Row (8) compares the married debtors who filed jointly with 
those who filed alone.  The joint filings were significantly more likely to succeed, 
                                                                                                                         
245 Compare supra Table 47, Row (1) with the first row of Table 42.   
246 See supra Section III.A.4, and Table 11 and accompanying text.  
247 The total number of cases does not add to 223 because, in some cases, the debtor checked neither box 
on the petition.  
248 See supra note 154.  
249 One debtor listed his spouse as "common law" and disclosed that they had three children together. We 
treated this debtor as married. See Schedules and Statements, In re Etter, No. 10-15015 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
June 7, 2010), ECF No. 12.  
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and this difference was statistically significant in two of the three measures.  In 
other words, a joint filing is not merely a proxy for marriage.   
We tested two other measures of "stability"—home ownership and employment 
duration—but neither proved particularly useful in predicting success.  Of the 
debtors who filed intelligible schedules, over 90% owned a home.  The 
homeowners had higher rates of success than the non-homeowners, but the 
differences were not very large and were not close to statistically significant under 
any of our measures.  See Table 47, Row (9).  We also used Schedule I to determine 
the duration of the debtor's employment.  As we noted above,250 our chapter 11 
debtors report very long periods of employment.  In the random sample, more than 
90% reported employment duration of more than one year.  As with home 
ownership, those debtors with more than a year of employment succeeded more 
often than those with less than a year, but the differences were not particularly large 
or close to statistically significant. 
As with our PACER data,251 we found that pro se cases are more likely to fail, 
but the effects are far stronger for the random sample data.  In fact, we found no 
successful pro se cases using any of our measures.  See Table 47, Row (11).   
For represented debtors, the data in Row (1) of Table 48 show that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between the log of the number of times that an 
attorney's name appears in the cases in the random sample and our measures of 
success.252 In rows (12) through (14) of Table 47, we compare the success rates of 
attorney experience groups against each other.  Groups with more experience 
always have higher rates of success, but the only statistically significant difference 
is between the low- and high-experience attorneys.   
The findings in row (15) of Table 47 suggest that debtors who disclosed a prior 
bankruptcy filing on their petitions failed more often than those who did not.  The 
difference is only statistically significant for one measure of success, but the 
estimated difference is practically significant (odds-ratios range from 1.76 to 1.99), 
and the differences in the other two measures are close to statistical significance.    
We expected to find that debtors with greater income, or greater income relative 
to their expenses, would be more likely to succeed.  Despite trying different ways to 
measure a debtor's income and expenses, we found little evidence to support this 
hypothesis.  Row (2) of Table 48 reports the marginal effects of increasing the log 
of the debtor's monthly income.  The estimated effect is positive, but it is not close 
to statistically significant.  We found similar results when we analyzed the debtor's 
unadjusted monthly income, the debtor's net income, and the ratio of the debtor's 
income to expenses.    
 
                                                                                                                         
250 See supra Table 24 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra Section IV.A.2. 
252 In an omitted specification, we also find a statistically significant relationship between the raw number 
of appearances and the success rate. 
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Table 48: Marginal Effects for Non-Dichotomous Variables 
 
 
 
Variable (# cases) 
Survive Confirm S&C 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
(p-value) 
(1) Log of attyct (205) .0391 
(.18) 
.0676** 
(.02) 
 
0693** 
(.01) 
 
(2)  Log of current monthly income (206)  .026 
(.17) 
.024 
(.20) 
.019 
(.30) 
(3) Priority debt divided by (current income 
+$1) using summary of schedules (205)  
-.00005 
(.73) 
 
-.00005 
(.71) 
 
-.00004 
(.68)  
 
(4) Secured debt/total debt (206) .211** 
(.04) 
 
.184* 
(.08) 
 
.203* 
(.05) 
 
(5) Real property/ Total assets (208) .170 
(.16) 
 
.220* 
(.07) 
 
.203* 
(.09) 
 
(6) Number of real estate parcels disclosed 
on schedules (212) 
.046*** 
(.00) 
 
.031*** 
(.00) 
 
.037***  
(.00)  
 
(7) log of total assets listed on summary of 
schedules (208) 
.021 
(.28) 
 
.005 
(.78) 
 
.007 
(.71) 
 
(8) log of total liabilities listed on summary 
of schedules (208) 
-.015 
(.61) 
 
-.053* 
(.07) 
 
-.051* 
(.08) 
 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
  
Debtors must repay their priority debts in full within five years of the order for 
relief,253 and so we expected to find that debtors with significant priority debts 
would be more likely to fail.  We tested this theory by looking at the ratio of the 
debtor's priority debts to his or her current monthly income.  The evidence is mixed.  
The figures in Row (3) of Table 48 suggest that debtors with a larger ratio are less 
likely to succeed, but the estimated effect is close to one and not statistically 
significant.  We used a simpler test for the data in Row (16) of Table 47, comparing 
those debtors with priority debts in excess of one year's worth of estimated income 
(twelve times the income reported on the summary of schedules) to those with less 
                                                                                                                         
253 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (2012). 
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than this amount.  Here, the difference is statistically significant for two of our three 
measures of success and almost significant (p-value rounds to 10%) for the third.   
Because we studied a time period with an historic collapse in real estate prices 
and many debtors reported significant real estate holdings, we decided to test 
whether cases with significant real estate succeeded at a different rate.  Our theory 
was that there would be less uncertainty about the proper use of assets in these cases 
and that the primary role of these bankruptcies was to facilitate negotiations 
between the debtor and secured creditors.  We tested three measures: (1) the number 
of real estate parcels reported by the debtor on Schedule A; (2) the ratio of the 
debtor's real property to total assets reported on the summary of schedules; and (3) 
the ratio of secured debt to total debt reported on the summary of schedules.  There 
are issues with all three measures.  In an effort to save coding time, we told our 
research assistants to stop counting parcels once they reached ten, and a great many 
of the debtors reached this limit.  The biggest problem with our real property and 
secured debt ratios is that individual debtors do not report consolidated financial 
statements; some debtors (correctly) reported interests in LLCs as personal property 
even though the primary assets of these LLCs were real property,254 even though 
substantially all of the debtor's unsecured debt came from personal guarantees of 
mortgages owed by wholly owned LLCs.  See Table 48, Rows (4)-(6). 
Despite these limitations, all of our measures suggest that real estate cases are 
more likely to succeed.  The estimated effects for the number of parcels, the ratio of 
secured to total debt, and the ratio of real to total property are all greater than one, 
though one of the three estimates for the real property ratio is not statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  Row (17) of Table 47 reports a simplified comparison, 
contrasting those cases in which the debtors reported three or more parcels with 
those in which the debtors reported two or fewer.  This comparison also suggests 
that debtors who own more real estate are much more likely to succeed.    
A few of our cases converted into chapter 11.  We expected these cases to fail 
more often because chapter 11 was not the debtor's first choice.  The estimated 
success rates for these cases are indeed markedly lower, but only one of the three 
differences is statistically significant at the 10% level.  See Table 47, Row (18). 
A surprising number of debtors chose chapter 11 even though they reported 
debts well below the chapter 13 debt limits.255 The figures in Row (19) of Table 47 
show that these debtors are much more likely to succeed, particularly if we define 
success to require plan confirmation.256 There are two reasons why these cases may 
succeed more often.  First, chapters 11 and 13 are quite different,257 and each may 
be well-designed for some debtors but not others.  The fact that these debtors chose 
                                                                                                                         
254 See supra note 178. 
255 See supra Table 30 and accompanying text. 
256 Our largest cases had tens of millions of dollars of debt, and so they might not be good comparisons. 
We tried comparing debtors below the debt limits to those above the limits but below 1.5 times the debt 
limits. Those below the debt limits had a higher rate of success, but the sample size was very small so the 
difference was not statistically significant. 
257 See supra notes 6–14 and accompanying text. 
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chapter 11 over chapter 13 suggests that chapter 11 is well-designed for their needs.  
Second, there could be a scale effect.  We tested the latter theory, and provide the 
results in Rows (7) and (8) of Table 48.  There seems to be no meaningful 
relationship between the log of the assets reported and our measures of success, but 
debtors with more debt appear less likely to confirm a plan. 
In Table 49, we return to an examination of the impact of the APR on debtor 
success.  Using the random sample data, we tested the effect, if any, of the broad 
versus the narrow view of the APR exception on success rates, using the three 
measures described earlier.    
 
Table 49: Success and Interpretation of the APR Exception—Random Sample 
  
 
Precedent 
(# of cases) 
(A)  
Survive 
(B) 
Confirm 
(C) 
S&C 
Mean Mean Mean 
Broad (30) 53.33 53.33 50.00 
No Precedent (118)  43.22 38.98  36.44  
Narrow (75) 33.33  32.00  29.33  
Broad Circuit (31) 45.16 38.71 38.71 
No Circuit (177)  42.37 39.55  36.72  
Narrow Circuit (15) 20.00  26.67  20.00  
 
     As the data in Table 49 show, for five of the six measurements the rate of 
success rises with a more debtor-friendly precedent.  Yet, the differences in success 
rates among narrow, broad, and no-precedent jurisdictions are not statistically 
significant.  Therefore, we cannot reject with 90% confidence the hypothesis that 
the differences in rates of success result from chance.    
Table 50 presents the results of some cross-sectional linear probability 
regressions that use "S&C" as the dependent variable; our findings were similar 
when we used "Confirm" or "Survive" as the dependent variables.  Our findings are 
consistent with a number of our theories, but only some of the results are 
statistically significant.  Once again, however, we caution that a failure to find 
statistical significance does not necessarily confirm the null hypothesis of no effect.  
A finding of no statistical significance just means that we cannot be 90% certain, 
for example, that the null hypothesis is wrong.  Indeed, in some cases the predicted 
effect is practically significant, but our small sample size prevents estimation of the 
true effect with sufficient precision.    
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Table 50: Regressions of Success Rates—Random Sample 
 
 Variables 
(A) 
S&C 
(B) 
S&C 
(C) 
S&C 
(D) 
S&C 
(E) 
S&C 
(F) 
S&C 
(1) Joint 
filing 
0.210*** 
(0.00) 
0.234*** 
(0.00) 
0.218*** 
(0.00) 
0.194*** 
(0.01) 
0.176** 
(0.02) 
0.215*** 
(0.00) 
(2) Filed in 
2010 
-.115 
(0.11) 
-.142* 
(0.05) 
--.162** 
(0.04) 
-.132 
(0.11) 
-0.128 
(0.14) 
-0.137* 
(0.08) 
(3) No asset -0.140* (0.09) 
-0.145* 
(0.08) 
-0.175** 
(0.05) 
-0.140 
(0.13) 
-0.100 
(0.30) 
-0.159* 
(0.08) 
(4) 
Converted 
into chapter 
11     
0.0012 
(0.996) 
-0.151 
(0.20) 
(5) Primarily 
business debt 
0.0782 
(0.24) 
0.0880 
(0.18) 
0.052 
(0.46)   
0.112 
(0.13) 
(6) Business 
operations    
0.141 
(0.22)   
(7) Small 
business     
0.186* 
(0.08)  
(8) Pro se -0.382** (0.01) 
-0.353** 
(0.02) 
-0.326 
(0.010)  
-0.467*** 
(0.01) 
-0.366* 
(0.06) 
(9) Log of 
attorney 
cases    
0.057* 
(0.06)   
(10) AttyLow -0.145 (0.11) 
-0.150* 
(0.09) 
-0.136 
(0.10)  
-0.113 
(0.25) 
-0.123 
(0.18) 
(11) AttyMid -0.042 
(0.65) 
-0.048 
(0.60) 
-0.022 
(0.82)  
-0.020 
(0.84) 
-0.023 
(0.81) 
(12) Number 
of parcels    
0.040*** 
(0.00)   
(13) 
Real/(total 
property)     
0.202 
(0.11)  
(14) Secured/ 
(total debt)      
0.220** 
(0.04) 
(15) Priority 
debt/income 
   
-1.37e-06 
(0.68)   
(16) Priority   -0.138    
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debt/income>
12 
(0.17) 
(17) Income/ 
expenses 
   
0.023 
(0.63)   
(18) Log of 
(income+1) 
     
-0.004 
(0.84) 
(19) More 
than 3 parcels   
0.111 
(0.12)    
(20) Log of 
(liabilities)    
-0.087** 
(0.01)  
-0.069** 
(0.03) 
(21) Log of 
(assets+1)   
-0.009 
(0.66)    
(22) Under 
chapter 13 
debt limit     
0.0895 
(0.28)  
(23) Broad 
circuit  
-0.020 
(0.84) 
-0.040 
(0.73) 
.015 
(0.90) 
0.0156 
(0.89) 
-0.0293 
(0.80) 
(24) Narrow 
circuit  
-0.308*** 
(0.02) 
-0.340** 
(0.02) 
-0.323** 
(0.03) 
-0.302** 
(0.04) 
-0.329** 
(0.02) 
(25) Broad 0.054 (0.60)      
(26) Narrow -0.123 (0.10)      
(27) Constant 0.468*** (0.00) 
0.458*** 
(0.00) 
0.595*** 
(0.00) 
1.33** 
(0.01) 
0.309** 
(0.02) 
1.356*** 
(0.01) 
Observations 214 214 196 175 182 196 
R-squared 0.135 0.141 0.146 0.192 0.155 0.180 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 50 provides a lot of data, and a few observations are in order.  First, even 
after controlling for other factors in this small data set, whether a case was filed 
jointly and whether it was filed in 2010 both appear to be valuable in predicting 
whether the case will succeed.  See Rows (1) and (2).  Second, whether a case is a 
"no-asset" case is also useful information as the relevant coefficient is large and 
statistically significant in many specifications.  See Row (3). 
Third, by comparison, the coefficient on whether a case was converted into 
chapter 11 is statistically insignificant and varies sharply depending on the other 
variables included.  See Table 50, Row (4).  One reason is that inclusion of some 
variables required dropping several observations for which the relevant data were 
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missing.  Fourth, the coefficients on the business-term variables suggest that 
business cases are more likely to succeed.  See Table 50, Rows (5) and (7).  Only 
the coefficient on the small business dummy is statistically significant, however, 
and even this coefficient is not significant in some omitted specifications.   
Fifth, once again we find that pro se cases are much more likely to fail, and that 
the probability of success for represented debtors increases with the volume of 
individual chapter 11 cases the attorney has handled.  See Table 50, Rows (8) and 
(9).  The coefficient on the log of cases is strongly significant.  When we include 
dummies for each category of attorney (the high experience attorneys are the 
omitted group), the coefficient for the low volume attorneys is significant in just 
one specification and the dummy for the moderate attorneys is never significant.  
Still, both take the "correct" sign.  Once again, we urge caution in interpreting these 
results as demonstrating that more experienced attorneys are more effective since 
we have not fully controlled for the selection effect.  That is, we do not know 
whether more experienced attorneys are more effective or whether they have better 
clients. 
Sixth, the coefficient relating to the number of parcels owned by the debtor is 
strongly significant, suggesting that real estate cases are more likely to succeed.  
See Table 50, Column (D), Row (12).  The coefficients on our other real estate 
measures take the right sign but are not significant.  As noted above, however, there 
are significant concerns with these other measures. 
Finally, we note that the coefficient on the narrow interpretation of the 
exception to the APR is negative and strongly significant.  While this is consistent 
with the view that a less debtor-friendly interpretation will reduce the rate of 
success, we remind the reader that a cross-sectional regression is especially 
vulnerable to omitted variable bias. 
 
3.  Direct Evidence of the Impact of the Absolute Priority Rule 
 
In Sections IV.A.2 and B.2, we examined the relationship between the absolute 
priority rule and success, using the tools of a social scientist.  Here we use tools 
more familiar to lawyers.  More specifically, we looked for absolute priority rule 
objections in all of the random sample cases in which a plan was filed, and then 
tried to determine whether the objection affected the outcome of the case.   
As Column (A) of Table 51 shows, plans were proposed in approximately 60% 
of the cases in the 2010 and 2013 random samples.  For each of the cases with a 
proposed plan, we searched the case docket for objections.  We included in Column 
(B) of Table 51 any case in which the substance of the objection rested on absolute 
priority grounds, even if the objecting party failed to invoke the magic phrase 
"absolute priority rule" or to cite section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).258  
                                                                                                                         
258 See, e.g., Objection to Confirmation ¶¶ 6–7, 10, In re Stickler, No. 10-10080 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Dec. 
15, 2010), ECF No. 90 (stating debtor had non-exempt assets that were not being paid to unsecured creditors 
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Also included in Column (B) of Table 51 are several cases in which a party in 
interest raised an objection to the plan proponent's failure to include in the 
disclosure statement information about the applicability of the absolute priority 
rule.259 The vast majority of objections, however, were objections to plan 
confirmation, not simply objections to inadequate disclosure.    
 We found APR objections in 22% of the cases in which a plan was proposed.260 
As Column (B) of Table 51 shows, the percentage of APR objections increased 
between 2010 and 2013.  In 2010, creditors raised APR objections in approximately 
17% of the cases with proposed plans; that figure increased to about 27% in 2013.  
Our sample is small, however, so the difference is not statistically significant (p = 
.17).  
 
Table 51: APR Objections 
 
  
(A) 
Plan Proposed 
 
(B) 
APR Objection 
(C) 
Plan not confirmed 
APR Objection No APR 
Objection 
2010 66/109 = 60.6% 11/66 = 16.7% 5/11 = 45.5% 22/55 = 40.0% 
2013 68/114 = 59.6% 18/68 = 26.5% 3/18 = 16.7%261 15/50 = 30.0% 
 
 The more surprising finding is the lack of direct evidence that the APR prevents 
debtors from confirming plans.262 In fact, Column C shows that cases in which an 
APR objection was raised failed less often than cases in which a plan was proposed 
but no objection was raised.  In 2010 and 2013, only eight of twenty-nine cases 
(27.6%) in which an APR objection was raised failed; by comparison, 35.2% of 
                                                                                                                         
and that the plan was not fair and equitable because it spread payments to unsecured creditors over eighty-
four months while the debtor "continue[d] to live in his $1,000,000 home"). 
259 See, e.g., Objection to Disclosure Statement ¶ 23, In re Blonder, No. 13-76658 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 
8, 2014), ECF No. 84 (stating undersecured creditor's objection that disclosure statement failed to discuss the 
absolute priority rule); see also Alan Schlosser's Objection to Debtors' Disclosure Statement at 4:12–22, In 
re Trapp, No. 13-16412 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 31, 2014), ECF No. 80 (noting that debtors had not applied or 
discussed the APR or its impact in the case); see also Objection by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission to Debtor's Disclosure Statement for Debtor's Amended Plan of Reorganization at 7–8, In re 
Levin, No. 10-33696 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 6, 2014), ECF No. 739. 
260 Plans were proposed in 134 cases, and there were twenty-nine cases with objections. That is an 
objection rate of 21.6%. 
261 In five cases from 2013, an APR objection was raised and confirmation did not occur; two of those five 
cases, however, are still open as of this writing and, thus, are not included in the figure in Column (C) of 
Table 51. See In re Blonder, No. 13-76658 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2013); see also In re Lopez, No. 13-
12073 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2013). The APR objection in Blonder was an objection to the adequacy of 
information in the disclosure statement. In addition, as of the writing of this Report, the creditor has 
withdrawn its objection and no further APR objections have been filed with the bankruptcy court. See 
Withdrawal of Objection to Disclosure Statement, In re Blonder, No. 13-76658 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 
2016), ECF No. 215. 
262 This finding is somewhat at odds with our earlier results in Sections IV.A.2 and B.2. See, e.g., supra 
Tables 44–45 (PACER data) and Tables 49–50 (random sample data). 
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cases in which no APR objection was raised failed.  Moreover, in only one of the 
eight failed APR objection cases did the bankruptcy court definitively identify the 
absolute priority rule as the reason for plan failure.263 In the other seven cases, the 
bankruptcy court's order denying confirmation and/or converting or dismissing the 
chapter 11 case either rested on grounds other than the APR,264 provided no reason 
in the written order for its decision,265 or spoke in general terms about the debtor's 
failure to propose a confirmable plan.266 
 This inability to identify APR as the sole reason for plan failure is not 
surprising.  The absolute priority rule is rarely the only objection to plan 
confirmation raised by a creditor, the U.S. Trustee, or the Bankruptcy 
Administrator.  For example, in an individual chapter 11 case, a creditor may object 
to the amount paid to unsecured creditors on the basis of both the absolute priority 
rule and the disposable income requirement.267 In In re Abraham,268 the U.S. 
Trustee identified more than twenty problems with the debtor's proposed plan, 
including the possibility that the debtor would prove unable to confirm a plan if the 
unsecured creditor class voted to reject the plan.269  
Of the other twenty-one cases in which an APR objection was raised, the 
bankruptcy court confirmed a plan in nineteen; two were still open without a 
confirmed plan or an order of dismissal or conversion as of June 1, 2016.  In the 
vast majority of the nineteen confirmed-plan cases with APR objections, the class 
of unsecured creditors voted to accept the plan, thereby obviating the need for the 
debtor to request confirmation under section 1129(b)(2)(B).270   
                                                                                                                         
263 See Order on Motion to Appoint Trustee and Objection to Confirmation, In re Chlad, No. 13-40141 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2014), ECF No. 133 (sustaining unsecured creditors' APR objection to plan and 
denying confirmation).  
264 See, e.g., Order Converting Case to Chapter 7, In re Sandford, No. 10-14424 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 18, 
2013), ECF No. 349 (converting case to chapter 7 and referencing earlier stipulation, which provided for 
immediate conversion to chapter 7 if debtor failed to comply with the stipulated order and secured creditor 
filed notice of default). 
265 See, e.g., Order Denying Confirmation and Converting Chapter 11 Case to Chapter 7, In re Drabin, No. 
10-16315 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2011), ECF No. 96. 
266 See Order Converting Case Under Chapter 11 to Case Under Chapter 7 at 1, In re Wrieden, No. 13-
32636 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2014), ECF No. 143 (granting U.S. Trustee's motion to convert case to 
chapter 7 because the debtor could not propose a confirmable plan). 
267 Cf. Objection by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to Debtor's Disclosure Statement for 
Debtor's Amended Plan of Reorganization ¶¶ 17B–C, In re Levin, No. 10-33696 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 6, 
2014), ECF No. 739 (objection by unsecured creditor SEC to adequacy of debtor's disclosure statement on 
several grounds, including failure to (1) explain how the debtor intended to satisfy section 1129(a)(15) if an 
unsecured creditor objected to the plan and (2) discuss the absolute priority rule). 
268 No. 10-11953 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 20, 2010), ECF No. 1. 
269 See United States Trustee's Objection to the Confirmation of the Individual Debtor's Amended Plan of 
Reorganization Filed November 1, 2010 at 2–6:8, id., ECF No. 66; see also Marvin O. Clark's Objection to 
Confirmation of Debtors' Plan of Reorganization ¶¶ 3, 10, In re Drabin, No. 10-16315 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 
13, 2011), ECF No. 89 (objecting to plan confirmation and stating that debtors' plan failed to comply with 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(1), (2), (3), (7), (8), (10) and (11) and did not satisfy the absolute priority rule). 
270 See, e.g., Amended Report of Balloting for Plan of Reorganization at 1–2, In re Blackbird, No. 13-
18854 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 5, 2015), ECF No. 115 (showing that Class 7, impaired class of general 
unsecured creditors, voted to accept plan); Debtor's Fourth Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Levin, 
152 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25: 61 
 
 
Given the small number of failed cases with APR objections and the difficulty 
of identifying the reason for plan failure among the cases in the random sample, we 
are unable to conclude for individual chapter 11 debtors that the absolute priority 
rule is a substantial barrier to plan confirmation once a plan is proposed.  Of course, 
the rule could have effects in the shadows, discouraging some debtors from filing a 
plan or from filing for bankruptcy at all.271 
We found more direct evidence that the APR has some impact on the amount 
that the debtor pays under the plan, with objections by unsecured creditors at times 
resulting in more favorable recovery for the entire class.  For example, in In re 
Stickler,272 the debtor initially proposed paying his unsecured creditors a total of 
$160,000 at 4% interest over seven years.273 Several unsecured creditors objected 
on the grounds that the debtor had non-exempt assets whose value was not being 
paid to the unsecured creditors, and that the debtor would "continue[] to live in his 
$1,000,000 house" during that seven-year period.274 The debtor modified the plan to 
pay his unsecured creditors $231,000 without interest over five years,275 and the 
unsecured creditor class voted to accept the plan.276   
General unsecured creditors, however, filed only a small proportion of the 
APR-based objections in cases with confirmed plans.  Undersecured creditors were 
far more likely to object on the basis of the APR than their wholly unsecured 
counterparts.  What is interesting is that APR objections by undersecured creditors 
did not always result in an increase in the dividend paid to the class of unsecured 
                                                                                                                         
No. 10-33696 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2014), ECF No. 897; Order Confirming Debtor's Fourth Amended 
Plan of Reorganization ¶ F, In re Levin, No. 10-33696 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2014), ECF No. 907; 
Amended Summary of Ballots, In re Rast, No. 13-11233 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. May 13, 2014), ECF No. 85 
(showing impaired class of unsecured creditors voted to accept plan); Order Confirming Debtor's Chapter 11 
Plan of Reorganization at 1, In re Ravipati, No. 13-82145 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr. 7, 2014), ECF No. 142; 
Order Confirming Debtors' Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization ¶ 11, In re Nissley, No. 10-14372 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ind. Oct. 17, 2013), ECF No. 335; Order Confirming Plan ¶ 1, In re Hines, No. 13-00298 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. May 29, 2013), ECF No. 63. In at least one case, In re McPhail, No. 13-04110 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
Nov. 12, 2013), the Bankruptcy Administrator raised the absolute priority rule as an issue for plan 
confirmation if the unsecured creditors voted to reject the plan, asking "[h]ow is it fair to allow the debtors to 
keep a business, multiple properties, a Range Rover, a large settlement, and pay only a 1.1% dividend to 
unsecured creditors?" See id., Response to Confirmation and Approval of Disclosure Statement ¶ 17, ECF 
No. 48. Nonetheless, the unsecured creditors voted to accept the plan, even though the debtors did not 
increase the dividend paid to that class. See Summary of Ballots, id., ECF No. 53 (showing Class X, the 
unsecured creditor class, accepted the plan). 
271 This possibility is discussed more extensively in Appendix B. 
272 No. 10-10080 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Jan. 19, 2010). 
273 See Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Ryan William Stickler Dated November 16, 2010 at 13, id., 
ECF No. 76. 
274 See Objection to Confirmation ¶¶ 6–7, 10, id., ECF No. 90. See also Second Modification to Debtor's 
Second Amended Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 ¶¶ 1A, C–E, G, J, In re Manteghi, No. 10-43851 
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2011), ECF No. 120 (debtor resolved various objections by his largest unsecured 
creditors, which resulted in increasing the sources available to fund payments to the class of general 
unsecured creditors). 
275 See Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Ryan William Stickler Dated March 21, 
2011 at 13, In re Stickler, No. 10-10080 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Mar. 22, 2011) ECF No. 142. 
276 See Application for Confirmation Under Section 1129(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code ¶ 11, id., ECF No. 
144.  
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creditors.  For example, in In re Robles,277 Wells Fargo—the holder of an 
undersecured first mortgage on a parcel of the debtor's real property—objected to 
the debtor's plan on a number of grounds, including the absolute priority rule.278 The 
debtor's originally-filed plan valued Wells Fargo's secured claim at $143,420, with 
payments over thirty years at 3% interest.279 Even though the bankruptcy court did 
not conduct a valuation hearing, the confirmed plan valued Wells Fargo's secured 
claim at $152,000, with payments to occur over thirty years at 5% interest.280 The 
debtor did not increase the dividend paid to unsecured creditors.281 
In In re Chavez,282 both Wells Fargo and Deutsche Bank ended up with 
improved plan treatment of their secured claims after objecting to the debtor's plan, 
in part on the basis of the absolute priority rule.  The debtor and Wells Fargo 
entered into two stipulations in which the debtor agreed to increase the value of 
Wells Fargo's secured claim from $185,000 to $270,000 on one piece of real 
property, and from $95,000 to $99,000 on another.283 In addition, the debtor 
increased the interest rate paid on Wells Fargo's secured claims from 3% to 4% in 
one instance and from 3% to 4.75% in another.284The debtor also entered into two 
stipulations with Deutsche Bank in which the debtor agreed to increase the value of 
Deutsche Bank's secured claim on one piece of real property from $110,000 to 
$154,000, and from $83,000 to $91,000 on another.285 The debtor increased the 
interest rate paid on those secured claims from 3% to 4% on one claim and from 3% 
                                                                                                                         
277 No. 13-13476 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2013). 
278 See Objection to Chapter 11 Plan ¶ 9, id., ECF No. 144.  
279 See id. at ¶ 3.  
280 See Order Confirming Debtor's Plan of Reorganization ¶ 6, id., ECF No. 167. 
281 Compare Debtor's Plan of Reorganization ¶ 3.11, id., ECF No. 79, with Debtor's Amended Plan of 
Reorganization ¶ 3.11, id., ECF No. 105. 
282 No. 13-10534 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013).  
283 Compare Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 10, id., ECF No. 10 (showing initial value of Eardley 
Avenue property at $185,000) with Stipulation re: Treatment of Creditor's Claim Under Debtor's Proposed 
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 2, ¶ 1, id., ECF No. 73 (showing change in value of Eardley Avenue 
Property to $270,000). Compare Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 11–12, id., ECF No. 10 (showing 
initial value of Gleneagle Street property at $95,000) with Stipulation re: Treatment of Creditor's Claim 
Under Debtor's Proposed Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 2, ¶ 1, id., ECF No. 72 (showing change in 
value of Gleneagle Street property to $99,000). 
284 Compare Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 12, id., ECF No. 10 (showing initial rate at 3.0%) with 
Stipulation re: Treatment of Creditor's Claim Under Debtor's Proposed Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 
2, ¶ 1, id., ECF No. 73 (showing change in interest rate to 4%). Compare Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization 
at 10, id., ECF No. 10 (showing initial interest rate at 3.0) with Stipulation re: Treatment of Creditor's Claim 
Under Debtor's Proposed Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 2, ¶ 1, id., ECF No. 72 (showing change in 
interest rate to 4.75%). 
285 Compare Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 12, id., ECF No. 10 (showing initial value of Springhill 
Drive property at $110,000) with Stipulation re: Treatment of Creditor's Claim Under Debtor's Proposed 
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 2, ¶ 1, id., ECF No. 74 (stipulating to secured claim of $154,000 on 
Springhill Drive property). Compare Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 11, id., ECF No. 10 (showing 
initial value of 2033 Finch Court at $83,000) with Stipulation Resolving Chapter 11 Plan Treatment (2033 
Finch Court, Atwater, California 95301 Class 8) at 2, ¶ 1, id., ECF No. 71 (stipulating to value of $91,000 
for Finch Court property). 
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to 5% on another.286 Thus, objections by undersecured creditors, partly on the basis 
of the absolute priority rule, did not lead to an increased dividend for unsecured 
creditors.287  
   
C.  Timely Disposition of Cases 
 
In this Section, we evaluate success by looking at how expeditiously cases 
move through the chapter 11 system.  Scholars have pointed out that a good 
bankruptcy system will sort between cases that should be reorganized and those that 
should not, quickly dismissing the latter.288 Morrison examined ninety-one cases 
filed in 1998 in the Northern District of Illinois by corporations that: (1) were not 
single-asset real estate cases; (2) were not using chapter 11 to sell assets or settle a 
dispute with a particular creditor; (3) were not "dead on arrival"; (4) were not 
publicly traded; (5) did not lack sufficient information; and (6) were not pushed into 
bankruptcy involuntarily.289 He found that 62% of the businesses in his sample were 
shut down or forced to exit chapter 11.290 Of these cases, half of the firms were shut 
down within three months and 70% within five months.291 
Warren and Westbrook examined 437 "business"292 cases filed under chapter 11 
in 2002.  Of all the cases that were eventually pushed out of chapter 11 without a 
plan having been filed, more than half were gone in less than six months, 70% were 
gone by nine months, and more than 80% were gone within a year.  By eighteen 
months, more than 90% of all the cases that would ever exit chapter 11 without a 
plan on file had done so already.293 
Likewise, we apply a time-to-disposition definition of success to determine how 
long it takes bankruptcy courts to dispose of the failed cases.  In Section C.1, we 
apply this measure of success to the cases in the PACER sample.  In Section C.2, 
                                                                                                                         
286 Compare Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 12, id., ECF No. 10 (showing initial rate at 3.0%) with 
Stipulation re: Treatment of Creditor's Claim Under Debtor's Proposed Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 
2, ¶ 1, id., ECF No. 74 (stipulating to 4% interest). Compare Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 11, id., 
ECF No. 10 (showing initial rate at 3.0%) with Stipulation Resolving Chapter 11 Plan Treatment (2033 
Finch Court, Atwater, California 95301 Class 8) at 2, ¶ 1, id., ECF No. 71 (stipulating to 5% interest). 
287 Compare Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization (July 17, 2013) at 13, id., ECF No. 75 with Chapter 11 
Plan of Reorganization at 13, id., ECF No. 10.  
288 See Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 3, at 382–83 (arguing that courts should treat 
bankrupt firms as real options); Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 606 
(discussing how this method of separation allows for higher success rates for cases that should be 
reorganized and a faster processing by the courts of cases that should not be reorganized). 
289 See Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, supra note 3, at 384–85. Morrison also consolidated 
affiliate filings and dropped repeat filings.  
290 See id. at 389 (stating that these businesses did not have a new capital structure when this occurred and, 
as a result, most of the corporations were liquidated).   
291 See id. at 382 (noting that the chapter 11 process for failed businesses was a strikingly short amount of 
time). 
292 Warren and Westbrook defined business cases to include all those in which: (i) the debtor checked 
"business"; (ii) the debtor was organized as a corporation, partnership or LLC; and (iii) there was a business 
name in the title. See Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 609. 
293 See id. at 630.  
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we use this same measure for the cases in the 2010 and 2013 random sample.  
Because we have more case-specific data for the random sample, we can evaluate 
whether individual debtors met various case milestones—such as filing of schedules 
and plan proposal—in an expeditious fashion.  We conclude that regardless of the 
measure of success used, bankruptcy courts move most individual chapter 11 cases 
through the system in a timely manner.   
 
1.  PACER Case Report Data 
 
For the 2010 PACER data, we use a cruder measure of success than did 
Morrison, or Warren and Westbrook.  Their samples were hand-coded, allowing 
them to focus on particular subsets of cases, such as those not operating in 
particular industries or those for which no plan was proposed.  Thus, we do not 
claim to update the Morrison, or Warren and Westbrook findings using our 2010 
PACER data.  While our measure is cruder, our data set is much larger and more 
recent.    
 Table 52 presents data on the number of days to conversion or dismissal—that 
is, the time to "failure"—for those 2010 cases for which PACER provided the 
relevant dates.  To provide some frame of reference, we include this same time-to-
failure measure for corporate chapter 11 cases, small business chapter 11 cases, and 
chapter 13 cases.   
 
Table 52: Days to Conversion or Dismissal for "Failed" Cases in 2010—
PACER Data 
 
Percent of 
Failures 
Converted or 
Dismissed 
(A) 
Individual 
Chapter 11 
(B) 
Corporate 
Chapter 11 
(C) 
Small Business 
Chapter 11 
(D) 
Chapter 
13 
(1) 10% 58 42 27 25 
(2) 25% 140 105 63 72 
(3) 50% 293 226 181 252 
(4) 75% 487 407 343 643 
(5) 90% 785 663 572 1,059 
(6) Average 363 302 251 407 
(7) Standard 
Deviation 303 272 260 412 
Number of Cases 2,389 4,778 1,424 217,253 
 
The median time to conversion or dismissal for individual chapter 11 cases is 
293 days, or between nine and ten months.  See Column (A), Row (3).  At about 
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sixteen months, 75% of the individual chapter 11 failures had been kicked out of the 
system.  It took 140 days—between four and five months—to kick out just 25% of 
the individual chapter 11 failures.  See Column (A), Row (2).  This time to 
dismissal is substantially longer than the times estimated by Morrison and by 
Warren and Westbrook, but, as noted above,294 measurements are not directly 
comparable given the differences in samples. 
A comparison between individual and corporate chapter 11 cases is more 
difficult because of the different rules for discharge.  A corporate chapter 11 debtor 
receives a discharge shortly after plan confirmation.295 If it later cannot pay the 
obligations set forth in its plan, it may re-file bankruptcy, but its discharge is 
unaffected.  By contrast, an individual debtor does not receive a discharge until plan 
payments are complete.296 Therefore, we should expect individual chapter 11 cases 
to last longer before dismissal, and this is indeed what we find.  The median time to 
dismissal for corporate chapter 11 cases is 226 days—about two months shorter 
than the median time for individual chapter 11 cases.  Compare Column (B), Row 
(3) with Column (A), Row (3).  The difference between the timing of small business 
bankruptcies and individual chapter 11 bankruptcies is especially pronounced, 
probably due to the deadlines imposed on small business debtors.  Compare, e.g., 
Column (C), Row (3) with Column (A), Row (3). 
A trustee monitors chapter 13 cases,297 and the debtor must meet strict 
deadlines.298 Therefore, we expected to find failed chapter 13 cases kicked out more 
quickly, especially at the beginning of the process.  This is exactly what we find.  It 
took just 72 days to kick out 25% of the chapter 13 failures (more than a month less 
than in individual chapter 11 cases).  See Column (D), Row (2).  The difference 
becomes less pronounced moving out the distribution of cases, however.  It took 
almost as long (252 days as opposed to 293) to kick out half of the chapter 13 
debtors as it did half of the individual chapter 11 debtors, and it actually took longer 
(643 versus 487 days) to kick out three-quarters of the chapter 13 debtors than to 
kick out three-quarters of the individual chapter 11 debtors.  Perhaps this finding is 
not surprising.  The cases lasting the longest before failure will be cases in which 
the debtor fails to comply with a confirmed plan, and there is little reason to think 
that chapter 13 will identify and kick out these cases more quickly.    
 
2.  The Random Sample Data 
 
Unlike chapter 13, chapter 11—with the exception of small business cases—
does not provide individuals with strict deadlines.  To ascertain how quickly 
                                                                                                                         
294 See supra Section IV.C.1. 
295 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (2012).  
296 See id. at § 1141(d)(5) (stating different ways in which an individual debtor can receive a discharge). 
297 See id. at § 1302 (listing duties of a chapter 13 trustee).  
298 For example, a chapter 13 debtor must propose a plan of reorganization within fourteen days of filing, 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b), and begin making payments within thirty days of filing, 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1) 
(2012). 
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individual cases in our random sample move through bankruptcy, we began by 
measuring how long it took debtors to file their schedules.  Table 53 provides the 
data.  
Table 53: Filing of Schedules—Time in Days 
 
 (A) 
First Summary of 
Schedules 
(B) 
Last Schedule 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
(1) More than 2 years 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 
(2) 366 days to 2 years 0.0% 0.0% 6.4% 2.6% 
(3) 181 to 365 days 0.0% 0.0% 4.6% 7.9% 
(4) 91 to 180 days 0.0% 0.9% 9.2% 9.6% 
(5) 61 to 90 days 0.0% 0.9% 9.2% 8.8% 
(6) 31 to 60 days 4.6% 3.5% 12.8% 14.9% 
(7) 1 to 30 days 44.0% 43.9% 22.0% 25.4% 
(8) 0 33.9% 36.8% 15.6% 18.4% 
(9) No Schedule Filed 5.5% 5.3% 5.5% 3.5% 
(10) Conversion 11.9% 8.8% 11.9% 8.8% 
Maximum Days 48 128 1,362 490 
Average Days 12 13 120 68 
Median Days 14 13 36 30 
 
While a few debtors never filed any schedules, of those who did, the median 
time for filing the summary of schedules was thirteen to fourteen days.  Only about 
5% of all debtors waited more than thirty days to file their first summary of 
schedules.  See Column (A), Rows (1)-(6).  Many schedules were later amended or 
supplemented, however.  The median time between filing of the petition and the 
filing of the last schedules in the chapter 11 case was around one month (thirty-six 
days in 2010 and thirty in 2013), and more than 28% of all debtors were still 
amending their schedules more than 60 days after filing.  See Column (B), Rows 
(1)-(5). 
The large number of amendments may suggest that debtors do not have a good 
understanding of their financial affairs at the start of the case and need time to sort 
them out.  If that is true, then a rigid system like chapter 13 may not work so well.  
On the other hand, it may mean that nobody is pressing the chapter 11 debtor to 
move forward.  If so, having trustee oversight, as in chapter 13, may prod debtors to 
settle on a set of final schedules and move on to plan negotiation and proposal.    
Plan proposal is another measure of case progress.  In about 60% of our random 
sample cases (61% in 2010 and 58% in 2013), a plan was proposed.  In a study of 
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all chapter 11 filings in 2004, one of us found a 49% plan proposal rate.299 The 
debtor proposed the plan in the overwhelming majority of cases.  We found only 
one case in 2010 and two in 2013 in which a party other than the debtor offered a 
reorganization plan, as Table 54 indicates.   
 
Table 54: Plan Proposed by Non-Debtor 
 
 2010 2013 
Yes 0.9% 2.6% 
No 99.1% 97.4% 
 
Virtually none of the plans was filed within the fourteen-day limit imposed on 
chapter 13 debtors;300 few, however, were filed past the 300-day limit imposed on 
small businesses.301 Table 55 provides data on the time to first plan proposal and to 
plan confirmation from the start of the chapter 11 case.  The data include cases 
initiated in chapter 11 and also those converted to chapter 11.  For cases that began 
in chapter 11, we ran the period from the filing of the petition.  For cases converted 
from another chapter, we ran the period from the order of conversion to chapter 11.  
Six of the 2013 cases counted as "None" in Column (B) were still open without 
disposition as of the close of our case analysis; the debtor had proposed a plan in 
three cases, but in none had the court confirmed a plan, or converted or dismissed 
the case.302 
                                                                                                                         
299 See Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage, supra note 126. 
300 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b) (2012). This time period may be extended, but only for cause.  
301 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(2) (2012). 
302 See In re Blonder, No. 13-76658 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2013); In re Lopez, No. 13-12073 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2013); In re Rosemberg, No. 13-23691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2013); In re Anderson, 
No. 13-38712 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2013); In re Jenkinson, No. 13:24701 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jul. 2, 2013); In 
re Buchanan, No. 13-21009 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2013). 
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Table 55: Plan Timing 
 
 (A) 
Time to First Plan 
Proposal 
(B) 
Time to Plan 
Confirmation 
2010 2013 2010 2013 
(1) More than 2 years 0.9% 0.0% 8.3% 3.5% 
(2) 1 to 2 years 11.0% 6.1% 17.4% 17.5% 
(3) 181 to 365 18.3% 19.3% 8.3% 9.6% 
(4) 91 to 180 26.6% 26.3% 0.9% 4.4% 
(5) 31 to 90 1.8% 4.4% 0.9% 0.0% 
(6) 15 to 30 0.9% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
(7) 1 to 14 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
(8) 0 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
(9) None 39.4% 42.1% 64.2% 64.9% 
Maximum 741 696 1,120 930 
Average 247 208 530 450 
Median 181 175 485 440 
 
The figures in Table 55 show that just one debtor (0.9%) in each of 2010 and 
2013 filed a plan within the fourteen-day limit applicable to chapter 13 debtors.  See 
Column (A), Rows (7) & (8).  Half of the individual debtors who proposed plans in 
2010 and 2013, however, did so within six months of the start of their chapter 11 
cases.  Outliers do exist.  Of those debtors who proposed plans, 80% in 2010 and 
89% in 2013 did so within one year of the beginning of their chapter 11 cases.303 
While approximately 60% of our debtors proposed a plan, only about 35% had a 
plan approved.  This confirmation rate is similar to the 30% to 33% confirmation 
rate found by Warren and Westbrook in their study of all chapter 11 filings,304 and 
the 34% confirmation rate one of us found in a study of chapter 11 filings in 
2004.305 Plan confirmation took time.  Column (B) shows that the median time to 
plan confirmation for the debtors in our sample was between fifteen and sixteen 
months from the start of the chapter 11 case.  The time from the start of the chapter 
11 case until confirmation appears to be 25% to 30% longer than that found by 
                                                                                                                         
303 In 2010, 48.5% of debtors proposed a plan within one year of the start of their chapter 11 case. See 
Column (A), Rows (3)-(8) of Table 55. Slightly more than 60% (60.6%) of debtors in 2010 proposed a plan. 
Thus, of those debtors proposing a plan in 2010, 80% [48.5/60.6] did so within one year of the start of their 
chapter 11 case. In 2013, 51.8% of debtors proposed a plan within one year. See Column (A), Rows (3)-(8) 
of Table 55. Almost 58% (57.9%) of the 2013 debtors proposed a plan. Therefore, 89% [51.8/57.9] of the 
2013 debtors who proposed a plan did so within one year of the start of their chapter 11 case. Note that the 
sum of the columns in Table 55 may add to slightly higher or slightly lower than 100% due to rounding. 
304 See Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 615. 
305 See Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage, supra note 126, at 1004.  
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Warren and Westbrook.  In their study, the median time to confirmation was about 
one year.306 
The figures in Table 55 include the few individual debtors who identified as 
small businesses—seventeen in 2010 and thirteen in 2013.307 Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Code in 2005 to require debtors in small business cases to file a plan 
"not later than 300 days after the date of the order for relief."308 The vast majority of 
debtors who identified as small businesses satisfied the Code's 300-day plan-
proposal requirement.309 As Table 56 shows, thirteen of 2010's seventeen small 
business debtors proposed plans, and nine did so within 300 days of the start of 
their chapter 11 cases.310 All of 2013's small business debtors who proposed plans 
did so within the Code's 300-day window.  Less than a quarter of the small business 
debtors in 2010 failed to propose a plan; more than half failed to do so in 2013.  
One should not overemphasize these differences, however, because we are dealing 
with so few debtors. 
                                                                                                                         
306 See Warren & Westbrook, Success of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 632. 
307 See supra Table 14. 
308 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(2) (2012). This provision was added in 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, § 437, apparently 
because Congress believed that too many debtors were languishing in bankruptcy. Thus, Congress created 
new exclusivity and plan-proposal time limits applicable only to small business debtors. Such a debtor has a 
180-day exclusivity period, compared with the 120-day period for non-small business debtors. Compare 11 
U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2012) (authorizing 120-day exclusivity period) with id. at § 1121(e)(1) (authorizing 180-
day exclusivity period).    
Three hundred days is a limit; if the debtor has not filed a plan by that time, the case may be dismissed. 
See, e.g., In re Randi's, Inc., 474 B.R. 783, 786 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012); see also In re Castle Horizon Real 
Estate, LLC, No. 09–05992–8–JRL, 2010 WL 3636160, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 10, 2010). Some cases 
hold the 300-day deadline applicable only to plans filed by the debtor, however. See, e.g., In re Fla. Coastal 
Airlines, Inc., 361 B.R. 286, 292 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (holding no statutory deadline to file a 
reorganization plan by any party in interest other than the debtor). 
309 We counted from the start of the chapter 11 case, not from the order for relief in cases in which the 
debtor first filed under another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, because a debtor who initially files under 
chapter 7 or 13 would not propose a chapter 11 plan until the case converted to chapter 11.  
310 One of the four debtors did not technically satisfy the 300-day plan-proposal requirement, having 
proposed his plan 301 days from filing his chapter 11 case. See In re Stickler, No. 10-10080 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 
19, 2010). Debtor obtained confirmation of his plan a little over fourteen months from the filing of his 
petition for relief under chapter 11. See Final Order Approving Disclosure Statement and Confirming Plan, 
id., ECF No. 146. In two of the other three cases outside the 300-day limit, the bankruptcy court confirmed a 
plan, while in the third the court dismissed the case. See Stipulated Order Confirming Plan, In re McManus 
Enters., Inc., No. 10-40983 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 6, 2012), ECF No. 183 (bankruptcy court entered order of 
confirmation on docket of lead corporate case for plan covering married individual debtors and three jointly 
administered business cases); Order Dismissing Case and Barring Refiling at 3, In re Church, No. 10-50168 
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2011), ECF No. 126 (granting motion of Bankruptcy Administrator to dismiss 
case, noting dismissal of debtor's previously filed 2009 chapter 13 case, barring debtor's refiling within 180 
days of dismissal order of any case under chapters 11, 12 or 13, and explaining that while debtor could refile 
under chapter 7, doing so would "NOT INVOKE THE STAY PROVISIONS OF 11 U.S.C. § 362"); In re 
Zakaria, No. 10-03146 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2010), ECF Nos. 78, 95 (confirming plan and later 
reopening case for entry of order of discharge).  
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Table 56: Small Business Debtors and Time to First Plan Proposal 
 
 2010 2013 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
>1 year 2 11.8% 0 0% 
301-365 days 2 11.8% 0 0% 
181-300 days 4 23.5% 3 23.1% 
91-180 days 5 29.4% 2 15.4% 
1-90 days 0 0% 1 7.7% 
No Plan 4 23.5% 7 53.8% 
Total Cases 17  13  
 
We also looked at the time it took debtors to obtain confirmation once they had 
proposed a plan.  The median time from first-plan proposal to confirmation ranged 
from more than seven months in 2010 to more than five months in 2013.  In small 
business cases, section 1129(e) requires the bankruptcy court to confirm a plan "not 
later than 45 days after the plan is filed."311 None of the small business debtors who 
obtained confirmation met this forty-five-day requirement.312 In fact, not a single 
debtor in 2010 or 2013, regardless of his or her small business designation, obtained 
confirmation of a plan within forty-five days of having first proposed it.   
 Approximately 65% of the debtors in the random sample did not confirm a plan 
of reorganization.  This low rate of plan confirmation, however, does not mean that 
chapter 11 is unsuccessful.  One goal of a successful bankruptcy system is to 
identify early on those cases with "no reasonable prospect of rehabilitation" in order 
to "reduce the amount of time they consume in Chapter 11."313  
In Table 57, we provide data on the time to conversion or dismissal for cases 
that are kicked out of chapter 11, using several different measurements.  Since 
individual debtors do not generally receive a chapter 11 discharge until plan 
payments are completed,314 a bankruptcy court may dismiss or convert the case after 
plan approval.315 In Columns (A) and (B), we do not include cases in which the 
                                                                                                                         
311 11 U.S.C. § 1129(e) (2012).  
312 It is not clear whether the forty-five days runs from the first-filed plan or re-sets when the debtor 
amends the first plan. See In re Crossroads Ford, Inc., 453 B.R. 764, 769–70 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2011) (holding 
that debtor's failure to obtain confirmation of initial plan within forty-five days of filing did not preclude 
debtor from filing an amended plan within 300 days and obtaining confirmation of that plan within forty-five 
days of its filing); cf. In re Save Our Springs All., Inc., 388 B.R. 202, 225 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding 
that forty-five-day confirmation period runs from filing of the original plan, "at least when an amended plan 
is not substantially different from the original plan"). 
313 See 1997 Commission Report, supra note 185, at 609 (footnote omitted).  
314 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5) (2012). As discussed in note 244, however, courts sometimes grant an early 
discharge for cause. 
315 See, e.g., In re Sorge, No. 10-17070 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2010), ECF Nos. 94, 113 (confirming 
debtor's plan of reorganization and, seven months later, granting U.S. Trustee's motion to convert to chapter 
7). 
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bankruptcy court initially confirmed a chapter 11 plan but subsequently ordered 
conversion or dismissal of the case.  Column (A) runs the time to conversion or 
dismissal from the start of the chapter 11 case.  Some of the individual chapter 11 
cases in our random sample, however, began in chapter 7 or chapter 13; therefore, 
the data in Column (B) are based on the time from the start of the bankruptcy case, 
regardless of starting chapter, to the conversion or dismissal order.   
Columns (C) and (D) of Table 57 include cases with failed plans—that is, those 
cases, as of the date of our coding, in which the bankruptcy court converted or 
dismissed the case after plan confirmation.  Seven plans failed post-confirmation 
and, thus, those cases are included in the figures in Columns (C) and (D) of Table 
57.316 In Column (C), we observe the time to conversion or dismissal from the start 
of the chapter 11 case, while the data in Column (D) are based on the time from the 
start of the bankruptcy case, regardless of starting chapter. 
                                                                                                                         
 
316 We did not include cases in which the case was neither converted nor dismissed post-confirmation. 
Therefore, our failed-plan figures for 2010 do not include three cases in which the debtors confirmed plans 
and subsequently filed another bankruptcy case, apparently before completing payments under their chapter 
11 plans. Compare In re Langdon, No. 10-07211 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 3, 2010) (married debtors 
confirmed chapter 11 plan with 10-year payment period for unsecured creditors) with In re Langdon, No. 14-
02744 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 12, 2014) (chapter 13 filing 39 months after confirmation of chapter 11 plan). 
Compare In re Inglis, No. 10-35781 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2010) (debtor confirmed plan with 51-month 
payment period for general unsecured creditors) with In re Inglis, No. 12-31540 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 12, 
2012) (debtor received discharge in chapter 7 case filed less than 10 months after confirmation of chapter 11 
plan). Compare In re Wright, No. 10-01325 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2010) (married debtors confirmed 
plan with 5-year payment period for unsecured creditors) with In re Wright, No. 14-07013 (Bankr. M.D. 
Tenn. Aug. 29, 2014) (married debtors received discharge in chapter 7 case filed approximately 46 months 
after confirmation of chapter 11 plan).   
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Table 57: Time in Days to Conversion or Dismissal—Random Sample 
 
 Failed Plans Not Included All Cases 
(A)  
From Start 
of Chapter 
11 Case 
(B) 
From Filing of 
Bankruptcy 
Petition 
(C) 
From Start 
of Chapter 
11 Case 
(D) 
From Filing of 
Bankruptcy 
Petition 
2010 2013 2010 2013 2010 2013 2010 2013 
2 or more 
years 
6.4% 4.4% 7.3% 4.4% 8.3% 6.1% 9.2% 6.1% 
1 to 2 
years 
12.8% 11.4% 14.7% 12.3% 14.7% 12.3% 16.5% 13.2% 
180 days 
to 1 year 
21.1% 13.2% 22.0% 14.0% 21.1% 13.2% 22.0% 14.0% 
0 to 180 
days 
23.9% 24.6% 20.2% 22.8% 23.9% 24.6% 20.2% 22.8% 
n/a 35.8% 41.2% 35.8% 41.2% 32.1% 38.6% 32.1% 38.6% 
Open	 0% 5.3% 0% 5.3% 0% 5.3% 0% 5.3% 
Maximum 1,794 907 1,794 907 1,794 969 1,794 969 
Average 329 279 356 292 356.6 298 382 312 
Median 227 203 294 205 255 205 301 214 
 
If the time to conversion or dismissal for failed plans is not included, then the 
median time from the start of the chapter 11 case to conversion or dismissal is more 
than seven and a half months for 2010 and more than six and a half months for 
2013.  See Table 57, Column (A).  If failed plans are not included and the time to 
conversion or dismissal is measured from the start of bankruptcy proceedings, 
regardless of chapter, the median period increases by more than two months to close 
to ten months in 2010; the increase in median time is only two days for 2013.  See 
Column (B) of Table 57.  Of course, six cases from 2013 were still open, with no 
disposition, as of the close of our analysis.317 That may account for the shorter 
period to conversion or dismissal for the 2013 cases compared with those from the 
2010 sample.  Stated more simply, the 2013 cases have had less time to fail.   
When we include the time to conversion or dismissal for failed plans, the 
median time increases, although perhaps by less than expected.  This is because 
most of our failed cases failed before a plan was confirmed.  Just four of our 2010 
cases and three of our 2013 cases failed after plan confirmation.  In 2010, the 
median time to conversion or dismissal from the start of the chapter 11 case 
increased by a month, from 227 to 255 days.  Compare Column (A) with Column 
(C) of Table 57.  The impact of the failed plans is less dramatic for 2013, no doubt 
                                                                                                                         
317 See supra note 302 and accompanying text.  
164 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25: 61 
 
 
due to the fact that less time had elapsed between our coding and the start of the 
2013 cases.  As a result, not only are there fewer failed plans, but plans that take 
longer to fail are less likely to appear in the 2013, than in the 2010, figures.   
By any of these measures, however, chapter 11 is succeeding.  Bankruptcy 
courts dismissed or converted half the cases in the 2010 random sample in 227 days 
or approximately seven months from the start of the chapter 11 case.  This time 
frame is two months less than the 300-day "drop dead" date that Congress created 
for small business debtors to propose a plan.318  
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
Individuals now account for between a quarter and a third of all chapter 11 
filings nationally.319 Perhaps these debtors belong in chapter 13, the more common 
individual reorganization, but their choices suggest that they disagree.  We found 
that as many as 46% of the chapter 11 debtors in the 2013 sample had liabilities 
below chapter 13's debt limits, yet still chose chapter 11.320 The rules governing 
individual chapter 11 bankruptcies are very different than those that govern chapter 
13, and it is possible that the latter would be a poor fit for these debtors.  Chapter 11 
debtors have much higher incomes,321 substantially more assets and much more 
debt,322 and they are far more likely to operate a business.323 As a result, they are 
more likely to have complicated cases and to have difficulty complying with 
chapter 13's tight deadlines.324 Chapter 11 debtors also have substantial real estate 
interests325 (and substantial mortgage debt that they need to modify326), and they 
may, therefore, need plans of reorganization that extend beyond five years.327 
We found that a little more than a third of individuals in chapter 11 "succeed" 
by confirming a plan and avoiding dismissal or conversion for 881 days.328 Success 
rates are higher in cases with joint filing or significant real property, and lower in 
no-asset cases and cases in which the debtor is represented by an inexperienced 
attorney or no attorney at all.329 We also found that cases are more likely to succeed 
in jurisdictions following the broad, rather than the narrow, interpretation of the 
absolute priority rule exception.330 We cannot be sure of causal effects, however.    
                                                                                                                         
318 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(2) (2012). 
319 See supra Table 1 and Figure 1. This percentage is much higher in some districts. See infra Table 58 in 
the Appendix.  
320 See supra Table 30 and accompanying text.  
321 See supra Table 25 and accompanying text.  
322 See supra Table 21 and accompanying text. 
323 See supra Table 11 and accompanying text. 
324 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.  
325 See supra Tables 35–38 and accompanying text.  
326 See supra Table 29 and accompanying text.  
327 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2012).  
328 See supra Table 46 and accompanying text. This is about the same as the oft-quoted rate for chapter 13. 
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Our definition of success is much broader, however.   
329 See supra Tables 42, 43, 45, 47, 48 and 50 and accompanying text.  
330 See supra Tables 44, 49 and accompanying text.  
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Many individuals successfully reorganize in chapter 11, but the normative case 
for an individual reorganization chapter separate from chapter 13 remains unclear.  
The absence of a bankruptcy trustee means that creditors must do more to monitor 
the debtor, and whether they are adequately doing so is uncertain.  Reasonable 
minds may believe that these individual chapter 11 cases drag on too long,331 and no 
single study can resolve normative questions, such as the time debtors should spend 
in chapter 11.  We hope, however, that our findings will provide a framework for 
discussing reform efforts aimed at the individual chapter 11 debtor. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
331 See supra Section IV.C.  
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Appendix A: Individual Chapter 11 Filings by District 
 
Table 4 in Section II.A.3 provides data from the five districts with the highest 
and lowest number of individual chapter 11 filings in 2010 and 2013.  Table 58 
below provides individual chapter 11 filing data for all 78 of the judicial districts 
covered by this study.  The table shows the number of individual cases filed in each 
district, the district's share of the total sample, and the percentage of chapter 11 
cases filed by individuals in that district. 
 
Table 58: Individual Chapter 11 Filings by District 
 
 2010 2013 
District 
Individual 
Ch. 11 
% 
Whole 
Sample 
% Individual 
of District 
Ch. 11 
Individual 
Ch. 11 
% 
Whole 
Sample 
% Individual 
of District 
Ch. 11 
AK 3 0% 27% 2 0% 33% 
ALMD 17 0% 40% 5 0% 21% 
ALND 38 1% 42% 20 1% 35% 
ARED 12 0% 44% 7 0% 32% 
ARWD 15 0% 24% 16 1% 44% 
AZ 294 7% 42% 117 4% 41% 
CACD 581 14% 47% 349 13% 47% 
CAED 118 3% 48% 59 2% 49% 
CAND 312 8% 65% 127 5% 61% 
CASD 77 2% 53% 33 1% 40% 
CO 59 1% 31% 34 1% 32% 
DE 7 0% 1% 3 0% 0% 
FLMD 232 6% 29% 146 6% 35% 
FLND 12 0% 26% 19 1% 40% 
FLSD 115 3% 27% 127 5% 39% 
GAMD 13 0% 16% 16 1% 37% 
GAND 68 2% 20% 61 2% 25% 
GASD 24 1% 23% 16 1% 33% 
IAND 3 0% 43% 0 0% 0% 
IASD 8 0% 25% 2 0% 20% 
ID 31 1% 46% 11 0% 41% 
ILCD 6 0% 30% 7 0% 32% 
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ILND 82 2% 26% 101 4% 33% 
INSD 16 0% 14% 15 1% 19% 
KS 17 0% 29% 12 0% 28% 
KYED 5 0% 13% 4 0% 10% 
KYWD 6 0% 14% 6 0% 18% 
LAED 8 0% 15% 10 0% 29% 
LAMD 1 0% 6% 1 0% 10% 
LAWD 20 0% 27% 17 1% 43% 
MA 125 3% 47% 54 2% 44% 
MD 153 4% 49% 81 3% 45% 
MIED 50 1% 27% 33 1% 21% 
MIWD 14 0% 27% 10 0% 26% 
MN 13 0% 16% 14 1% 19% 
MOWD 21 1% 31% 19 1% 37% 
MSND 7 0% 24% 10 0% 38% 
MSSD 10 0% 21% 12 0% 41% 
MT 12 0% 34% 9 0% 56% 
NCED 62 2% 38% 50 2% 40% 
NCMD 4 0% 11% 4 0% 13% 
NCWD 21 1% 18% 9 0% 18% 
ND 3 0% 38% 0 0% 0% 
NE 22 1% 28% 4 0% 14% 
NH 12 0% 30% 9 0% 26% 
NJ 93 2% 27% 80 3% 24% 
NM 16 0% 32% 13 0% 43% 
NV 200 5% 40% 125 5% 47% 
NYED 43 1% 15% 34 1% 13% 
NYND 8 0% 18% 7 0% 23% 
NYSD 66 2% 6% 41 2% 10% 
OHND 21 1% 19% 13 0% 25% 
OHSD 21 1% 35% 22 1% 36% 
OKED 3 0% 27% 2 0% 67% 
OKND 2 0% 8% 1 0% 17% 
OR 26 1% 39% 12 0% 32% 
PAED 36 1% 23% 29 1% 23% 
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PAMD 9 0% 21% 7 0% 14% 
PAWD 66 2% 37% 46 2% 43% 
PR 60 1% 36% 131 5% 58% 
RI 5 0% 18% 1 0% 20% 
SC 40 1% 44% 27 1% 42% 
SD 8 0% 53% 1 0% 20% 
TNED 38 1% 37% 26 1% 40% 
TNMD 94 2% 54% 47 2% 49% 
TNWD 25 1% 36% 22 1% 38% 
TXED 27 1% 20% 11 0% 17% 
TXND 56 1% 14% 42 2% 18% 
TXWD 67 2% 26% 34 1% 28% 
UT 21 1% 24% 11 0% 28% 
VAED 85 2% 34% 59 2% 42% 
VAWD 11 0% 27% 8 0% 38% 
VT 3 0% 33% 0 0% 0% 
WAED 8 0% 22% 10 0% 38% 
WAWD 126 3% 41% 75 3% 52% 
WIWD 23 1% 53% 15 1% 45% 
WVND 7 0% 25% 0 0% 0% 
WY 6 0% 32% 4 0% 44% 
Total 4049   2617   
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Appendix B: Impact of APR on Chapter Choice 
 
In Section IV, we examined the impact of the absolute priority rule's exception 
on survival and plan-confirmation rates.  That analysis was limited to cases in 
which the debtor already had chosen to file for relief under chapter 11.  A 
jurisdiction's precedent interpreting the APR exception in individual cases, 
however, may affect not only survival and confirmation rates for cases in chapter 
11, but also debtors' decisions whether to file for relief under chapter 11 in the first 
place.  Therefore, in this Appendix, we estimate the effects of the absolute priority 
rule on the individual debtor's choice of chapter.   
A more vigorous absolute priority rule for individuals in chapter 11 could cause 
some debtors to choose a different chapter or forego bankruptcy entirely.  We test 
this hypothesis using a fixed-effects regression that makes use of the timing of legal 
opinions and data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  The AO does 
not publish the number of individual chapter 11 filings,332 but it does report the 
number of non-business chapter 11 cases by district and quarter.  We use the reports 
for the first quarter of 2006 through the first quarter of 2016.333 An analysis of our 
2010 and 2013 filings data suggests that a little more than half (55%) of individuals 
in chapter 11 report that their debts are primarily non-business debts.  All of the 
non-business chapter 11 cases were filed by individuals and only 15% of business 
chapter 11 cases were filed by individuals.  We, therefore, use the number of non-
business chapter 11s as a proxy for the number of individual chapter 11s.  More 
specifically, our dependent variable is the percentage of non-business bankruptcies 
filed in chapter 11 (100* non-business chapter 11/ total non-business bankruptcies). 
All regressions take the following form: 𝑦𝑑𝑞 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽(𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 + 𝜇/ + 𝜆1 +𝜖/1.  Fixed district effects, µ, control for differences between districts that are 
constant across time, and fixed quarter effects, λ, control for differences across time 
that are constant across districts.  We do not include macroeconomic controls 
because they are not available at the district level for the most recent quarters.  Our 
chosen dependent variable may make these controls unnecessary if an economic 
downturn affects the number of filings in the various chapters proportionally. 
We adopt the same legal measures that we used in Section IV with one 
important exception.  In Section IV, we used the interpretation in place six months 
after the filing of the debtor's petition because most debtors will wait several 
months to propose their plan.  Here, we focus on the filing decision; thus, we 
assume that precedents have an immediate effect.334   
 
                                                                                                                         
332 EPIQ reported the number of individual chapter 11s until January of 2013, but this is before many of 
our legal changes. Our results are consistent. Also, note that these numbers are no longer publicly available. 
333 See U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Business and Nonbusiness Cases Filed, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy 
Code— Table F-2 (Three Months), ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., www.uscourts.gov/file/20287/download. 
334 If an opinion was decided before the end of a quarter, we assumed that its effect was proportional to the 
number of days remaining in the quarter.   
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Table 59: Impact of APR on Chapter Choice 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev 
Broad .066 .245 
Narrow .163 .364 
Broad Circuit  
.042 
.198 
Narrow Circuit .118 .319 
Ch11p (% non-business bankruptcies 
filed in chapter 11) 
.0930 .149 
Total Observations: 3,690 
 
Table 59 presents the summary statistics.  In the vast majority of the district-
quarter observations included in the regression there was no prior precedent for how 
to interpret the APR.  Chapter 11 accounts for a very small share of all non-business 
filings.  There are some outliers, however; the highest observed value was 1.942.  
The high value of the maximum observed is due, in part, to the fact that some 
districts-quarters have very few filings.  In fact, some districts had none at all, in 
some quarters.  To mitigate this problem we excluded all U.S. territories (Guam, 
Northern Marinara Islands, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands), but doing so did 
not completely solve the problem.  The number of non-business bankruptcy filings 
varies radically from district to district, and so the percentage of filings made in 
chapter 11 may be estimated much more accurately in big districts than in small 
districts (heteroskedacsticity).  One solution is to weight districts with more filings 
more heavily, but this can create its own problems.335 We, therefore, present both 
weighted (by the number of non-business bankruptcies) and unweighted 
regressions.  Doing so has the added advantage of testing for misspecification.  The 
differences in differences model assumes that the legal rule has the same effect in 
every district, but this is almost certainly not the case as some districts will have a 
higher proportion of high-asset individuals for whom chapter 11 is more attractive.  
It is likely that these high-asset individuals are concentrated in more populous 
districts (with larger cities), and thus weighting by non-business bankruptcies 
should increase the estimated coefficients.  All standard errors are clustered by 
district. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
335 See Gary Solon, Steven J. Haider & Jeffrey Wooldridge, What Are We Weighting For? (NBER 
Working Paper No. 18859, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18859. 
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Table 60: Percentage of Non-Business Cases in Chapter 11 
 
 Unweighted Weighted 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Broad 0.054 
(.21) 
 0.076** 
(.08) 
 
Narrow -0.004 
(.67) 
 0.010 
(.49) 
 
Broad Circuit  0.00732 
(.66) 
 0.0335 
(.20) 
Narrow Circuit  -0.0292** 
(.03) 
 -0.0360** 
(.04) 
Constant 0.0929*** 
(0.00) 
0.0929*** 
(0.00) 
0.115*** 
(0.00) 
0.115*** 
(0.00) 
Observations 3,690 3,690 3,690 3,690 
R-squared 0.041 0.020 0.038 0.022 
Number of districts 90 90 90 90 
 
Table 60 presents the results.  Seven of the eight coefficients have the "correct" 
sign; broad decisions are followed by more chapter 11 filings and narrow decisions 
are followed by fewer.  Five of the eight coefficients are not statistically significant 
at the 10% level, however, meaning that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there 
is no relationship between the decisions and the filing rate with 90% certainty.  
Even when not statistically significant, the coefficients suggest that the effects may 
be economically significant.  For example, consider the results in column (A), 
which suggest that a broad interpretation may increase the percentage of non-
business filings made in chapter 11 by 0.05.  While this is a small number, the mean 
is just 0.09.    
As expected, weighting the regressions by the total number of non-business 
filings in a district increases both the predicted magnitude of the effects and, 
usually, their statistical significance.  The fact that the magnitude increases suggests 
that any effect is stronger in the larger, more populous districts.  As noted above, 
this is consistent with the theory that a greater proportion of high-asset individuals 
live in these districts. 
The coefficient on broad is much larger than the coefficient on narrow.  Perhaps 
this is because most lawyers expected courts to adopt the narrow interpretation of 
the exception to the APR and a broad ruling is, therefore, a greater surprise.  This 
does not hold true for the circuit court decisions, but this may also make sense.  The 
broad "circuit" court decision is not really a circuit court decision at all but rather a 
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decision by the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.336 At least one 
bankruptcy court in the Ninth Circuit has stated that it is not bound by BAP 
precedent and has expressly rejected this broad interpretation.337 Moreover, debtors' 
attorneys may have feared that the Ninth Circuit could overrule the BAP, as it did in 
January of 2016.338 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
336 See In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).  
337 See In re Arnold, 471 B.R. 578, 590 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012), appeal dismissed (Jan. 16, 2013).  
338 See Zachary v. Cal. Bank & Tr., 811 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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Appendix C: Court Decisions Interpreting the APR Exception 
 
Jurisdiction Case Citation View 
Adopted 
First Circuit   
Bankr. D.P.R. In re Lee Min Ho Chen, 482 B.R. 473 (Bankr. 
D.P.R. 2012). 
Narrow 
Bankr. D. Mass. In re Walsh, 447 B.R. 45 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2011). 
Narrow 
Third Circuit   
E.D. Pa. In re Brown, 505 B.R. 638 (E.D. Pa. 2014). Narrow 
Bankr. E.D. Pa. In re Alfaro, 501 B.R. 292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2013). 
Narrow 
Bankr. E.D. Pa. In re Brown, 498 B.R. 486 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2013) aff'd, 505 B.R. 638 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
Narrow 
Fourth Circuit   
4th Circuit In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 2012). Narrow 
Bankr. 
W.D.N.C. 
In re Eagan, No. 12-30525, 2013 WL 237812 
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. Jan. 22, 2013). 
Narrow 
Bankr. D.S.C. In re Ferguson, 474 B.R. 466 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
2012). 
Narrow 
Bankr. E.D. Va. In re Maharaj, 449 B.R. 484 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
2011) aff'd, 681 F.3d 558 (4th Cir. 2012). 
Narrow 
Bankr. E.D. Va. In re Simon, No. 07-31414-KRH, 2008 WL 
2953471 (Bankr. E.D. Va. July 29, 2008). 
Narrow 
Bankr. W.D. Va. In re Mullins, 435 B.R. 352 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 
2010). 
Narrow 
Fifth Circuit   
5th Circuit In re Lively, 717 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013). Narrow 
Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 
In re Tex. Star Refreshments, LLC, 494 B.R. 
684 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2013) 
Narrow 
Bankr. S.D. Tex. In re Lively, 467 B.R. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2012) 
Narrow 
Bankr. S.D. Tex. In re Lively, 466 B.R. 897 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2011) aff'd, 717 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013) 
Narrow 
Bankr. S.D. Tex. In re Stephens, 445 B.R. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2011) 
Narrow 
Sixth Circuit   
6th Cir. Ice House Am., LLC v. Cardin, 751 F.3d 734 
(6th Cir. 2014) 
Narrow 
E.D. Tenn. In re Cardin, (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Aug. 7, 2012) 
(No. 11-52077), rev'd, Ice House Am., LLC v. 
Broad 
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Cardin, 751 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2014).  
 
E.D. Tenn. In re Lindsey, No. 3:11-CV-00445, 2012 WL 
4854718 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2012), appeal 
dismissed, Lindsey v. Pinnacle Nat'l Bank (In 
re Lindsey),726 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 2013), 
vacated, No. 3:11-CV-00445, 2013 WL 
5436968 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 2013). 
Narrow 
Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 
In re Lindsey, 453 B.R. 886 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 2011), aff'd, No. 3:11-CV-00445, 2012 
WL 4854718 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2012), 
vacated, No. 3:11-CV-00445, 2013 WL 
5436968 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 2013). 
Narrow 
Seventh Circuit   
Bankr. N.D. Ill. In re Batista-Sanechez, 505 B.R. 222 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2014).  
Narrow 
Bankr. N.D. Ill. In re Draiman, 450 B.R. 777 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2011). 
Narrow 
Bankr. E.D. 
Wis. 
In re Gerard, 495 B.R. 850 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 
2013). 
Narrow 
Eighth Circuit   
BAP In re Woodward, 537 B.R. 894 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2015). 
Narrow 
Bankr. D. Neb. In re Woodward, No. BK11-40936, 2014 WL 
1682847 (Bankr. D. Neb. Apr. 29, 2014). 
Broad 
Bankr. D. Neb. In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
2007). 
Broad 
Ninth Circuit   
9th Cir. Zachary v. Cal. Bank & Trust, 811 F.3d 1191 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
Narrow 
B.A.P. 9th Cir. In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2012), overruled by Zachary v. Cal. Bank & 
Trust, 811 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2016). 
Broad 
Bankr. D. Haw. In re Kelley, No. 12-02066, 2013 WL 6330942 
(Bankr. D. Haw. Dec. 5, 2013). 
Broad 
Bankr. D. Ariz. In re Sample, No. 2:10-38373-DPC, 2013 WL 
3759795 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 15, 2013). 
Broad 
Bankr. C.D. Cal. In re Arnold, 471 B.R. 578 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2012), appeal dismissed, Arnold v. U.S. Nat'l 
Bank Ass'n., (In re Arnold), (9th Cir. 2013). 
Narrow 
Bankr. C.D. Cal. In re Kamell, 451 B.R. 505 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2011). 
Narrow 
Bankr. D. Or. In re Tucker, 479 B.R. 873 (Bankr. D. Or. Broad 
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2012), abrogated by Zachary v. Cal. Bank & 
Trust, 811 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2016).   
 
 
 
 
 
Bankr. D. Or. In re Tucker, No. 10-67281-fra11, 2011 WL 
5926757 (Bankr. D. Or. Nov. 28, 2011). 
Narrow 
Bankr. D. Mont. In re Anderson, No. 11-61845-11, 2012 WL 
3133895 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2012), 
abrogated by Zachary v. Cal. Bank & Trust, 
811 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2016). 
Broad 
 
 
 
 
Bankr. D. Idaho In re Borton, No. 09-00196-TLM, 2011 WL 
5439285 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 9, 2011). 
Narrow 
Bankr. S.D. Cal. In re Karlovich, 456 B.R. 677 (Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. 2010). 
Narrow 
Bankr. N.D. Cal. In re Gbadebo, 431 B.R. 222 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
Narrow 
Bankr. D. Nev. In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Nev. 
2010), abrogated by Zachary v. Cal. Bank & 
Trust, 811 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2016). 
Broad 
 
Tenth Circuit   
10th Cir. Dill Oil Co. v. Stephens (In re Stephens), 704 
F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2013). 
Narrow 
Bankr. D. Kan. In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 2007), declined to follow by Dill Oil Co. 
v. Stephens (In re Stephens), 704 F.3d 1279 
(10th Cir. 2013) 
Broad 
Eleventh Circuit   
M.D. Fla. SPCP Group, LLC v. Biggins, 465 B.R. 316 
(M.D. Fla. 2011) 
Broad 
Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 
In re Martin, 497 B.R. 349 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2013) 
Narrow 
Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 
In re Gelin, 437 B.R. 435 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2010), declined to follow by SPCP Group, LLC 
v. Biggins, 465 B.R. 316 (M.D. Fla. 2011) 
Narrow 
Bankr. S.D. Ga. In re Steedley, No. 09-50654, 2010 WL 
3528599 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2010) 
Narrow 
Bankr. N.D. Ga. In re Akinpelu, 530 B.R. 822 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
2015) 
Narrow 
 
